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Abstract 
The prevalence of settlements in class and derivative litigation challenging mergers and 
acquisitions in which the only payment is to plaintiffs’ attorneys suggests potential 
systemic dysfunction arising from the increased frequency of parallel litigation in 
multiple state courts.  After examining possible explanations for that dysfunction, and the 
historical development of doctrines limiting parallel state court litigation—the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens and the “first-filed” doctrine—this article suggests that those 
doctrines should be revised to better address shareholder class and derivative litigation.  
Revisions to the doctrine of forum non conveniens should continue the historical trend, 
deemphasizing fortuitous and increasingly irrelevant geographic considerations, and 
should place greater emphasis on voluntary choice of law and the development of 
precedential guidance by the courts of the state responsible for supplying the chosen law. 
The “first-filed” rule should be replaced in shareholder representative litigation by 
meaningful consideration of affected parties’ interests and judicial efficiency. 
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Introduction1 
Recent commentary has noted and examined the proliferation of suits brought by 
stockholders in multiple forums essentially simultaneously, either derivatively on behalf 
of a corporation or directly on behalf of its stockholders as a class, alleging wrongful 
action or inaction by the corporation’s board of directors, often regarding a transaction 
such as a merger.2 In such litigation, the law’s role as a facilitator of market exchange 
requires that the legal system supply a single authoritative answer to the central 
question—whether the directors complied with their legal and equitable duties.  As we 
explain below, however, the possibility of multiple answers to that question, from 
multiple courts, adversely affects the interests of the stockholders whom corporate 
representative litigation is supposed to benefit.  And as we also explain below, outdated 
                                                 
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge assistance from a variety of sources.  Jennifer Broder, Samantha 
Lipton, Ian Nussbaum, and Nicholas Walter all provided invaluable research assistance and editing.  Jeffrey 
Gorris of Bouchard Margules & Friedlander, P.A., supplied excellent and constructive substantive criticism 
at every stage of drafting.  The authors also thank Brian Frawley, Koji Fukumura, Steven Haas, John 
Hardiman, the honorable J. Travis Laster, Mark Lebovitch, Ed Micheletti, Ted Mirvis, Norm Monhait, 
Andrew Pincus, Paul Rowe, Bill Savitt, Jim Smith, Pam Tikellis, John Tumilty, and Jessica Zeldin for their 
thoughtful comments.  The views expressed herein, of course, are solely those of the authors as individuals.   
2 See, e.g., John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345 (2012); John Armour et al., Is 
Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=1578404; Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness Parker, Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation: Who 
Caused This Problem, and Can It Be Fixed?, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2012); Theodore Mirvis, Anywhere But 
Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and Suggests Some Solutions, 7 M&A J. 17 (May 2007); Andrew 
J. Pincus, The Trial Lawyers’ New Merger Tax, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (Oct. 2012); 
Brian J.M. Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137 (2011); Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative 
Shareholder Suits and its Application to Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation, NW. U.L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2024508; Sara Lewis, Note, 
Transforming the “Anywhere but Chancery” Problem into the “Nowhere but Chancery” Solution, 14 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 199 (2008); Verity Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Jurisdiction,  Illinois 
Public Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series No. 11-21, available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2046552 ; Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State 
Competition and Litigation (Jan. 16, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1984758; Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger 
Litigation (Oct. 1, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2155809. 
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and inappropriate application of forum selection doctrines in multi-forum corporate 
litigation contributes to that effect.  This article therefore examines those doctrines and 
urges that they be revisited and revised to better serve the interests of stockholders.       
The structure of American federalism raises two basic questions when disputes 
cross state boundaries: first, which courts may exercise jurisdiction; and second, which 
state’s law should apply.  How our system developed to cope with those questions is well 
known:  in the nineteenth century, questions of personal jurisdiction and choice of law 
were answered through doctrines that relied upon rigid geographical boundaries, which 
limited the exercise of jurisdiction and the choice of applicable law to a state’s borders.  
During the first half of the twentieth century, this system changed into a more flexible 
arrangement where courts were permitted to exercise jurisdiction over defendants 
domiciled outside of their states, so long as those defendants had certain contacts with the 
forum.  As the ability to exercise jurisdiction expanded, so did the possibility of multi-
forum litigation.   
Amplifying the multi-forum litigation problem was the increasing use of 
representative actions over the same period of time, and not just in the context of 
corporate litigation.  Often motivated by a desire to secure a role in litigation that will 
justify their share in potential fee awards, plaintiffs’ lawyers often bring parallel actions 
against the same defendant in multiple jurisdictions, hoping to become the lead plaintiffs’ 
attorney, but if not, working with the other plaintiffs’ attorneys to participate in a 
settlement by virtue of it having filed suit in another jurisdiction that made the merger 
litigation difficult to consolidate or cheaper to settle than litigate.  For federal litigation, 
the Multi District Litigation Panel emerged as a means to collect parallel actions into a 
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single proceeding.3  Without a similar comprehensive mechanism at the state level, courts 
must rely on discretionary doctrines, such as the first filed rule and forum non conveniens, 
to determine which action should proceed.  As we explain more fully below, those 
doctrines are out-dated and often unprincipled tools for addressing the modern multi-
forum litigation problem, and they fail to provide what commercial actors need most: a 
single, predictable, authoritative answer that resolves their dispute and can guide future 
transactions.   
Our central claim is that judicial doctrines typically relied upon to sort out 
competing jurisdictional claims—the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the first-filed 
rule—developed in ways that have not adequately accounted for the nature of 
representative litigation or the importance to the market of the consistent development of 
the law governing private commercial relationships.  Although the potential for multi-
forum litigation has existed since the beginning of our federal system, a unique 
combination of factors has now rendered that potential an ever-present reality in 
contemporary corporate practice, with resulting negative consequences for those whom 
representative litigation is supposed to benefit.   
To remedy this problem, we advocate a doctrinal presumption that would better 
calibrate the connection between legal institutions and the economic relationships they 
are meant to support.  Specifically, we argue that where lawsuits are filed 
                                                 
3 28 U.S.C. §1407(a) (2006) (“When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are 
pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated 
pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the [U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation] 
upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and 
witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.”  See also Quinn, supra note 2, at 
161 n.100, (citing John C. Heyburn, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2225, 
2227-28 (2002) (discussing how the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation decides to transfer cases)); 
Daniel A. Richards, Note, An Analysis of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation’s Selection of 
Transferee District and Judge, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 311 (2009) (presenting an empirical study of transfer 
orders under the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation).  
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contemporaneously in parallel forums, the courts should give effect to the parties’ 
expressed choice of the law that is to govern their relationship— in the corporate context, 
the law of the chosen state of incorporation—by applying a rebuttable presumption that 
the litigation should proceed in the courts of that state.  Our proposed presumption de-
emphasizes the role that a defendant’s physical contacts with a given location plays in 
determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction is proper, and continues the historical 
trend toward emphasizing the parties’ meaningful relationship to the forum rather than 
geographical boundaries of incidental or unrelated activity. 
The proposed presumption furthers several important values.  First, giving the 
parties’ choice of law greater importance in evaluating choice of forum promotes the 
consistent application of relevant doctrine, by allowing the courts that are authoritative in 
that law to adjudicate the case.   That, in turn, promotes the growth of precedent to guide 
future transactions.  Fostering that consistency and growth is the primary public interest 
implicated in corporate and contract cases, because consistency and predictability 
contribute to wealth creation.4  Undermining that consistency and growth denies 
investors and other economic actors the most legitimate and definitive source of a ruling.   
                                                 
4 In order to allow shareholders to contract efficiently, and lower the cost at which they make their capital 
available, corporate law strives to be predictable.  The concept of fiduciary obligations is fundamental to 
the corporate form and increases ambiguity in corporate law, but only insofar as the uncertainty costs 
arising from the application of the concept are outweighed by the added efficiency that results from giving 
investors confidence that their capital will be protected. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 92 (1991) (fiduciary principles “preserve the 
gains resulting from the separation of management from risk bearing while limiting the ability of managers 
to give priority to their own interests over those of investors”); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory 
Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1593-97 (1989) (discussing how fiduciary duties in 
ex post decisionmaking protect investors); Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Private 
Benefits of Control 36 (Yale Law & Economics Research Paper, Nov. 29, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2182781 (describing the value of fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders as 
promoting commitment by controllers not to extract excessive private benefits of control, and asserting that 
“the more experienced and expert the reviewing court, the more accurate is judicial review, and the more 
effective, for both the controllers and the minority shareholders, is the controllers’ capacity to commit”). 
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Second, our proposed presumption enhances judicial accountability.  Allowing a 
court to decide a case governed by another state’s law deprives the highest court of the 
state whose law is at stake of the chance to issue an authoritative ruling.  If the courts of 
the state whose law is at stake cannot speak, they cannot be held accountable for the 
law’s development.  In some cases, compelling circumstances relating to other parties’ 
interests or some supervening public interest may justify that deprivation, but systematic 
deprivation carries with it systemic costs:  it diminishes the chance for appellate courts to 
weave a definitive and consistent tapestry out of their state’s laws, and increases the 
possibility of unpredictability in the law’s application.  
Third, giving the courts of the state of incorporation more authority will help them 
ensure that corporate representative litigation better serves the interests of stockholders.  
There is strong evidence of excess agency costs in the results of recent corporate 
representative litigation.5  Unless a consistent incentive system can be implemented that 
encourages representative litigation that benefits stockholders, the representative 
litigation system may on balance hurt investors more than it protects them.   As federal 
experience shows, implementing such a system is difficult even when there is only one 
sovereign.  When a state attempts to create a sensible corporate representative litigation 
system, comity and common sense suggest that its courts should be given at least 
presumptive primacy when a forum dispute arises, so that the state’s policies regarding 
the representative litigation system can be consistently enforced.  This will allow those 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Robert M. Daines & Olga Koumrian, Recent Developments in Shareholder Litigation Involving 
Mergers and Acquisitions, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 3 (Mar. 2012), http://www.cornerstone.com/files/ 
Publication/2af469a2-f24a-4435-96c0-a36d24a541ae/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/876cdfd2-d105-
408e-aee0-a37fe880c07a/Cornerstone_Research_Shareholder_MandA_Litigation_03_2012.pdf (providing 
data on shareholder lawsuits); Griffith & Lahav, supra note 2, at 32-43; Pincus, supra note 2, at 2-7; 
Thomas & Thompson, supra note 2, at 17-20. 
6 
 
courts to select the plaintiffs best able to represent stockholders with fidelity, weed out 
non-meritorious cases, and focus more attention on meritorious cases by setting 
incentives for class counsel that reward achievements for stockholders and do not 
encourage settlements without benefits for them.6 
Fourth, our proposed presumption will tend to lighten overburdened dockets 
because scarce judicial resources will not as frequently be inefficiently allocated to the 
application of foreign states’ laws.  A lack of resources is a consistent refrain among 
American jurists.  In an environment where fiscal retrenchment is commonplace, why 
should courts voluntarily undertake to learn and parse another state’s laws, a task that can 
be more efficiently accomplished by the courts of the state whose law is at stake?  Rather, 
by concentrating on disputes governed by their own states’ law and presumptively 
declining to exercise jurisdiction to determine controversies governed by other states’ 
laws, courts will be able to resolve disputes and craft valuable precedent as efficiently as 
possible while also usefully refining the law of their home state.   
Finally, our proposed presumption mitigates a legitimacy problem that the current 
system generates.  There is a presumption in some cases (involving a tort victim, for 
example) that the plaintiff’s choice of forum is legitimate and deserves some degree of 
deference, at least where the forum is the plaintiff’s home state and the injury occurred 
there.7  There is no basis for such deference in the representative context, however, when 
                                                 
6 As it stands now, forum shopping undermines a judge’s ability to regulate these incentives because filing 
in multiple jurisdictions forces parties into premature settlements and other perverse outcomes.  See infra 
note 54 and accompanying text. 
7 State courts have refused to dismiss causes of action brought by resident plaintiffs despite the availability 
of more convenient forums primarily due to concerns for the welfare of their residents and because those 
residents pay to maintain the courts.  See Douglas v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 
387 (1929) (upholding a New York statute that permitted courts to dismiss actions brought by non-residents 
but not by residents under the doctrine of forum non conveniens because “[t]here are manifest reasons for 
preferring residents in access to often overcrowded Courts, both in convenience and in the fact that broadly 
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a single plaintiff purports to choose the appropriate forum for an entire class of 
stockholders, the majority of whom invariably are not residents of the forum in which the 
suit is brought.  And, that lack of legitimacy is especially acute when the named plaintiff 
files suit in a state in which she does not reside.  In those situations, there is no reason to 
give any weight to the plaintiff’s choice of forum—there is no “convenience” to be 
preserved or vulnerable interest of the plaintiff to be protected—and therefore, the suit 
should presumptively be heard in the courts of the state whose law was chosen by the 
stockholders at the outset, before litigation emerged, to govern the relationships in 
question.   
Our proposed presumption has two principal corollaries that would refine existing 
conflict of laws doctrine.  First, reliance on chronological precedence of filing—the so-
called “first filed rule”—should be eliminated, as such, in representative shareholder 
actions.  The first-filed rule may work tolerably well as a “tie-breaker” when a judge has 
to choose between two substantially similar cases filed in the same forum, and when the 
contending plaintiffs are similarly equipped to represent the class effectively.  But, when 
                                                                                                                                                 
speaking it is they who pay for maintaining the Courts concerned”); Thomson v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 66 Cal.2d 
738, 742-43 (Cal. 1967) (reversing a dismissal of a resident’s breach of contract cause of action based on a 
“state policy that California residents ought to be able to obtain redress for grievances in California courts, 
which are maintained by the state for their benefit” and concerns for “the welfare of California residents”); 
Chapman v. S. Ry. Co., 230 S.C. 210, 215 (1956) (refusing to dismiss a case for wrongful death brought by 
a resident and noting that “[t]he conclusion is inescapable that when a resident of this state sues a foreign 
corporation upon a transitory cause of action, where such corporation is doing business in this state, it 
would not be consistent with sound public policy to deny such resident access to the courts of this state for 
the adjudication of his rights”); Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560, 570-71 (Tex. 1999) (relying on 
Douglas and noting that a state statute that discriminates on the basis of residence in applying the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause).  This policy also reflects a 
concern that dismissing a resident’s claim could leave a plaintiff “without a forum to litigate his claim” if 
other states dismiss the action under forum non conveniens too.  See Comment, Forum Non Conveniens, 
Injunctions Against Suit and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 740, 744-45 (1962); accord 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 cmt. c (1971) (“[S]ince it is for the plaintiff to choose 
the place of suit, his choice of a forum should not be disturbed except for weighty reasons . . . .”).  Section 
84 provides that a court will not exercise jurisdiction if a forum is “seriously inconvenient” and a “more 
appropriate forum is available.” The Restatement notes that, typically, one appropriate forum will be “the 
state where the occurrence took place,” and another will be “the state of the plaintiff’s domicil.” Id. cmt. f. 
Very often, of course, these two forums will be the same.  
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the first-filed rule is used by different judges to determine which forum should retain 
control of a case, the rule becomes a mechanism by which judges avoid making a 
considered decision on which is the proper forum for a case, and it becomes an arbitrary 
method of resolving the matter.  By contrast, we argue that first-filed status should never 
be considered independently important in shareholder actions filed in multiple 
jurisdictions, and that staying an action on the basis of the first-filed rule is justifiable 
only where the second-filed action is an attempt to undo or circumvent significant 
progress already made in the first-filed proceeding, or presents some similarly substantial 
threat of inefficiency.   
Second, the factors considered in the traditional forum non conveniens analysis 
should be given weight based on a more coherent consideration of their policy relevance.  
Although a state’s interest in interpreting its own laws is a commonly enumerated factor 
in current forum non conveniens analysis, it is only one consideration among several 
equally-weighted concerns.  Our proposed presumption would change that relationship in 
the context of parallel representative shareholder actions that are contemporaneously filed.  
Rather than simply being one factor among many, it would give greater weight to the 
represented shareholders’ choice of law when determining whether a given forum is 
appropriate in a parallel litigation situation.  Similarly, our proposed presumption would 
modify existing doctrine governing litigation involving a corporation’s internal affairs by 
elevating the voluntary choice of governing law to primary significance, and reducing 
emphasis on what we submit (as discussed below) are largely irrelevant geographic 
considerations.  In particular, it would modify § 313 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws, which provides that “[a] court will exercise jurisdiction over an action 
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involving the internal affairs of a foreign corporation unless it is an inappropriate or an 
inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.”8 
Our analysis proceeds as follows: in Part I, we briefly review the problem of 
competing forums, particularly in shareholder class and derivative actions.  In Parts II 
and III, we outline the history of the procedural and substantive rules that produced the 
current doctrinal structure governing multi-forum litigation.  Part II recounts the 
expansion of personal jurisdiction doctrine and the increasing use of representative 
litigation, while Part III describes the development of the doctrines (forum non 
conveniens and the first-filed rule) that ostensibly address the potential for multi-forum 
litigation engendered by that expansion.  Part IV inventories the pathologies that have 
arisen under the current doctrinal structure, and Part V outlines our suggested reforms. 
I. The Problem of Multi-Forum Litigation in Shareholder Class and Derivative 
Actions 
In recent years, shareholder class actions challenging mergers and acquisitions 
have become more prevalent, and so have instances in which litigation of this sort has 
been brought more or less concurrently in multiple forums.9  In 2010 and 2011, 91% of 
all deals worth over $100 million were litigated, and these deals were targeted with an 
                                                 
8 See infra Part V.B.3. 
9 There is no indication that this increase is attributable to deterioration in the conduct of directors.  To the 
contrary, and as one of us has pointed out elsewhere, many objective factors should make suits attacking 
corporate M&A transactions less, not more, common now.  These include: (i) improved disclosure of 
information required by previous judicial decisions and the SEC; (ii) the supremacy of independent 
directors populating most public company boards; and (iii) the decline in structural takeover defenses and 
the active marketing of many companies by their boards. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Anton Philips Oration at the 
Anton Philips Fund Center for Company Law: The Logical, But Often Overlooked, Consequences of 
Corporate Governance Reform and Prior Judicial Decisions for Current Corporate Law Litigation 16-21 
(Nov. 4, 2011) (discussing all three factors); see also In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holder Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 
449 (Del. Ch. 2002) (discussing standards of disclosure); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc., S’holders Litig., 924 
A.2d 171, 204 (Del. Ch. 2007) (same). 
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average of 5.1 lawsuits each.10  But of these lawsuits, only 5% resulted in a payout to 
shareholders.11  84% of the settlements resulted only in new disclosures to 
shareholders.12  The lawyers, on the other hand, did well, reaping an average reported fee 
of $1.2 million per settlement.13  By contrast, in 2005, only 39% of deals worth over 
$100 million were litigated.14  And, settlements that confer no financial benefit on the 
class have historically been far less common than they are now.  In 1999 to 2000, 52% of 
suits filed on behalf of shareholders produced a financial benefit for the class, and only 
10% of settlements were “disclosure-only.”15  These trends coincide with an increase in 
the frequency of multi-forum litigation:  multi-forum litigation occurred in 46.5% of 
litigated deals in 2010, compared to 8.6% in 2005.16 
 The choice of forum in shareholder representative actions is driven almost 
entirely by tactical considerations of plaintiffs’ counsel: it is not at all novel to point out 
that “the plaintiffs’ lawyer typically has a greater economic stake in the litigation than the 
individual representative shareholder, so that litigation agency costs may ensue.”17  And in 
relation to multi-forum litigation, the choice of plaintiffs’ counsel to file “cases in an effort to 
obtain a slice of the attorney fees awarded in those representative litigation cases that settle ... 
is a way that these lawyers attempt to derive economic rents by manipulating the 
                                                 
10 Pincus, supra note 2, at 3 (citing Daines & Koumrian, supra note 5). 
11 Daines & Koumrian, supra note 5, at 11. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 12.  This figure may be distorted by very high payouts in a small number of cases. Id. 
14 Pincus, supra note 2, at 2; Daines & Koumrian, supra note 5. 
15 Id. (citing Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: 
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133 (2004)). 
16 Cain & Davidoff, supra note 2, at 13-14. 
17 Thomas & Thompson, supra note 2, at 4.  See also Quinn, supra note 2, at 152-54; John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Understanding The Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications Of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of 
Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 685 (1986) (describing “a serious 
principal-agent problem that gives the plaintiff's attorney, not the client, the real discretion as to whether to 
commence suit,” and noting that “[t]his is the likely situation in class and derivative actions where the 
number of clients is large and the individual injuries small”). 
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jurisdictional and venue rules in which litigation occurs, rather than by adding value through 
their litigation efforts.”18 
Consistent with the view of forum choice as lawyer-driven, the increasing frequency 
of multi-forum shareholder representative litigation coincides with, and may be explained by, 
two shifting dynamics in the plaintiffs’ class action bar.  The first such shift stemmed from 
federal legislation.  The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)19 was 
enacted to check “perceived abuses of the class-action vehicle in litigation involving 
nationally traded securities.”20  But, the PSLRA erected barriers only to securities class 
actions filed in federal court,21 and the plaintiffs’ bar responded by litigating such actions in 
state court instead.22  In an attempt to avoid circumvention of the barriers imposed by the 
PSLRA, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), 
which prevented plaintiffs from bringing securities actions under state law,23 and made 
federal securities claims brought in state court removable to federal court.24  To the extent 
that PSLRA and SLUSA cut down on securities class actions, plaintiffs’ lawyers who had 
pursued multi-forum securities class actions—particularly lawyers in smaller firms lacking 
the resources to prosecute class actions under the new securities law regime—chose instead 
to bring cases invoking state corporate law claims,25 claims which SLUSA explicitly 
                                                 
18 Thomas & Thompson, supra note 2, at 7; see also Quinn, supra note 2, at 152 (“A plaintiff’s litigation 
strategy based on bringing state claims outside the state of incorporation may be unnecessarily costly to 
shareholders who ultimately must directly or indirectly pay the costs of settlement.”). 
19  Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
20 Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006). The House Conference 
Report accompanying the PSLRA found that “nuisance filings, targeting of deep-pocket defendants, 
vexatious discovery requests, and ‘manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom they 
purportedly represent’ had become rampant.” Id. (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995)). 
21 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(1) (2006) (“The provisions of [the requirements added by PSLRA] shall apply to 
each private action arising under this sub-chapter that is brought as a plaintiff class action pursuant to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
22 Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82. 
23 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), 78bb(f)(1) (2006). 
24 Id. §§ 77p, 78bb(f). 
25  See Brian Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 
2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 427, 467 (“During the 2000s there was increasingly vigorous jockeying among 
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excluded from its purview.26   Congress further encouraged this trend in 2005, by enacting 
legislation (the Class Action Fairness Act, or CAFA27) to allow defendants to remove class 
actions from plaintiff-friendly state courts to federal courts.28  But CAFA, like SLUSA, 
exempted claims “that relate[] to the internal affairs or governance of corporations.”29  Thus, 
after CAFA, plaintiffs’ firms seeking to file class actions in state court were even more 
encouraged to concentrate on state corporate cases.30   
The second dynamic shift was the fragmentation of the securities class action bar.  
Although the PSLRA concentrated securities class actions in the hands of large plaintiffs’ 
firms in the near term,31 the shareholder plaintiffs’ class action bar became increasingly 
fragmented, especially after 2005, as new entrants and other events reduced the size and 
influence of larger and more established firms.32  In short, especially after 2005, there were 
more plaintiffs’ class action firms with greater incentives to pursue representative 
shareholder litigation asserting state corporate law claims in multiple state courts. 
                                                                                                                                                 
law firms who brought securities class actions for the lead counsel role. Various firms that were pushed out 
of securities class actions, especially smaller firms, responded by gravitating to corporate suits.”); Howard 
M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 1604 (2008) (noting that 
the increased expense of filing a securities class action after the PSLRA was enacted benefited the larger 
firms); Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 349, 384 (2011) 
(“M&A objection class actions have replaced traditional stock drop cases as the lawsuit of choice for 
plaintiffs’ securities lawyers.”). 
26 15 U.S.C. §§ 77bb(f)(3)(A)(ii), 77p(d)(1)(B) (2006). 
27 Pub. L. No. 109‐2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
28 Pub. L. No. 109‐2, § 2(b) (congressional statement of purpose); see Emery G. Lee & Thomas E. Willging, 
The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and 
Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1733 (2008) (discussing CAFA’s purpose). But see Stephen B. 
Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1924, 1924 (2006) (calling CAFA’s congressional statement of purpose “bullshit”).  
29 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(9)(B) (2006). 
30 See S. REP. NO. 109-14 (2005) (“True to the concept of federalism, [CAFA] appropriately leaves certain 
‘intrastate’ class actions in state court: cases involving small amounts in controversy; cases with a class of 
100 plaintiffs or less; cases involving plaintiffs, defendants and governing law all from the same state; 
cases against states and state officials; and certain securities and corporate governance cases.”). 
31 One firm (New York-based Milberg Weiss) between 1995 and 2003 was lead counsel or co-lead counsel 
in over 50% of securities class actions. Erichson, supra note 25, at 1603-04 (2008). 
32 Cheffins et al., supra note 25, at 467-69 (discussing Milberg Weiss’s break-up and subsequent 
indictment); James P. McDonald, Note, Milberg’s Monopoly: Restoring Honesty and Competition to the 
Plaintiff’s Bar, 58 DUKE L.J. 507, 532-33 (2008) (discussing Milberg Weiss’s dominance of the market). 
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The PSLRA may have had another unintended consequence.  Perceiving that too 
many representative suits were brought by repeat individual plaintiffs with trivial ownership 
stakes and questionable motives to serve faithfully the interests of the investors they 
supposedly represented, Congress tried to create incentives for institutional investors to act as 
lead plaintiffs.33  The vision was that institutions, as well-motivated fiduciaries, would only 
sue when the suit had real merit and when a genuine investor would favor prosecution.34  
Indeed, some envisioned that institutions would regulate the market, discouraging nuisance 
suits and prosecuting worthy ones more aggressively to get real benefits for the class, not just 
generate legal fees.35  But mainstream investment funds, such as mutual fund complexes like 
Vanguard and Fidelity, often do not act as plaintiffs at all.  Rather, we have some reason to 
believe that a wide array of smaller, often public, pension funds have entered the market as 
frequent plaintiffs.  Their behavior seems entirely consistent with that of the individual 
plaintiffs that concerned the authors of the PSLRA.  There is cause to believe that these 
institutions often have few shares, but frequently attack third-party merger transactions 
regardless of whether any conflict of interest is involved, and propose settlements that, as we 
shall soon see, provide monetary benefits to the plaintiffs’ lawyers, not the class.36  Less 
                                                 
33 See Charles Silver & Sam Dinkin, Incentivizing Institutional Investors To Serve as Lead Plaintiffs in 
Securities Class Fraud Class Actions, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 471, 471-75 (2008).  
34 Id. 
35 This idea was suggested in Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: 
How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 
(1995). 
36 Our observations here are tentative, and this is a subject that is ripe for further research.  But, it appears 
that, at least frequently, the institutional investors that sue in mergers have small ownership stakes. E.g., In 
re Icagen, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6692-CS (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 2012) (disclosure-only claim in a 
merger worth $56 million, where co-lead plaintiffs were an individual with 18,000 shares worth $108,000, 
a fund with 7,500 shares worth $45,000, and an individual with 862 shares worth $5,172); In re Burlington 
N. Santa Fe S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 5043-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (disclosure-only claim in a 
merger valued at $44 billion with one co-lead counsel representing municipal pension fund with stake of 
3,643 shares, worth $364,300); In re Sepracor, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 4871-VCS (Del. Ch. May 21, 
2010) (disclosure-only claim in a $2.6 billion dollar merger where one co-lead plaintiff was a union 
pension fund with 3,515 shares, worth $80,000, and the other co-lead plaintiff an individual with 100 
shares, worth $23,000); IBEW Local Union 98 v. Noven Pharms. Inc., C.A. No. 4732-CC (Del. Ch. Dec. 
30, 2009) (disclosure-only claim in a $428 million merger with three union pension funds and one 
 
14 
 
debatable than their motivation is the reality that the proliferation of small institutions acting 
as repeat plaintiffs has contributed to the number of challenges filed to every announced 
transaction, the number of law firms in the market, and the incentives to use forum-shopping 
to jockey for a seat at the table.  This is not a phenomenon limited to Delaware 
corporations.  Corporations incorporated in many states now appear to suffer material 
costs in litigation over multiple jurisdictions, which results in payment of attorneys’ fees 
but no benefit for shareholders.37   
                                                                                                                                                 
individual acting as plaintiffs; the greatest stake was of 9,300 shares, worth approximately $150,000); In re 
Interwoven, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 4362-VCL (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 2009) (appointing as co-lead 
plaintiffs a pension fund with a stake of $1.6 million, and two individuals with a combined stake of $11,200; 
not appointing as a lead plaintiff a pension fund that had a stake only worth $9,000; and later approving a 
disclosure-only claim, in a $775 million deal).  The attorneys were paid in all of these suits, with the 
highest fee award being $550,000.  In none of these cases did the transaction the plaintiffs challenged get 
altered; each was approved by the stockholders at the same level of consideration as when the plaintiffs 
filed suit. 
Furthermore, the speed with which lawsuits are filed is another sign that large institutional investors 
are not regulating the market, unlike in the idealized vision of securities litigation under the PSLRA. See 
supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.  The rapidity with which many institutional investors bring suits 
suggests that, at many institutions, no actual time is spent deciding whether to sue, and that institutions 
have arrangements with certain counsel authorizing those counsel to sue within twenty-four hours of an 
announced premium-paying transaction.  See William B. Rubenstein, What We Now Know About How 
Lead Plaintiffs Select Lead Counsel (and Hence Who Gets Attorneys Fees!) in Securities Cases, 3 CLASS 
ACTION ATT’Y FEE DIG. 219, 219-20 (2009) (“[S]ome plaintiffs firms have entered into arrangements 
whereby they monitor the funds’ investments for irregularities and suggest possible grounds for litigation.”).  
The ownership stakes of many of the institutions are so low that it would arguably be an act of fiduciary 
impropriety for the institution to spend any material time on a lawsuit, because any use of staff time would 
be disproportional to the thousands of dollars the institution has invested.  All of these realities are 
symptoms of a serious agency problem.     
37 For example, in 2010, Endo Pharmaceutical agreed to purchase Penwest Pharmaceuticals, a Washington 
corporation.  The merger was attacked immediately in state and federal court in Washington and New York 
states.  Less than a month after the first lawsuit was filed, Penwest decided to enter into a global settlement 
to ensure that the merger would close, even though it stated in its SEC filings that “each of the [five] 
lawsuits is entirely without merit.”  In return for the global settlement, Penwest provided additional 
disclosures and agreed not to oppose the plaintiffs’ application for attorneys’ fees, “not to exceed $450,000.”  
Penwest Pharmaceuticals Co., Schedule 14A (Amendment No. 1 to the Proxy Statement), at 10 (Oct. 1, 
2010).  As another example, in 2009, Pulte Homes. agreed to buy Centex, a Nevada corporation.  Centex 
shareholders sued in both Nevada and Texas.  The suits were settled for $1.1 million in attorney’s fees, but 
with no recovery for the class. Rocker v. Centex Corp., 377 S.W.3d 907 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012), vacated and 
remanded by agreement of the parties.  And as yet a further example, in February 2011, Ventas, a REIT, 
agreed to purchase Nationwide Health  Properties, a Maryland corporation headquartered in California.  
Seven suits were filed against Nationwide within a month, in both California and Maryland.  They were 
eventually consolidated and settled: Ventas made supplemental disclosures, but there was no recovery for 
the class. See Ventas, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 27 (Nov. 7, 2011).  These three brief examples 
confirm that all corporations that are involved in mergers, no matter where they are chartered, are at risk of 
suffering the costs of burdensome multiforum litigation that does not deliver benefits for shareholders. 
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Despite this, Professors Thomas and Thompson tentatively conclude that multi-forum 
litigation does not “appear to generate much in the way of additional costs.”38  They do 
caution that “[t]here is more work to be done to empirically document what are the extra 
costs associated with multiple lawsuits being filed in different courts for each transaction and 
when such additional costs are material.”39  We think otherwise: multi-forum litigation does 
engender costs, and those costs are non-trivial.40  Most notably, growth in the frequency of 
deal litigation does not seem to be matched by growth in recoveries for those whose interests 
are to be represented in such litigation.  To the contrary, the recent evidence described above 
demonstrates the predominance of deal litigation settlements involving payment of attorney’s 
fees to plaintiffs’ counsel, but no payment to class members.41  We acknowledge that in some 
circumstances supplemental disclosure or other non-monetary consideration can justify a 
settlement in which plaintiffs’ counsel earns a fee,42 but the absence of any monetary 
                                                 
38 Thomas & Thompson, supra note 2, at 64. 
39 Id. n.252. 
40 A very distinguished judge who served for many years on the North Carolina Business Court seems to 
share our concerns: 
The fees paid to counsel and plaintiff are what this Court has come to regard as “stinky 
fees.”  They just smell bad and have no economic justification.  We have come to the 
point in this country that whenever a merger is announced, some lawyer with a client 
holding a small number of shares rushes to file a lawsuit containing class action 
allegations.  After minimal discovery and review by an “expert,” plaintiff requests that 
“additional information” be disclosed and agrees to go away with settlement in hand—
having done absolutely nothing for the class.  
For their part, defense lawyers, investment bankers, and the companies are willing  
to pay these fees to get the deal done, regardless of the merits. . . . 
In the future, judges should decline to approve any settlement that does not benefit 
shareholders in a material way.  Stinky fee suits may actually discourage other legitimate 
and serious claims, thus doing further damage to our system. 
 Ward v. Lance, Inc., C.A. No. 10-CVS-16553, at 1-2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2011) (ORDER). 
We believe that the growth in settlements of this nature is attributable in material measure to the perverse 
incentives caused by forum shopping, which disables the judges of the state of incorporation from fixing 
the incentive system in the manner that Judge Tennille suggests and, as importantly, increases the costs and 
uncertainty of litigation to defendants in a manner that makes “stinky” settlements more rational than 
moving to dismiss or otherwise fighting a meritless case. 
41 See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text. 
42 E.g., Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1165 (Del. 1989) (“[A corporate benefit 
justifying a fee award] need not be measurable in economic terms.  Changes in corporate policy or, as here, 
a heightened level of corporate disclosure, if attributable to the filing of a meritorious suit, may justify an 
award of counsel fees.”); In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 2011 WL 2519210, at *18, 21, Appx. 
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consideration in 84% of deal litigation settlements, together with the increase in the volume 
of such litigation, suggests that less salutary considerations may be at work, and that there is 
a systemic failure endangering the ability of representative shareholder litigation to produce 
net benefits to investors.43 
 Perhaps, because these statistics confirm what many practitioners and judges already 
knew, we have dulled ourselves to clear evidence of a problem.  So we underscore the lesson 
conveyed by the data.  In these cases, plaintiffs, claiming to be representatives of all 
stockholders, settled cases attacking the fairness of a proposed transaction.  Yet 84% of the 
time in the deals attacked in 2011, the stockholders got the same consideration the plaintiffs 
challenged as unfair, with only some additional disclosures of information.44  Another 11% 
of the time, the stockholders got almost the same deal, with some “irrelevant and immaterial” 
terms changed.45  Only 5% of the time did the stockholders receive an increased payout.  But 
100% of the time, the plaintiffs’ lawyers got fees.  Would any bona fide stockholder find this 
useful?  By analogy, it is difficult to imagine that it would be acceptable for 84% of 
medical malpractice suits to be settled with plaintiffs’ lawyers succeeding in obtaining 
only additional information about what the physician did wrong, but not getting a 
monetary award for their clients and still getting a fee for their victory.46  Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                                                 
A-C (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2011) (comparing “meaningful” and “exceptional” disclosures, which merit 
substantial fees, with disclosures “of questionable quality”); 1-9 DONALD J. WOLFE, JR. & MICHAEL A. 
PITTENGER, CORPORATE & COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY § 9.05[c] 
(updated 2012) (reviewing examples of non-monetary benefits giving rise to fee awards).  
43 See, e.g., Thompson & Thomas, supra note 15, at 152-55 (identifying “common indicia of litigation 
agency costs” to include suits being settled “quickly for small amounts,” and “multiple lawsuits being filed 
against the company for the same alleged wrongdoing”). 
44 Pincus, supra note 2 (citing Cain & Davidoff, supra note 2). 
45 Id. 
46 This analogy may not be apt where supplemental disclosure is genuinely material to further stockholder 
deliberation and voting. See Sauer-Danfoss, 2011 WL 2519210, Appx. C (identifying fee awards based on 
“particularly significant or exceptional disclosures”).  But in too many cases in which disclosure is 
“minimally beneficial,” the analogy is sound. Id. at 19.  As noted, the rise of supermajorities of independent 
directors on boards, the decline in structural takeover defenses, and the improvement in disclosures all 
suggest that litigation over M&A transactions should have become rarer, not more frequent. See Strine, 
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this continues to happen in the corporate law context, and what happens is that the cost of 
capital for American corporations goes up, lawyers get paid, and stockholders suffer drag.  
 And indeed, there are a number of ways in which the prevalence of multi-forum 
litigation and the inability or unwillingness of courts to limit the effects of such litigation can 
exacerbate inefficiencies and “race to the bottom”-type behavior in the handling of 
representative corporate litigation.  Such effects, in turn, predictably increase the deadweight 
costs of such litigation.  We outline below several illustrative scenarios in which these effects 
might plausibly occur, and these scenarios are not at all hypothetical—they describe 
circumstances we have observed, and experienced practitioners in the deal litigation field 
confirm that they reflect situations they have encountered:47   
• Unnecessary expedited proceedings in weak cases.  Shareholder class actions are 
brought in multiple forums (including the state of incorporation), asserting a claim of 
breach of fiduciary duty based on an alleged failure to satisfy fiduciary obligations 
associated with the sale of the company by a board with a supermajority of 
independent directors; the challenged transaction is at arms’ length; deal protection 
devices are standard, and no other bidder has surfaced; and claims of failure to 
disclose material information are strained at best.  Based on their familiarity with 
cases of this sort, the defendants in the case in the court in the state of incorporation 
would be inclined to oppose plaintiffs’ request for expedited proceedings, and the 
court would be inclined to deny that request.  Because of the pendency of essentially 
identical proceedings in the other forum, however, and in the absence of reasonable 
                                                                                                                                                 
supra note 9, at 16-22.  Another reality underscores this point: in almost every disclosure-only case, the 
disclosures the plaintiffs obtain do not change the result, and the transaction the plaintiffs challenged is 
supported by the electorate (including the plaintiffs) in unaltered form. 
47 We have consulted a wide range of experienced practitioners and corporate law scholars and considered a 
wide variety of actual corporate representative cases.   Those consultations and that evidence convince us 
that the general scenarios that we outline here are in fact common results of filing cases involving a single 
corporate transaction or decision in multiple forums.   
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certainty that the court in that other forum would abstain from exercising jurisdiction, 
the defendants have little practical choice but to agree to and actively support 
expedition.  For example, in Stourbridge Investments LLC v. Bersoff, the court denied 
a motion to expedite proceedings, supported by defendants, where defendants’ 
counsel had candidly explained, “the Virginia action certainly changed the way we 
viewed the Delaware action. . . .  We weren’t confident we could successfully oppose 
expedition in both jurisdictions, so we agreed to not oppose in Delaware and have 
moved to stay in Virginia based upon the pendency of the Delaware case.” 48  Denials 
of motions to expedite in non-meritorious cases have not stopped plaintiffs’ lawyers 
from seeking out other jurisdictions to bring their claims,49 and, likewise, do not 
                                                 
48 Tr. of Oral Arg., Stourbridge Invs. LLC v. Bersoff, C.A. No. 7300-VCL, at *4-5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 13, 
2012).  
49 In a striking example from October 2011, a distinguished plaintiffs’ firm litigated the Medco/Express 
Scripts merger in federal court in New Jersey, after seeking expedited treatment in that jurisdiction.  A 
second distinguished plaintiffs’ firm wanted the case to go ahead in Delaware, where the companies were 
incorporated. See Tr. of Scheduling Conf., In re Medco Health Solutions, Inc., S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 
6720-CS (consol.) (Oct. 21, 2011).  Ten days later, there was a role reversal.  In litigation relating to the El 
Paso/Kinder Morgan merger (again two Delaware corporations), the first firm now sought to litigate the 
case in Delaware, whereas the second firm sought to litigate outside Delaware, in Texas. See Tr. of Status 
Conf., Kahn v. Foshee, C.A. No. 6949-CS (Oct. 31, 2011).   
Many commentators suspect that the Delaware courts’ expertise in identifying weak cases, and 
weeding them out quickly, has contributed in part to the current dysfunctional dynamic by encouraging 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring weak suits in which the only real goal is a quick settlement for fees elsewhere. 
See Micheletti & Parker, supra note 2, at 6; Mirvis, supra note 2, at 17.  Moreover, there are other factors 
that affect where plaintiffs file that these judicial tools cannot address, such as jurisdictions that offer 
discovery on motions to dismiss. Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 2, at 1377-80.  So to 
the extent that such multi-forum litigation continues to occur, simply cutting fees, denying motions to 
expedite, and granting motions to dismiss claims are likely to have little impact on the current problems.  
See John C. Coffee, Foreword: The Delaware Court of Chancery: Change, Continuity—and Competition, 
2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 387, 390 (“Discouraging litigation in Delaware (even non-meritorious litigation) 
only increases the migration of cases out of Delaware.”).  The data on attorneys’ fee awards in stockholder 
representative litigation show that it is not the case that Delaware judges are reluctant to award fees in 
meritorious cases.  In the nine years since the Delaware Court of Chancery began a system of electronic 
filing, the court has awarded $780 million in attorneys’ fees and expenses.  Even setting aside the $300 
million fee award in the Southern Peru case, which was made in response to a recovery to the class of 
shareholders of over $2 billion, the Court of Chancery has awarded $475 million in fees and expenses over 
the past nine years.  Fee awards of over $5 million were issued in 27 cases in that period, and awards of 
over $10 million on 11 occasions.  Thus, the inability to get a substantial fee from a Delaware court for 
generating a substantive benefit for stockholders is not a plausible explanation.  See Register in Chancery 
Court of Delaware, Data on Fee and Expense Awards (updated Nov. 20, 2012); see also In re S. Peru 
Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761 (Del. Ch. 2011), aff’d, Ams. Min. Corp. v. Theriault, 
51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012).  
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necessarily induce other courts to follow suit.50  Rather, filings by multiple plaintiffs’ 
law firms in multiple forums can be viewed as cooperative, as well as competitive, 
because the resulting additional defense costs and uncertainties about which court 
will hear the case, and how it will decide it, increase the pressure on defendants 
interested in global resolution of litigation to pay larger overall attorneys’ fees 
than might be paid if litigation were confined to a single forum.  The issue is not 
trivial because significant costs of discovery and disruption result from the choice to 
pursue expedited motions in parallel litigation, in the form of litigation expense that 
would otherwise be avoided.  In a world in which settlements of these cases involve 
only payment of attorney’s fees and not additional payments to stockholders, the 
corporations involved in the merger, and therefore their investors, bear those costs.  
Thus, those costs contribute to an increase in the cost of capital, and a net negative 
societal impact. 
• Quick Settlements That Monetarily Benefit Only Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, Not 
Stockholders.  Shareholder class claims are filed in multiple jurisdictions 
asserting claims for breach of fiduciary, typically invoking the duties owed by 
directors under cases like Lynch51 and Revlon.52  The defendants and their counsel 
have no certainty that every forum will stay or dismiss the case in favor of the 
courts of the state of incorporation.   The defendants and their counsel also have 
                                                 
50 We do not claim that courts outside the state of incorporation invariably refuse to dismiss deal challenges, 
or always grant motions for expedited proceedings in such cases.  See, e.g., In re Blackboard, Inc. S’holder 
Litig., 2011 CA 005465 B (D.C. Super. May 23, 2012) (dismissing class action after having rejected a 
motion to expedite).  We also acknowledge that judges often defer to the jurisdiction whose laws are at 
stake.   See infra notes 179 and 231.  But some judges do not, a circumstance that creates incentives for 
forum shopping.. 
51 Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) (requiring the application of the entire 
fairness doctrine to a merger with a controlling stockholder). 
52 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (requiring the directors 
to undertake reasonable efforts to secure the highest price when selling the company). 
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limited familiarity with how the courts of the other states handle corporate law 
matters, because those courts rarely do.  Faced with this situation and the certainty 
of litigation costs and some degree of deal risk simply because of this inefficient 
and uncertain litigation context, the defendants have a rational incentive to settle 
the case early and cheaply if that will enable the deal to be completed as proposed 
and end the litigation. 53  Indeed, if the defendants believe that the transaction is 
good for stockholders, as they should if they are directors recommending the 
transaction, then settling cases that are an obstacle to the transaction in a cost-
effective way is a proper fiduciary act.  The defendants thus are willing to settle 
the case by disclosing more information about the transaction and accepting the 
cost of paying attorneys’ fees to the plaintiffs’ lawyers, especially if that can be 
done in a way that results in all plaintiffs’ attorneys in all forums agreeing to 
stand down. 
 This dynamic leads to two worrying possibilities.  The first, which is 
exemplified by the data on settlements where only the attorneys get a monetary 
benefit, is that meritless cases are being rewarded and that investors and 
corporations are suffering an unjustifiable increase in the cost of capital as a result 
of agency cost factors exacerbated by forum shopping.  Usually, the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys file parallel actions in multiple forums challenging a pending arm’s 
length merger on the theory that the directors have failed to achieve the highest 
available value.  A court familiar with the applicable law might appreciate that the 
                                                 
53 E.g., In re Xoma Corp. Sec. Litig., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10502, *3 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 1992) (“The 
law favors settlement of cases and quieting of litigation, particularly in complex class actions and 
derivative litigation.”); Rome v. Archer, 197 A.2d 49, 53 (Del. 1964) (noting, in context of derivative suit, 
that law “favors the voluntary settlement of contested issues”); accord Denver Area Meat Cutters v. 
Clayton, 209 S.W.3d 584, 590 (Tenn. App. 2006) (same). 
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case is quite weak.  In the interest of avoiding litigation uncertainty, however, and 
given the pendency of multiple suits, the parties agree to a settlement in which no 
additional consideration is to be provided in the transaction, but that some 
additional disclosure would be provided, and that defendants would not oppose a 
fee application by plaintiffs’ counsel up to a material but limited amount, 
particularly if the plaintiffs’ lawyer negotiating the settlement can get all plaintiffs 
in all cases on board to share the fees.  Acting independently, a knowledgeable 
court might reject the settlement as illusory: because the plaintiffs have advanced 
claims that have little to no value—such as attacks on third-party merger 
transactions proceeded by a lengthy and open sales process—the additional 
disclosure supports the release, and it would seem to punish the defendants to 
force them to defend litigation of trifling utility in multiple forums by denying 
approval.54   
The second, however, is that in the wave of such repeated meritless suits, 
some good suits get missed and valuable claims are released for inadequate 
consideration.  Better plaintiffs’ lawyers may shy away from multi-forum “herd” 
cases where their more diligent and skilled approach might have generated 
information supporting more substantial relief than repeat filers happy with a 
quick disclosure only settlement.    More likely, a more diligent lawyer who sued 
might feel pressure to join the herd, when other plaintiffs’ lawyers are willing to 
settle for additional disclosures, fearing that the settlement might proceed and a 
                                                 
54 See, e.g., In re Topps Co. S’holder Litig., 924 A.2d 951, 961 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[S]tockholders want to 
have unmeritorious cases dismissed without rewarding plaintiffs’ lawyers for the simple fact that they filed 
a lawsuit.”); id. n.38 (“Absent the rational sifting out of non-meritorious cases, stockholders suffer as the 
costs of litigation exact an undue toll on the procession of transactions valuable to stockholders and cause a 
harmful diminution in wealth-generating risk-taking by directors.”). 
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release entered, without the lawyer’s participation in the resulting fee 
award.   Both possibilities are made more likely realities as a result of the perverse 
incentives created by forum disputes.55 
• Hastily prepared derivative complaints.  With derivative litigation potentially brought 
in multiple forums, plaintiffs’ counsel must consider whether to engage in extended 
investigation (including use of statutory rights to inspect corporate documents56) 
before filing a complaint, or to file as soon as possible, on the basis of sparse publicly 
available information.  Plaintiff’s counsel who opts for investigation and deliberation 
may find herself the “loser” under rules of jurisdictional priority that favor the first-
filed lawsuit.57  That counsel faces at least some risk that a poorly drafted, factually 
weak complaint in another forum may result in dismissal under rules governing pre-
suit demand on the board of directors, and that such a dismissal would be invoked 
against his more fully researched complaint, when it is eventually filed.58  A rational 
                                                 
55 There is a third, also suboptimal, possibility: where a shareholder claim is unlikely to prevail in the courts 
of the state of incorporation, plaintiffs’ counsel may be drawn to the courts of a different state in the hope 
of achieving a better result in a court less familiar with and less likely to correctly apply governing law.  
Viewed ad hoc, this possibility might be seen as beneficial to shareholders; as a systemic matter, however, 
it is suboptimal for investors as a whole because it defeats the legitimate expectations of all parties (both 
management and stockholders) with interests at stake.  It is also an intrusion, inconsistent with generally 
accepted conflict of laws principles (the internal affairs doctrine), on the authority of the state of 
incorporation to define the relationships and duties among management and stockholders. See infra notes 
222-227 and related text. 
56 See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262 n.57 (Del. 2000) (“Plaintiffs may well have the ‘tools at 
hand’ to develop the necessary facts for pleading purposes.  For example, plaintiffs may seek relevant 
books and records of the corporation under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, if they 
can ultimately bear the burden of showing a proper purpose and make specific and discrete identification, 
with rifled precision, of the documents sought.”); accord In re Quintiles Transnat’l Corp. S’holders Litig., 
2003 NCBC 11, ¶¶ 21-23 (N.C.B.C.); Kanter v. Barella, 388 F. Supp. 2d 474, 481 (D.N.J. 2005). 
57 See infra Section III.B. 
58 Courts have given preclusive effect to the dismissal of suits with poorly researched complaints despite 
the later filing of well-researched complaints.  See In re Sonus Networks, Inc., 499 F.3d 47, 53, 60 (1st Cir. 
2007) (affirming trial court’s dismissal of suit on the basis of issue preclusion despite additional facts not 
pled in first action and holding that “a party should be held to account not only for what he actually pleaded, 
but for what he could have pleaded in the earlier suit”); Henik ex rel. LaBranche & Co. v. LaBranche, 433 
F. Supp.2d 372, 380-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (giving preclusive effect to a dismissal under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23.1 based on failure adequately to plead demand futility); LeBoyer v. Greenspan, 2007 
WL 4287646, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2007) (precluding plaintiff from relitigating different claims 
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response (or really anticipation) by a plaintiff’s lawyer in these circumstances is to 
forego careful investigation and file a complaint as quickly as possible.  The 
foreseeable result is the prevalence of complaints that are most likely susceptible to 
dismissal, and, in turn, the impairment of potentially more viable derivative suits and 
the diminution of the benefits to investors of that form of litigation.  Another 
foreseeable result is the imposition on corporate defendants of the costs of addressing 
and dismissing inadequately supported derivative complaints, costs that are 
ultimately borne by investors.59 
• Improvident, accelerated lead counsel determinations or even class certification.  In 
parallel shareholder class actions, competing plaintiffs’ counsel have a powerful 
incentive to establish priority for their respective selected forums.  More particularly, 
they are strongly motivated to force as quickly as possible the decision on which 
counsel should be designated as lead counsel, who should be the lead plaintiff 
whether to certify a class, and how the class should be defined.  Ideally, such matters 
                                                                                                                                                 
regarding different time periods); In re Bed Bath & Beyond Derivative Litig., 2007 WL 4165389, at *6-7 
(D.N.J. Nov. 19, 2007) (holding that the “[f]ailure of the [earlier] plaintiff to raise the additional claims and 
issues that the Plaintiff has raised here does not justify relitigation”); Arduini ex rel. Int’l Game Tech. v. 
Hart, 2012 WL 893874, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 14, 2012) (noting that the“[p]laintiff’s arguments that he has 
allegations specific to the demand futility issue that are different from the allegations brought up in [the 
underlying proceeding do not] preclude our use of issue preclusion”); In re Career Educ. Corp. Derivative 
Litig., 2007 WL 2875203 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2007) (appeal pending) (holding that doctrine of issue 
preclusion barred plaintiffs from relitigating issues contained in a separate derivative complaint that was 
dismissed with prejudice).  This is precisely the situation addressed in Louisiana Municipal Police 
Employees’ Retirement System v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 324-51 (Del. Ch. 2012).  The ruling in that case, 
however, if widely followed, might ameliorate the concerns expressed here about this scenario:  the opinion 
adopted a presumption that the self-selected shareholder representative who commences a “fast-filed” 
derivative action is not an adequate representative and, therefore, a dismissal of her hastily filed complaint 
will not preclude prosecution of a later-filed, more forceful derivative complaint in another forum.  Id. 
59 Pyott, 46 A.3d at 338 (“When plaintiffs sue derivatively to recover damages from directors and senior 
officers for harm suffered by the corporation, the hastily filed complaints have little chance of surviving a 
Rule 23.1 motion, yet the defendant fiduciaries must respond, and the corporation must underwrite the 
costs of defense, either directly through indemnification and advancement or indirectly through 
insurance.”). 
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would be determined promptly, to be sure,60 but a plaintiff’s counsel, a court, and 
defendants interested in establishing priority for their preferred jurisdiction will want 
to press for resolution of these procedural matters, rather than linger on any difficult 
questions associated with identifying the most suitable class or derivative 
representative.  Costs of poor decision making on these matters stem directly from 
undue potential for inter-forum competition, and are borne by investors, directly or 
indirectly. 
The common thread in each of these scenarios is that uncertainty about choice of 
forum incentivizes participants in the system—plaintiffs’ lawyers, and defendants and their 
counsel—to seek or accept these outcomes.  One might look to judges to police inefficient 
litigation, but there are several possible circumstances that, operating separately or in tandem, 
might limit the judges’ effectiveness in this regard.  We feel obligated to touch on this 
delicate subject.  At the basest level, some might suggest that a judge may be motivated by 
campaign contributions from plaintiffs’ counsel,61 or by loyalty to plaintiff’s counsel who is a 
former clerk or personal friend.  We would expect such motivations to be rare, however.  
More likely is the possibility that a judge may be broadly loyal to her institutional setting—
the bar in which she practiced and which she continues to inhabit—and may wish to avoid 
disappointment and resentment that might arise from dismissing litigation that is 
remunerative to that bar.  Another possibility is that a judge may find class and derivative 
litigation intellectually and reputationally more rewarding than a more standard diet of 
                                                 
60 E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (“At an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class 
representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action.”); Bertrand 
v. Maram, 495 F.3d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 2007) (criticizing failure to rule on class certification motion before 
resolution of the merits); Prezant v. De Angelis, 636 A.2d 915, 921 (Del. 1994) (stating that Chancery 
Court Rule 23(c)(1) “appears to contemplate a determination of whether an action is properly maintainable 
as a class action at an early stage of the litigation”);  Howe v. Microsoft Corp., 656 N.W.2d 285, 291-93 
(N.D. 2003) (emphasizing importance of early resolution of class certification). 
61 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009) (invoking “objective rules” to 
determine whether a judge’s recusal was constitutionally required). 
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routine civil or criminal cases. Ultimately, however, settlements of non-meritorious claims 
disserve investors, and our nation as a whole, by raising the cost of capital.  On balance, the 
system favors plaintiffs’ counsel, by conferring additional fee awards which might not 
otherwise be justified.  The system may also favor individual defendants (primarily corporate 
directors), who may get a windfall benefit from settlements because the incentive system we 
have described means that some strong cases may settle too cheaply, with claims 
extinguished at no cost to the fiduciaries who have acted questionably.62   
Noting the competition or cooperation among plaintiffs’ lawyers filing class actions, 
Professors Griffith and Lahav have recently described the system of bringing and settling 
corporate class actions as a market process.63  Griffith and Lahav argue that plaintiffs, by 
filing in multiple states (where complaints cannot be consolidated), create a market of sellers 
who all have the power to “sell” a settlement (or a judgment) to the defendant firm.64  
Because a settlement in one state has preclusive effect on all parallel suits, defendants will 
seek to buy a settlement, and hence certainty that whatever transaction is being litigated can 
proceed.65  Griffith and Lahav believe that there are positive effects associated with the 
multi-jurisdictional filings, such as the strategic outsourcing of weak cases from the state of 
incorporation, and that problems with the current system can be fixed by greater vigilance 
from judges and communication between courts.66   
We find this conclusion impossible to reconcile with the objective facts about 
litigation outcomes for representative stockholders.  The descriptions of current multi-forum 
                                                 
62 As previously noted, most deal litigation settlements currently involve payment only of plaintiffs’ 
counsel fees, and such payment is typically made by the corporation.  WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 42, 
§9.05[g] (stating that in settlements of derivative actions in which the corporation is benefited, the 
corporation typically pays the fee awarded, and in class actions involving a “therapeutic benefit” to a class 
of stockholders, the corporation is always typically ordered to pay the fee, “seemingly for lack of a 
pragmatic alternative”).  
63 Griffith & Lahav, supra note 2. 
64 Id. at *6. 
65 Id. at *27-32. 
66 Id. at *59-71. 
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corporate litigation suggest that the extraction of economic rents and imposition of 
deadweight costs are a substantial problem.  The solution proposed by Professors Griffith and 
Lahav characterizes these rents and costs as part of a well-functioning and beneficial market 
system.67  We believe that the appropriate response is to reexamine and, if necessary, readjust 
the jurisdictional and venue rules that make these rents and costs possible.  We recognize, of 
course, that any adjustment of the governing rules will operate only at the margin, and will 
not eliminate all potential for uncertainty and all misapplication of legal rules by judges 
dealing with multi-forum competition.  We believe, however, that rules ultimately do make a 
difference, and that improving those rules to narrow the potential for inefficiencies in the 
handling of multi-forum litigation will at least reduce the costs of that litigation to the 
investors it is supposed to benefit and society as a whole.68  At a minimum, such 
improvements may reinforce the ability and willingness of judges to rein in inefficient 
shareholder representative litigation in the face of incentives to avoid such policing.69 
II. The Doctrinal Origins of the Multi-forum Litigation Problem  
A.  Overview 
 In this section, we describe in modest detail the doctrines that determine the 
appropriate forum and the applicable law in American civil litigation, with an emphasis 
on corporate disputes.  Because our argument focuses on corporate cases, our analysis 
                                                 
67 Id. at *43-50. 
68 The New York City Bar Association has suggested a federal statute that would provide that any 
challenge to a proposed transaction could only be brought “in the courts of the state of the company’s 
incorporation.” Committee on Securities Litigation, Coordinating Related Securities Litigation: A Position 
Paper, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, at *9-10 (Apr. 17, 2008), 
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Securities_Litigation_%20A.pdf.  Another solution would be to amend 
SLUSA to require that shareholder derivative actions may only be filed in the courts of the defendant 
company’s state of incorporation. See Pincus, supra note 2, at 9.  Congress could also prevent the 
multiplication of federal suits by requiring that any law suits relating to mergers or acquisitions that are 
filed in federal court should be transferred to a federal court in the state of incorporation of the target 
company, with any questions of state law then referred to that state’s own courts. See id.  
69 See supra text accompanying notes 61 and 62.   
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centers upon state courts; and, because state courts are tribunals with general jurisdiction, 
we do not discuss subject matter jurisdiction here.  Rather, we focus on personal 
jurisdiction, choice of law, and the internal affairs doctrine.     
Our description covers both the contemporary system and its nineteenth century 
precursors.  The problem of how to allocate jurisdiction over a dispute is not a new 
dilemma, but is rather a fundamental issue that originates from the unique design of the 
American federal system.  Unlike the unitary English system from which it sprang,70 the 
federal constitution adopted in 1787 raised the novel question of how to limit the various 
constituent states’ ability to exercise jurisdiction over non-citizens.71  In other words, a 
balancing issue arose: how to allocate lawsuits among the states in a way that would 
minimize costs to parties interacting across a large country, on one hand, and secure each 
state’s prerogative to adjudicate matters of legitimate local concern, on the other.  
Accompanying that issue was the related question of which state’s law applied to a 
dispute that spanned state boundaries. 
In brief, this section traces the development of jurisdictional doctrines from the 
nineteenth century’s static territorial approach to the flexible system inaugurated in the 
twentieth.  As exemplified in Pennoyer v. Neff, the approach to personal jurisdiction that 
emerged over the course of the nineteenth century strictly confined a court’s exercise of 
                                                 
70 See Harold L. Korn, The Development of Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States: Part I, 65 BROOKLYN 
L. REV. 935, 971 (1999) (“In England’s single realm . . . [e]xtraterritorial contacts needed no consideration.  
The authority of the King’s courts ran throughout the realm, and—apart from the constant struggles among 
English courts over subject matter jurisdiction in purely English cases—territorial factors (though 
sometimes spoken of in the language of ‘jurisdiction’) actually concerned only internal administrative 
matters that we would today recognize as problems of venue of the reach of a local officer’s authority to 
serve process.”). 
71 See FOREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 
276 (1985) (“The constitutional reallocation of powers created a new form of government, unprecedented 
under the sun.  Every previous national authority either had been centralized or else had been a 
confederation of sovereign constituent states.  The new American system was neither one nor the other: it 
was a mixture of both.”). 
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jurisdiction to the geographic borders of the state in which it was located. 72  A defendant 
who did not consent to jurisdiction would not have to face a suit in a state in which he 
was not a resident or did not have property.  In the corporate context, the internal affairs 
doctrine, developed during the same time period, complemented the territorial approach, 
acting as a jurisdictional bar to adjudicating disputes relating to the governance of foreign 
corporations.  Also complementing this system were choice of law rules that tied the law 
applicable to a dispute to the territory in which the event leading to the cause of action 
occurred.  Parallel suits appear to have been uncommon during this time period,73 
unsurprising given personal jurisdiction’s strict territorial limitations and the local scope 
of most economic activity.  Overall, the nineteenth century’s system has been described 
as rigid, often in a pejorative sense.74  But it worked reasonably well at the time, when 
interstate commerce was still relatively insubstantial. 
By the middle of the twentieth century, this static territorial approach to 
jurisdiction was replaced with a more flexible approach that allowed the exercise of 
jurisdiction so long as a defendant had “minimum contacts” with a forum state.  
Contemporaneously, the internal affairs doctrine was relaxed from a jurisdictional bar to 
a choice of law doctrine.  Furthermore, the choice of law determination underwent an 
evolution similar to the introduction of minimum contacts analysis, changing from a 
                                                 
72 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
73 See infra Subsection II.B.4. 
74 See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (“The requirements for personal jurisdiction 
over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff to the flexible standard of 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.”); Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 68 MO. L. REV. 753, 753 (2003) (“Pennoyer held that an unwilling, nonresident defendant 
must be served within the boundaries of the state. During the ensuing sixty-eight years, courts struggled 
with application of this rigid principle to an expanding and increasingly mobile economy . . . .”); D. Curtis 
Webster, State Court Jurisdiction After Shaffer v. Heitner: The Lingering Problems, 15 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 281, 284 (1979) (“Justice Fields recognized that Pennoyer’s analysis of strict territoriality would 
prevent the exercise of state judicial authority in . . . instances where jurisdiction would be desirable.”). 
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territorial assessment to an examination of which state had the “most significant 
relationship” with the matter.  These changes had the practical effect of expanding courts’ 
ability to exercise jurisdiction over foreign defendants and to interpret other states’ laws 
when doing so.  The twentieth century’s approach retained Pennoyer’s focus on 
geography but replaced the prior system of rigid jurisdictional boundaries with a fluid 
case-by-case assessment of a defendant’s connections to a given forum.  At the same time, 
representative actions became frequent and plaintiffs began to file parallel actions in 
multiple forums with regularity.  In other words, previously separate trends—the 
loosening of personal jurisdiction’s territorial limits and the growing popularity of the 
representative lawsuit—combined to create a situation where defendants faced a number 
of repetitive lawsuits in a variety of forums. 
As will be discussed in detail in Part III, offsetting this expansion was the 
development of the concept of forum non conveniens, a discretionary doctrine that 
allowed a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction in situations where physical distance 
prejudiced defendants.75  Courts also began to employ the first-filed rule, the modern 
equivalent to the nineteenth century’s abatement doctrine, to determine the appropriate 
forum in the increasing number of parallel cases being filed on their dockets, a result of 
representative litigation’s spectacular growth during this time period.  But, as we explain 
later, those efforts to limit the exercise of jurisdiction have been ineffective, and the 
expansion of jurisdiction described here, and the resulting increase in multi-forum 
litigation, has continued.   
                                                 
75 Other tools for addressing the problem of expanding jurisdictional rules were also developed during this 
time, namely the federal doctrines of abstention, anti-suit injunctions, etc.  We focus here on forum non 
conveniens owing to its centrality and because it can serve as a proxy for other similar doctrines, which are 
based on many of the same principles. 
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The purpose of this section is not to present a comprehensive treatment of the 
history of American procedure relating to the exercise of jurisdiction and conflict of laws, 
which is an undertaking that has been done well at a general level already.76 Rather, the 
brief, functionalist historical account presented here77 shows that the problems of 
allocating jurisdiction among states is a problem as old as our republic, and that solutions 
to that problem have evolved as our national economy has matured.  In that sense, the 
suggested reforms we discuss later are another step in a continual process of adjustment 
and improvement.  Indeed, our argument can be understood as another measured step in 
the historical movement away from understanding commerce as a geographically-
bounded activity.  
B.  The Original System of Territorially Determined Jurisdiction 
For our purposes, the system for allocating jurisdiction among the states that 
emerged over the course of the nineteenth century had two salient characteristics.  First, 
the analysis of whether to exercise jurisdiction was a formalistic inquiry as to where a 
defendant lived in relation to static geographical boundaries.  Second, the choice of 
forum decision and the choice of law decision were intertwined, because the “vested 
rights” theory for choosing applicable law also looked to where a dispute fell within 
geographic boundaries.  As is discussed below, these approaches were rooted in a 
concern for state sovereignty and coincided with economic activity that was often local in 
scale. 
                                                 
76 See, e.g., ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (4th ed. 1986); EUGENE F. SCOLES ET 
AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th ed. 2000). 
77 We recognize that history rarely unfolds according to a neat, logical pattern.  But, given the purpose of 
this article and the brevity with which we must treat the historical record, we consider a purposive 
interpretation of the relevant doctrines’ development an efficient proxy for a more searching inquiry.   
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1. Pennoyer v. Neff and Its Antecedents 
Early American courts had little upon which to rely when confronting the 
question of how to allocate jurisdiction among the sister states.  Other than providing that 
a sister state’s obligations and decisions should be given full faith and credit,78 the 
Constitution was silent on the question of the state courts’ ability to exercise 
jurisdiction.79  Shortly after the Constitution’s adoption, Congress passed the Full Faith 
and Credit Act of 1790, but it was a brief piece of legislation that did not address the 
question of the scope of state court jurisdiction.80  Thus, constitutional and statutory 
guidance was limited.81  
Nevertheless, courts began fashioning a doctrine, well before the Pennoyer case, 
that a court could only exercise jurisdiction over persons or property located within its 
state’s territorial borders.82  As that position developed in both federal and state 
opinions,83 two related explanations for applying territorial jurisdiction became typical: 
                                                 
78 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
79 See Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
849, 851 (1989) (“After the Constitution was ratified, a citizen of Massachusetts presumably had a different 
political relationship with Connecticut than with France, but exactly how it differed was unclear. . . . [The 
Constitution] did not . . . directly address the authority of state courts to adjudicate the rights of 
noncitizens.”). 
80 See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. 
81  Early American courts were perhaps not writing on an entirely clean slate.  Although a subject of 
scholarly debate, it is possible to discern territorial jurisdiction’s origins in English decisions dating to the 
fifteenth century.  Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 608-09 (1990) (citing Bowser v. Collins, 
(1482) 145 Eng. Rep. 97 (Ex. Ch.), and Case of the Marshalsea, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B.) 1041; 10 
Coke Rep. 68b, 77a. But see Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The 
“Power” Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L. J. 289 (1956) (questioning English tradition as source 
of American territorial jurisdiction doctrine); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court 
Jurisdiction, 1965 S. CT. REV. 241, 253-60 (same); James Weinstein, The Early American Origins of 
Territoriality in Judicial Jurisdiction, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1 (1992) (same). 
82 As early as 1813, Justice Johnson’s dissenting opinion in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Mills v. 
Duryee gave a clear articulation of the justification behind the rule: “[J]urisdiction cannot be justly 
exercised by a state over property not within the reach of its process, or over persons not owing them 
allegiance or not subjected to their jurisdiction by being found within their limits.” 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 
486 (1813) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (finding a judgment against an out-of-state defendant to be appropriate 
because the defendant had been served with process in the forum state). 
83 For illustrative federal decisions, see Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 614-15 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828); 
D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 174-75 (1850); Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 
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first, allowing a court to exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant would be 
unfair where the out-of-state defendant would be unaware of the suit because service of 
process could not occur outside of the state’s boundaries;84 and second, allowing the 
extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction would interfere with a foreign state’s 
sovereignty.85  Thus, by the time Pennoyer was decided in 1877, a common law principle 
favoring territorial jurisdiction had been developed at both the federal and state level. 
 The Pennoyer decision consolidated this precedent and tied it to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which was adopted less than ten years earlier.  As every first year law 
student knows, but as most lawyers eventually forget, the issue in Pennoyer was whether 
                                                                                                                                                 
336, 350 (1850); Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 457 (1873); Sarchet v. The General Isaac Davis, 21 F. 
Cas. 484, 485 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1838); Whitaker v. Bramson, 29 F. Cas. 947, 951-52 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1827).  
Illustrative state decisions include: Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37 (N.Y. 1809); Bissel v. Briggs, 9 
Mass. 461 (1813); Bigger v. Hutchings & Smith, 2 Stew. 445, 447-48 (Ala. 1830); Holt v. Alloway, 2 
Blackf. 108, 109 (Ind. 1827); Delano v. Jopling, 11 Ky. 117, 119 (1820); Wernwag v. Pawling, 5 G. & J. 
500, 507-10 (Md. 1833); Whittier v. Wendell, 7 N.H. 257, 258-59 (1834); Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121 
(N.Y. 1818); Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40 (1814); Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend. 148, 152-60 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1830);  Dunn v. Dunn, 4 Paige 425 (N.Y. Ch. 1834); Evans v. Instine, 7 Ohio 273 (1835); Steel v. 
Smith, 7 Watts & Serg. 447 (Pa. 1844).  See generally 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 
281 (1832) (“It is only when the jurisdiction of the court in another State is not impeached, either as to the 
subject-matter or the person, that the record of the judgment is entitled to full faith and credit.  The court 
must have had jurisdiction not only of the cause, but of the parties, and in that case the judgment is final 
and conclusive.”).  
84 See, e.g., D’Arcy, 52 U.S. at 174 (holding that a New York judgment against an out-of-state defendant 
who was not served with process was void, reasoning that allowing such would prejudice defendants “who 
reside elsewhere, and who are ignorant of the proceeding,” and noting that “countries foreign to our own 
disregard a judgment merely against the person, where he has not been served with process nor had a day in 
court.”); Kilburn, 5 Johns. at 41 (“To bind a defendant personally by a judgment when he was never 
personally summoned, or had notice of the proceedings, would be contrary to the first principles of 
justice.”); see also Borden, 15 Johns. at 141-44 (discussing related decisions from English courts and other 
U.S. federal and state courts). 
85 As Justice Story, who wrote the majority opinion in Mills v. Duryee, later explained: 
The first and most general maxim or proposition is that . . . every nation possesses an 
exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory.  The direct consequence of 
this rule is, that the laws of every state affect, and bind directly all property, whether real 
or personal, within its territory; and all persons, who are resident within it, whether 
natural or born subjects, or aliens; and also all contracts made, and acts done within it. . . . 
Another maxim, or proposition, is that no state or nation can, by its laws, directly 
affect, or bind property out of its own territory, or persons not resident therein, whether 
they are natural born subjects, or others.  This is a natural consequence of the first 
proposition; for it would be wholly incompatible with the equality and exclusiveness of 
the sovereignty of any nation, that other nations should be at liberty to regulate either 
persons or things within its territories. 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 17, 20 (1834). 
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an Oregon court had jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant when it issued a default 
judgment against him.86  Although the defendant owned land in Oregon at the time the 
suit commenced, that property was not formally attached to the proceeding.87  Because 
the property was not properly attached, the Supreme Court held that the default judgment 
had been issued without appropriate quasi in rem jurisdiction and was therefore void.88  
The reasoning behind that holding focuses on a state’s control of its territory: 
[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over 
persons and property within its territory.  As a consequence, every State 
has the power to determine for itself the civil status and capacities of its 
inhabitants; to prescribe the subjects upon which they may contract, the 
forms and solemnities with which their contracts shall be executed, the 
rights and obligations arising from them, and the mode in which their 
validity shall be determined and their obligations enforced. . . .  The other 
principle of public law referred to follows from the one mentioned; that is, 
that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or 
property without its territory. . . .  The several States are of equal dignity 
and authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power 
from all others.  And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary 
principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its 
territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal 
established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to 
subject either persons or property to its decisions.89 
 
As applied in the cases following Pennoyer, but before the Supreme Court’s 
International Shoe decision, territorial jurisdiction created a system where the available 
forums in which a plaintiff could bring an action were limited to places where the 
                                                 
86 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 719-20 (1877). 
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 722. 
89 Id. (emphasis added). The opinion then grounded this territorial view of jurisdiction in the Fourteenth 
Amendment: “Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of 
such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that 
proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that 
court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.”  Id. at 733. 
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defendant was a resident, held property, or consented to jurisdiction (which includes a 
plaintiff’s temporary presence in a jurisdiction, so-called “tag” jurisdiction).90   
2. The “Vested Rights” Approach to Choice of Law Decisions 
By the end of the nineteenth century, choice of law decisions were also being 
made by examining how a dispute related to territorial boundaries.91  From the principle 
that a state has exclusive jurisdiction over its territory,92 Joseph Beale developed the 
theory that “only the law of the state where the rights vested may be properly applied to 
adjudicate the private dispute.”93  As Beale explained, because “the power of a state is 
supreme within its own territory . . .   [i]t follows that no statute has force to affect any 
person, thing, or act . . . outside the territory of the state that passed it.”94  To interpret 
and apply the laws of another state, under whose law the rights at issue in the dispute 
“vested,” was an affront to that state’s sovereignty.   
The vested rights approach appeared in a number of decisions, most notably the 
Supreme Court’s Slater v. Mexican National Railroad Co. opinion,95 and the Restatement 
(First) of Conflict of Laws.  According to the Restatement’s formulation, rights vested 
                                                 
90 See Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 193 (1915) (“[C]ourts of one state 
cannot, without a violation of the due process clause, extend their authority beyond their jurisdiction so as 
to condemn the resident of another state when neither his person nor his property is within the jurisdiction 
of the court rendering the judgment, since that doctrine was long ago established by the decision in 
Pennoyer v. Neff.”); First Nat. Bank of Rome, Ga. v. First Nat. Bank of Jasper, Fla., 264 F. 83, 84 (5th Cir. 
1920), aff’d, 258 U.S. 112 (1922) (“It is settled that constructive service can only bring nonresidents within 
the jurisdiction of a court where there is a res in the control of the court in which the nonresident has an 
interest, and then only for the sole purpose of adjudicating his rights, if any, to the res.  This is the extent of 
the jurisdiction of a court to proceed upon substituted service, in the absence of personal service or 
appearance.”) (citations omitted).  For personal jurisdiction cases based on tag jurisdiction, see Burnham v. 
Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 612-13 (1990), which catalogues numerous cases in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century that permitted a court to retain personal jurisdiction over a defendant that was only 
temporarily in the state, but personally served in it.  
91 For a concise review of early American choice of law jurisprudence leading up to Beale’s introduction of 
vested rights theory towards the end of the 19th century, see SCOLES ET AL., supra note 76, at §2.7. 
92 See STORY, supra note 52, at § 18, at 19. 
93 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 311-12 (1935). 
94 Id. 
95 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) (“[T]he only source of this obligation is the law of the place of the act.”). 
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under the law of the place where the event creating the cause of action occurred—in a tort 
case, this was the place of injury;96 in a contract case, the place of formation;97 in a 
property dispute, the situs of the real property.98  In that sense, the analysis was similar to 
Pennoyer’s approach in that it also focused on a dispute’s relationship with territorial 
boundaries.  And, like the Pennoyer system, the rules of the First Restatement have been 
described as “rigid,” providing predictability yet failing to accommodate cases that defied 
confinement to a single territory.99 
3. The Internal Affairs Doctrine as Jurisdictional Bar 
Initially, the Pennoyer system applied to individuals and corporations alike.  
Through the middle of the nineteenth century, opinions adhered to territorial logic in the 
corporate context, holding that a corporation could only be sued in the state where it was 
chartered or held property.100  But, during the latter part of the century, courts began to 
construct a rule allowing corporate defendants to be sued outside of their chartering state 
if they were doing business in the forum state.101   
                                                 
96 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934). 
97 Id. § 332. 
98 Id. §§ 211, 214, 216-23. 
99 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 76, at §2.7, at 21 n.19. 
100 The Supreme Court’s decision in Bank of Augusta v. Earle is the leading case in this regard. See 38 U.S. 
519 (1839). 
101 Two related theories were developed in the latter half of the 19th century.  First, courts articulated a 
consent-based theory, which reasoned that corporations consented to jurisdiction in a state where they were 
doing business. See, e.g., Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 
U.S. 350 (1882); St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1913).  Second, courts developed a 
presence-based theory, which reasoned that corporations were subject to jurisdiction if they were physically 
present in the state at the time of suit. See, e.g., Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 
(1917) (“A foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in the absence of 
consent, only if it is doing business within the State in such manner and to such extent as to warrant the 
inference that it is present there.”).  These jurisdiction-expanding theories developed as it became 
“increasingly apparent that corporations were not going to confine their business activities to the state in 
which they were incorporated and that restricting suit against them to a single jurisdiction was both 
unrealistic and unfair.”  4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1066  (3d ed. updated 2012) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER]. 
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Despite that precedent, corporate defendants were not entirely exposed to foreign 
litigation.  The internal affairs doctrine, developed as the corporate form grew in 
popularity, required that disputes over a corporation’s governance be resolved in the 
incorporating state’s courts.  As an early New York case put it, under the internal affairs 
doctrine “[w]e can enforce no forfeiture of charter for violation of law; nor can we 
remove directors for misconduct.  These powers all properly belong to the courts of the 
state from which they derive their existence.”102  In other words, as courts began to 
exercise jurisdiction over corporate defendants in certain cases, such as those sounding in 
tort, the internal affairs doctrine required them to defer to the courts of the chartering 
state in cases involving the corporation’s internal relations, where the chartering state’s 
interests and laws were considered paramount.  For our purposes, the important aspect of 
the internal affairs doctrine at this stage in its history was that it operated not only as a 
choice of law rule, but also as a jurisdictional bar.103   
The internal affairs doctrine coincided with a territorial conception of corporate 
law.  Corporations were originally considered adjuncts of the states in which they were 
chartered;104 up until the mid-nineteenth century, corporations could typically only 
                                                 
102 Howell v. Chi. & Nw. Rwy. Co., 51 Barb. 378, 378 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868). 
103 See, e.g., N. State Copper & Gold Mining Co. v. Field, 20 A. 1039, 1040 (Md. 1885); Wilkins v. Thorne, 
60 Md. 253 (1883); Smith v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 96 Mass. 336 (1867); Williston v. Mich. S. & N. Ind. 
R.R. Co., 95 Mass. 400 (1866); Erickson v. Nesmith, 86 Mass. 233 (1862); Redmond v. Enfield Mfg. Co., 
13 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872); Howell v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 51 Barb. 378 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1868); Madden v. Penn. Electric Light Co., 37 A. 817 (1897). See generally 17 WILLIAM MEADE 
FLETCHER ET. AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8425 (updated ed. 
2012); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 196, 197, 199 (1934). 
104 Corporations were originally chartered for a particular purpose and through specific legislation.  See 
Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 33, 46-47 
(2006) (“Incorporation was not generally available to all who applied; instead, corporate charters were 
granted only sparingly, one-by-one, through special acts of state legislatures.  Each act was specifically 
tailored to the particular project proposed, with powers and privileges specifically defined.  Not only were 
business corporations ‘creatures’ of the state—in the sense that they came into existence through specific 
acts of state legislatures—but through the early part of the nineteenth century, they were viewed as 
agencies of the state.”).  Even as Jacksonian populism introduced general incorporation, or the ability to 
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operate within the confines of their chartering state.105  And, even as corporations later 
gained the ability to freely operate throughout the country, that respect for state 
sovereignty remained.106  As the Supreme Court stated in its 1933 decision in Rogers v. 
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, “[i]t has long been settled doctrine that a court—state 
or federal—sitting in one State will as a general rule decline to interfere with or control 
by injunction or otherwise the management of the internal affairs of a corporation 
organized under the laws of another state but will leave controversies of such matters to 
the courts of the state of the domicile.”107  There was a conceptual consistency between 
corporate law and the territorial approach to personal jurisdiction and choice of law 
discussed above: all pinned the limits of jurisdiction to states’ geographical boundaries.   
                                                                                                                                                 
anyone to seek and obtain a charter, the public-spirited nature of the corporation persisted for some time.  
See Currie’s Adm’rs v. Mut. Assurance Soc’y, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 315, 347 (1808) (“[A]cts of 
incorporation . . . ought never to be passed, but in consideration of services rendered to the public.”); 
JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE § 13 (8th ed. 1866) 
(“The object in creating a corporation is, in fact, to gain the union, contribution and assistance of several 
persons for the successful promotion of some design of general utility . . . .  The principle is . . . that the 
design of a corporation is to provide for some good that is useful to the public.”); see also Pauline Maier, 
The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation, 50 WM. & MARY Q. 51, 53 (1993) (“That a 
particular venture would benefit the private estates of individuals seems to have been of no concern—or to 
have been a positive consideration—as long as the public’s welfare was also served.”).     
105 See, e.g., Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 588 (“It is very true that a corporation can have no legal existence 
out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created.  It exists only in contemplation of law, and 
by force of the law; and where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can 
have no existence.  It must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty.”); 
see also Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate 
Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 155 (1985) (“As late as the 1860s, the status of operating a corporation 
in a foreign jurisdiction was uncertain.”). 
106 See Smith, 96 Mass. at 339 (stating that the internal affairs doctrine “does not merely regard the powers 
of the court, but rather the extent of the state authority which underlies those powers.  It is in the nature of a 
question of sovereignty”); Howell, 51 Barb. at 383 (“It is the duty of the state to provide for the collection 
of debts from foreign corporations, due to its citizens, and this has been done; and it is the duty of the state 
to protect its citizens from fraud, by all the means in its power, whether against domestic or foreign 
wrongdoers.  This, however, does not authorize the courts to regulate the internal affairs of foreign 
corporations.  The courts possess no visitorial power over them.  We can enforce no forfeiture of charter for 
violation of law; nor can we remove directors for misconduct. These powers all properly belong to the 
courts of the state from which they derive their existence.”); Redmond, 13 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) at 334 (“To 
attempt, by a judgment of this court, to compel a foreign corporation to distribute its assets among the 
stockholders, because some of the directors were resident here, or because some of the funds were within 
the jurisdiction of the court, would be assuming a power which the court ought not to exercise, and 
rendering a judgment which could not be enforced against the company in the place of its existence.”). 
107 288 U.S. 123, 130 (1933). 
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4. Infrequent Parallel Litigation and the Advent of Representative Litigation  
 Given the territorial approach to jurisdiction outlined above, parallel litigation 
appears to have been an infrequent occurrence during this time period, at least by 
contemporary standards.  It appears that, because economic activity was predominantly 
local, the prototypical parallel suit situation involved estate disputes where extended 
families crossed state lines108 or suits attaching a merchant’s property to satisfy a debt not 
only in the defendant’s home jurisdiction but also in locations where the defendant’s 
factors transacted.109  
Representative litigation was also rare.  In the first half of the nineteenth century, 
class actions, which had ancient origins in English chancery practice,110 became 
                                                 
108 See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917) (affirming decision of Kentucky court of 
appeals not to grant full faith and credit to decision of Tennessee court that held that decedent was 
domiciled in Tennessee, and that Tennessee court could thus resolve disposition of decedent’s personal 
property located in Kentucky);  Frederick v. Milbourne, 73 So. 442 (Ala. 1916) (upholding the decision of 
an Alabama lower court to refuse to grant full faith and credit to court proceedings in Georgia concerning 
the disposition of real estate in Georgia); Selle v. Rapp, 220 S.W. 662 (Ark. 1920) (refusing to respect New 
Jersey court’s disposition of decedent’s real property in Arkansas, where decedent had executed a will in 
Arkansas but became a citizen of moved to New Jersey before death). See generally Bert E. Hopkins, The 
Extraterritorial Effect of Probate Decrees, 53 YALE L.J. 221 (1944) (discussing parallel suits in estate 
actions). 
109 See, e.g., Lindsay v. Larned, 17 Mass. 190, 190 (1821); Drake v. Bander, 8 Tex. 351, 357 (1852).    
110 Zechariah Chafee’s classic historical analysis traced the class action’s origin to the English bill of peace: 
Class suits began as an offshoot of bills of peace with multiple parties.  A common-law 
action soon came to be a two-sided affair, usually with only one plaintiff and one 
defendant.  . . .  [A] dispute of one person against many persons usually had to come 
before the law courts, if at all, in the form of many separate actions.  Hence it was far 
cheaper and more convenient to have a single suit in chancery, which was accustomed to 
handle polygonal controversies. . . .  In such situations, each member of the multitude had 
the same interests at stake as every other member, so that it was an obvious waste of time 
to try the common question of law and fact over and over in separate actions. . . .  It was 
much more economical to get everybody into a single chancery suit and settle the 
common questions once and for all. . . . .  From such a bill of peace it was a natural step 
to the representative suit. 
 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 200-01 (1950).  See also Adair v. New River 
Co., (1805) 32 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch.); 11 Ves. Jr. 429, 444 (“There is one class of cases, very important 
upon this subject: viz. where a person, having at Law a general right to demand service from the 
individuals of a large district, to his mill, for instance, may sue thus in Equity.  His demand is upon every 
individual, not to grind corn for their own subsistence except at his mill.  To bring actions against every 
individual for subtracting that service is regarded as perfectly impracticable.  Therefore a bill is filed to 
establish that right; and it is not necessary to bring all the individuals: why?  No, that it is inexpedient, but, 
that it is impracticable, to bring them all.  The Court therefore has required so many, that it can be justly 
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recognized in American equity doctrine.111  At the same time, courts in the United States 
began allowing shareholders to sue on behalf of the corporation.112   
                                                                                                                                                 
said, they will fairly and honestly try the legal right between themselves, all other persons interested, and 
the plaintiff.”).  For an alternative analysis that criticizes Chafee’s reading of the cases and connects 
contemporary class actions to the group litigation of the twelfth to fifteenth centuries, see STEPHEN C. 
YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987).  
English class suits before 1830 fall into three main categories. Geoffrey C. Hazard et al., An Historical 
Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1861-78 (1998).  The first is bills of 
peace, in which a court would resolve cases, often involving real property, that involved “a common benefit 
to or burden upon” the members of a group.  These cases have been described as “perhaps the first 
recognizable expression of class suit doctrine.” Id. at 1863.  The second category is creditor or legatee bills, 
in which the Court of Chancery would attempt to resolve the claims of all the creditors or legatees on the 
estate of a debtor or decedent. Id. at 1866-74.  The third category—of which Adair v. New River Co. is an 
example—is cases in which plaintiffs filed suit against unincorporated associations, which could not be 
sued in their own name, but whose shareholders or members could be sued. Id. at 1874-76.  The English 
courts did not develop a doctrine of res judicata in this period; this was an issue that was only resolved by 
U.S. cases a century later. Id. at 1877-78, 1925-26. 
111 Joseph Story pioneered representative litigation in the United States. In 1820, after reviewing English 
cases, he established in American law an exception to the “necessary party” doctrine, according to which 
all the parties with an interest in an action had to be joined in an action. Thus, in the case before him, the 
legatees of a decedent did not need to join all of the other interested parties in order to obtain an accounting 
from an executor. West v. Randall, 29 F.Cas. 718 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 17,424). He held: 
It is a general rule in equity, that all persons materially interested, either as plaintiffs or 
defendants in the subject matter of the bill ought to be made parties to the suit, however, 
numerous they may be.  The reason is that the court may be enabled to make a complete 
decree between the parties, may prevent future litigation by taking away the necessity of a 
multiplicity of suits, and may make it perfectly certain, that no injustice shall be done, 
either to the parties before the court, or to others, who are interested by a decree, that may 
be grounded upon a partial view only of the real merits. . . . The rule, however, that all 
persons, materially interested in the subject of the suit, however numerous, ought to be 
parties, is not without exception. [I]t being a general rule, established for the convenient 
administration of justice, it must not be adhered to in cases, to which consistently with 
practical convenience it is incapable of application. 
 Id. at 721-22 (citations omitted).  
Story relied in part on West when, four years later, he held that a creditor of a bank, which had become 
insolvent, did not need to join all the bank’s former shareholders in order to recover dividends that were 
improperly paid out to them in violation of statute. Wood v. Dummer, 30 F.Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) 
(No. 17,944). He summed up the exceptions to the “necessary party” doctrine thus:  
The result of the whole cases is, that where the parties are so numerous, that it is 
inconvenient or impracticable to bring all before the court, the rule [i.e., the necessary party 
doctrine], which is founded on the consideration of public good, shall not be applied, since 
it would defeat the purposes of justice. 
Id. at 439. See also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS §72 (1838) (stating the 
“general rule in equity” that “all persons materially interested, either legally or beneficially, in the subject-
matter of a suit, are to be made parties to it, either as plaintiffs or defendants, however numerous they may 
be, so that there may be a complete decree, which may bind them all”).   
The basic contours of the class action—namely, numerosity, common questions of law and fact, and 
fair representation—were codified in Federal Equity Rule 48, which was in force from 1842 to 1912.  Fed. 
Equity R. 48 (“Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without manifest 
inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought before it, the Court in its discretion may 
dispense with making all of them parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties before it to 
represent all the adverse interest of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit properly before it.”). 
40 
 
 Despite their advent at the beginning of the nineteenth century, representative 
suits in the United States remained uncommon at least 100 years later.113  Due to their 
peripheral position in American jurisprudence, and although developed 
contemporaneously, representative suits appear to have evolved without conscious 
consideration of their implications for the jurisdictional issues discussed above.  The 
closest purposeful connection between jurisdictional rules and representative suits 
occurred occasionally in federal courts during the early nineteenth century, where the 
representative mechanism was used in situations where formally joining all parties to a 
                                                                                                                                                 
112 The Supreme Court recognized shareholders’ ability to bring derivative suits in 1855.  Dodge v. 
Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331, 342 (1855) (allowing a shareholder to “maintain a bill in equity against the directors 
and compel the company” to refund profits); see also Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1882) 
(upholding Dodge but setting a number of substantive and procedural limitations on shareholders’ ability to 
bring derivative suits). See generally Hazard et al., supra note 110, at 1889-90 (discussing DeBaun v. 
Mayor of New York, 16 Barb. 392 (N.Y. App. Div. 1853), a prototypical taxpayers’ derivative suit in New 
York); id. at 1897-1901 (discussing Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288 (1853), a suit against the managers of 
a book business that could also be regarded as a derivative suit). 
English courts first heard suits by shareholders seeking relief from management action at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century. Adley v. Whitstable Co., (1810) 34 Eng. Rep. 122 (Ch.); 17 Ves. Jr. 316 
(shareholder in an incorporated fishery was granted conditional relief against management that denied him 
profits). In the 1843 case of Foss v. Harbottle, English courts cut back on shareholder rights to sue 
derivatively on behalf of the corporation, and held that the corporation must sue instead in its own name. 
(1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch.) 203; 2 Hare 460, 493 (“[I]t is only necessary to refer to the clauses of the 
Act to shew that, whilst the supreme governing body, the proprietors at a special general meeting 
assembled, retain the power of exercising the functions conferred upon them by the Act of Incorporation, it 
cannot be competent to individual corporators to sue in the manner proposed by the Plaintiffs on the present 
record.”). The English courts carved out an exception to this general bar to derivative suits in Atwool v. 
Merryweather, in which it was held that a minority shareholder was permitted to sue in the name of the 
corporation to recover damages for a fraudulent act, where a majority of shareholders—including the 
directors who allegedly committed the fraud—had voted against such action. [1868] L.R. 5 Eq. 464 n.3 
(Ch.). See generally Bert S. Prunty, The Shareholders’ Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. 
L. REV.  980, 980-85 (1957) (discussing English origins of the derivative suit).  
113 YEAZELL, supra note 110, at 222.  One reason for infrequent use of representative suits is that, until the 
twentieth century, decisions in representative litigation were not binding on class members not formally 
joined to the suit, which reduced much of the procedural mechanism’s utility. In Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur 
v. Cauble , decided in 1921, the Supreme Court ruled for the first time that “[i]f the federal courts are to 
have the jurisdiction in class suits to which they are obviously entitled, the decree when rendered must bind 
all of the class properly represented.” 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921).  Otherwise, the Court noted, a court might 
determine the rights of one group of class-members under one theory, and that theory might be repudiated 
by another court determining the rights of another group of class-members. Id. at 366-67.  In Hansberry v. 
Lee, the Court reaffirmed Ben-Hur but noted that absent members could only be bound by the result of a 
class action if they were “in fact adequately represented by the parties who are present.” 311 U.S. 32, 43 
(1940).   
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suit would have disallowed the court from exercising its diversity jurisdiction.114  The 
contemporary jurisdictional issues that would arise from large shareholder classes 
dispersed across the nation simply did not occur with any frequency at a time when 
representative suits predominantly involved local parties.  The local focus of these suits is 
evidenced in the typical purpose for which the aggregation mechanism was used at the 
time.  Rather than being brought predominantly on tort-like claims—such as actions for 
trespass or trespass on the case—nineteenth century class suits were often used in 
property-related disputes, such as estate matters or controversies over common 
property.115  This is unsurprising: because most trade was limited to local geographies, 
harm to a large number of far-flung plaintiffs—as is typical in the modern tort class 
action—was a rare occurrence, and thus disputes were primarily isolated to property-
related matters, where the focus was on gathering all parties in a single case so as to 
definitively resolve claims against locally situated assets.  Indeed, of this time period’s 
leading corporate cases, few if any arose as representative actions.116 
                                                 
114 In 1806, the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts only had diversity jurisdiction if all the plaintiffs 
were citizens of different states than all the defendants. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 
(1806). Federal jurisdiction in the nineteenth century was “primarily diversity jurisdiction,” but the 
“necessary parties” doctrine acted as a bar to federal court, because joining large numbers of plaintiffs or 
defendants increased the chance of destroying diversity. Hazard et al., supra note 110, at 1882. 
Representative suits, where only the citizenship of the named party was relevant to determining diversity, 
therefore acted as an “avenue of escape” from the necessary parties doctrine. Id. at 1883.   
115 See, e.g., McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S. 340 (1885) (dispute over validity of will); Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 
288 (dispute over ownership of book publishing business); Randall, 29 F.Cas. 718 (accounting action by 
legatees against executor). 
116 Cf. N. State Copper & Gold Min., 20 A. 1039, 1040 (Md. 1885) (suit by single stockholder complaining 
that charge assessed by corporation on shareholders was illegal and void, and seeking to recover the stock 
he had forfeited by not paying charge); Wilkins v. Thorne, 60 Md. 253, 254 (1883) (complaint by single 
stockholder against the president of the North State Copper and Gold Mining Company, arguing that the 
president had defrauded the stockholders); Williston v. Mich. S. & N. Ind. R.R. Co., 95 Mass. 400 (1866) 
(suit by single stockholder seeking payment of guaranteed dividends); Smith v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 96 Mass. 
336, 339 (1867) (suit by single complainant seeking to be restored to his rights under a life insurance policy 
issued by defendant).   
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5. Summary 
 By the end of the nineteenth century, the modern interstate economy that had 
developed in the United States relied on a legal system that organized its judiciary into 
exclusive compartments according to state boundaries.  The principle behind this 
organization was the territorial theory of jurisdiction, which was developed over the 
course of the century and culminated in the Supreme Court’s 1877 Pennoyer decision.  In 
essence, that theory precluded courts from exercising jurisdiction over an individual or 
entity without a physical presence within the boundaries of the state.  Complementing 
Pennoyer’s approach to personal jurisdiction were the territory-based vested rights choice 
of law rule and the internal affairs doctrine, which operated as a jurisdictional bar where 
plaintiffs attempted to bring suits outside of a corporation’s chartering state.  In this 
system, choice of forum and choice of law were the same inquiry.  That is, once one 
knew where the defendant was physically present or owned property, one knew both 
which forums were available and which laws applied.117  In this system, parallel litigation 
was an infrequent concern. 
 The nineteenth century system dealt with the fundamental problem of how to 
allocate jurisdiction among courts in a federal system by erecting strict boundaries 
between the states.  This system handled a dispute that implicated multiple jurisdictions 
by funneling it back to the defendant’s home jurisdiction.  Although this approach created 
inequities—the most obvious being between the tort claimant, who could only bring her 
case where the defendant was located and not in her local courts, and the tort defendant, 
                                                 
117 At this time, the doctrine of forum non conveniens was not recognized outside of a few scattered 
opinions.  See Allan Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. 
PA. L. REV. 781, 801 (1985) (“[T]he doctrine of forum non conveniens was virtually unheard of, outside of 
the admiralty context, prior to 1929”). 
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who did not have to worry about defending distant lawsuits even where the defendant had 
acted distantly—those inequities were largely inconsequential given the local nature of 
most economic activity at the time.  As we next discuss, later developments attempted to 
recalibrate the balance between plaintiffs’ access to the courts with defendants’ 
convenience while maintaining the essential characteristics of the territorial system.  
C.  Extending Jurisdiction to Accommodate an Interstate Economy 
 During the early 20th century, the territorial approach to allocating jurisdiction 
between the constituent components of the federal system began to unravel.  One of the 
territorial approach’s core assumptions—that economic activity was largely contained 
within states’ political boundaries—became untenable as commerce attained interstate 
scale.118  In response, courts developed a new set of doctrines that retained the territorial 
paradigm but assessed a given court’s exercise of jurisdiction through a flexible array of 
factors that were thought to better accommodate commercial reality and its effects on the 
ability of litigants to obtain justice in the courts.  Contemporaneously, the vested rights 
choice of law rule was abandoned for an inquiry that determined the applicable law by 
examining which state had the most significant relationship with the dispute.  The 
internal affairs doctrine was also relaxed, changing from a jurisdictional bar to a mere 
                                                 
118 See, e.g., 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 101, § 1065 (“In the years following the seminal decision in 
Pennoyer v. Neff, it became apparent that to limit in personam jurisdiction to those situations in which an 
individual defendant could be served personally within the territory of the forum state or had consented to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of that state was inadequate in a society that was becoming increasingly 
complex.  Accordingly, as modes of transport and communication improved and the mobility of American 
citizens increased, so did the pressure on state legislatures and the courts to develop broader bases for 
asserting jurisdiction over individuals who were beyond the territorial limits of the state at the time of 
suit.”).  For the growth in interstate commerce in this period, see, for example, Sukkoo Kim, Expansion of 
Markets and the Geographic Distribution of Economic Activities: The Trends in U.S. Regional 
Manufacturing Structure, 1860-1987, 110 Q.J. ECON. 885-86 (1995) (discussing the rapid integration of 
U.S. regions following advances in transportation and information transmission). 
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choice of law rule.  Thus, the range of actions over which a court could exercise 
jurisdiction was expanded. 
1.  The Minimum Contacts System of Personal Jurisdiction 
Although decisions following Pennoyer advanced theories for allowing courts to 
exercise jurisdiction over defendants doing business in the forum,119 no reformulated 
jurisdictional test was clearly articulated until the Supreme Court’s 1945 decision in 
International Shoe.120  That decision and its progeny121 established a test whereby 
jurisdiction could be exercised over a defendant who had “minimum contacts” with the 
forum in question, so long as the exercise of jurisdiction did not offend “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”122  Although later cases would clarify that 
territorial boundaries were still relevant to the jurisdictional analysis,123 International 
Shoe’s rule provided a basis for expanding the range of out-of-state defendants over 
which a court could exercise jurisdiction.  At the state level, a corresponding expansion 
of jurisdiction was accomplished through the enactment of long-arm statutes, which 
typically have either (1) allowed a court to exercise jurisdiction if a minimum contacts 
                                                 
119 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
120 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
121 E.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 
(1957); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
122 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.  At first glance, the International Shoe test may not appear that different 
from the earlier consent- and presence-based theories, which predicated the exercise of jurisdiction on a 
defendant’s contacts with the forum state.  But, “the old test looked to a quantum of activities sufficient to 
establish a basis of jurisdiction for all suits, whereas [International Shoe’s] approach made jurisdiction 
depend on all of the circumstances of the particular case.”  Note, State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
911, 923 (1960). 
123 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293 (“[W]e have never accepted the proposition that 
state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we and remain faithful to the principles of 
interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution.”). 
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test similar to International Shoe’s is satisfied or (2) enumerated the in-state activities 
that would provide the basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.124   
For our purposes, the important characteristic of the International Shoe system is 
not just that it expanded courts’ jurisdictional reach but that it reinterpreted Pennoyer’s 
focus on fixed territorial limits into a fact-specific inquiry into a defendant’s connection 
with the forum state’s geographic boundaries.  The physical location of a defendant and 
its activities remained the hallmark of the system.  The fundamental change was that the 
geographic analysis, which had involved an examination of static boundaries under 
Pennoyer, was conducted on a case-by-case basis after International Shoe. 
2. “Most Significant Relationship” Choice of Law Analysis 
Determining what law was applicable to a dispute underwent a similar change 
during the 20th century that persists to this day.  Whereas the prior system analyzed 
where the event precipitating the dispute occurred in an attempt to determine under which 
state’s laws the rights at issue vested, choice of law decisions in the current system are 
made by assessing which state has the “most significant relationship” to the dispute.125  
The “most significant relationship” test is found throughout the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws, which softens the First Restatement’s rigid territorial rules into open-
ended directives that allow a court to consider a number of factors when determining the 
applicable law.126  Although there are exceptions, the majority of states have followed 
                                                 
124 Of the former, California’s long-arm statute, which simply provides that “[a] court of this state may 
exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States,” 
is a good example. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10.  New York’s long-arm statute is an example of the 
latter. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302.  Illinois’s long-arm statute incorporates both approaches. 735 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/2-209 (2008).  
125 LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 41, §109, at 303. 
126 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145, 188 (1971). 
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suit, abandoning the traditional territorial rules in favor of the more flexible approach that 
the Second Restatement exemplifies.127 
3.  The Internal Affairs Doctrine Becomes Limited to a Choice of Law Rule 
At the time the doctrines of personal jurisdiction and choice of law were being 
refashioned, courts were also changing their approach to the internal affairs doctrine.  As 
discussed above, the internal affairs doctrine originated as a jurisdictional bar requiring 
dismissal of suits involving governance questions of out-of-state corporations.128  But, 
fourteen years after its decision in Rogers v. Guaranty Trust, in which it upheld the 
application of the internal affairs rule as a basis to refuse to exercise jurisdiction,129 the 
Supreme Court in Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. held that the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens, not the internal affairs doctrine, should guide the 
decision of whether a court should exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.130  
The court reasoned that whether or not the case involved the internal affairs of a foreign 
corporation was “one, but only one, factor which may show convenience of parties or 
witnesses, the appropriateness of trial in a forum familiar with the law of the 
corporation’s domicile, and the enforceability of the remedy if one be granted,” deeming 
                                                 
127 See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 76, §§2.15-2.17 (discussing states’ abandonment of lex loci delicti and 
lex loci contractus rules). 
128 See supra notes 100 through 107 and accompanying text. 
129 288 U.S. 123, 130 (1933) (“It has long been settled doctrine that a court—state or federal—sitting in one 
State will as a general rule decline to interfere with or control by injunction or otherwise the management 
of the internal affairs of a corporation organized under the laws of another state but will leave controversies 
as to such matters to the courts of the state of the domicile.”). 
130 330 U.S. 518 (1947) (“There is no rule of law, moreover, which requires dismissal of a suitor from the 
forum on a mere showing that the trial will involve issues which related to the internal affairs of a foreign 
corporation.  That is one, but only one, factor which may show convenience of parties or witnesses, the 
appropriateness of trial in a forum familiar with the law of the corporation’s domicile, and the 
enforceability of the remedy if one be granted.  But the ultimate inquiry is where trial will best serve the 
convenience of the parties and the ends of justice.  Under modern conditions corporations often obtain their 
charters from states where they no more than maintain an agent to comply with local requirements, while 
every other activity is conducted far from the chartering state.  Place of corporate domicile in such 
circumstances might be entitled to little consideration under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which 
resists formalization and looks to the realities that make for doing justice.”). 
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the forum non conveniens analysis more true to reality because “[u]nder modern 
conditions corporations often obtain their charters from states where they no more than 
maintain an agent to comply with local requirements, while every other activity is 
conducted far from the chartering state.”131  Absent from the court’s opinion, however, is 
an explanation for why it rejected the potential utility, in terms of party and investor 
expectations, of placing importance on choice of law in considering application of the 
forum non conveniens doctrine, or why the situs of a corporation’s operational activity 
should be deemed significant at all in relation to a legal dispute not arising out of that 
activity.   
Thus, although the doctrine remained applicable to choice of law decisions, it was 
no longer applied as a jurisdictional bar.132  This approach was memorialized in the 
                                                 
131 Id. at 527-28. 
132 See Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 650 F.2d 408, 419 (2d Cir. 1981) (“‘There is no rule of 
law which requires dismissal of a suitor from the forum on a mere showing that the trial will involve issues 
which relate to the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.’  The fact that this case may involve 
‘complicated affairs of a foreign corporation is not alone a sufficient reason for a federal court to decline to 
decide it.’” (quoting Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Co., 330 U.S. 518, 527 (1947), and Williams v. Green 
Bay & W.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 556-57 (1946)); Burton v. Exxon Corp., 536 F. Supp. 617, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982) (“That an action touches upon the internal affairs of a foreign corporation does not automatically 
require a district court to dismiss the case and relegate the parties to a forum in the corporation’s state of 
domicile.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)  OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 313 (1971).  The internal affairs 
doctrine has even been supplanted as a choice of law rule.  For example, a California statute, Cal. Corp. 
Code § 2115, provides that for non-California corporations, other than certain publicly traded firms, whose 
shareholders and revenues are attributable to California at defined levels, the California corporate statutes 
apply to a variety of matters including annual election of directors, the director’s duty of care, director and 
officer indemnification, and cumulative voting.  Invoking the primacy of the internal affairs doctrine as a 
matter of constitutional law, the Delaware Supreme Court has declined to apply Section 2115.  
VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc..871 A.2d 1108, 1115-18 (Del. 2006) (rejecting 
application of § 2115 to determine voting rights in a Delaware corporation).  In some instances, however, 
and even in the absence of a statutory directive like California’s § 2115, courts have gone so far as to reject 
the internal affairs doctrine even as a basis for choosing applicable law.  Thus, for example, New Jersey 
state courts, emphasizing business activity and participants’ residence in New Jersey, have applied New 
Jersey’s dissolution statute in cases involving corporations formed under other states’ laws. Krzastek v. 
Global Res. Indus. & Power, 2008 WL 4161662, at *15 n.6 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Sept. 11, 2008), cert. 
denied, 962 A.2d 530 (N.J. 2008) (“Even assuming that the broader remedies available to an oppressed 
minority shareholder are indicative of a conflict between New Jersey and Massachusetts laws, we are 
satisfied that under the flexible governmental-interest test, New Jersey has the greater interest. Both states 
have a significant interest in deterring the breach of the duty of good faith and loyalty to minority 
shareholders. New Jersey, however,  as the state where [the defendant] maintained its headquarters, from 
 
48 
 
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, which states that “[a] court will exercise 
jurisdiction over an action involving the internal affairs of a foreign corporation unless it 
is an inappropriate or an inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.”133  The comments 
in the Restatement describe the factors to be considered when determining whether to 
exercise jurisdiction over an internal affairs case, most of which are geographic in 
focus.134  For example, the Restatement prescribes weighing the “contacts” between the 
defendant corporation and its chartering state, on one hand, and the defendant corporation 
and the forum state, on the other hand.135  Where the corporation is “only technically a 
foreign corporation, since all, or the great majority, of its contacts, other than the place of 
its incorporation, are in the state of the forum” the Restatement recommends exercising 
jurisdiction over disputes involving the entity’s internal governance.136  The Restatement 
therefore looks behind shareholders’ choice of incorporating jurisdiction to examine the 
corporation’s geographical relationships when deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                                                                 
where it transacted its business to secure construction projects, hired its employees and processed its bills, 
had the greater interest in deterring the breach of the duty of good faith and loyalty to its minority 
shareholder.); Conway v. DialAmerica Marketing, Inc., No. C-116-08, at *10 (N.J. Ch. Div. Sept. 30, 
2008), available at http://www.nybusinessdivorce.com/uploads/file/Conway.pdf  (“[New Jersey] courts 
remain free . . . to retain jurisdiction in cases involving the internal affairs of a foreign corporation and to 
grant relief on equitable principles wherever indicated, even to the extent of applying to a foreign 
corporation in a proper case certain substantive features of this Revision [of the New Jersey Business 
Corporations Act]. There are modern choice of law doctrines developing in this field, which the 
Commission did not wish to restrict by adopting the approach in [the Model Business Corporation Act].” 
(citations omitted) (quoting 1968 Commissioners’ Comment to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:13-2)); see also 
Ackert v. Ausman, 218 N.Y.S.2d 814, 819 (N.Y. Sup. 1961) (concluding that a shareholder action on 
behalf of a Nevada corporation claiming excessive investment adviser compensation “does not involve the 
internal affairs of a foreign corporation.”).  The Supreme Court of the United States has taken a decidedly 
different approach from these cases, strongly adhering to internal affairs doctrine. See CTS Corp. v. 
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 90 (1987) (“Th[e] beneficial free market system [of allocating capital 
to corporations] depends at its core upon the fact that a corporation—except in the rarest situations—is 
organized under, and governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law of the 
State of its incorporation.”); Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645-46 (1982) (noting that a state “has no 
interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations”).  
133 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 313 (1971). 
134 See id. cmt. c. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
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4. The Contemporaneous Expansion of Representative Litigation 
As the rules governing the exercise of personal jurisdiction expanded courts’ 
reach during this time period, representative actions increased in frequency.  As discussed 
above, the framework for the modern American class action was constructed in the 
nineteenth century.137 The twentieth century’s landmark procedural reform, namely the 
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, attempted to rationalize 
the representative litigation rules that had been already established.138  The fundamental 
                                                 
137 Supra Section II.B.4. 
138 The drafter of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, James William Moore, claimed that he was codifying 
the current approach of the courts to class actions. James W. Moore & Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 
32 ILL. L. REV. 307, 325 (1937) (“Rule 23 of the Proposed Rules does not deal with Class Actions in a 
novel manner.”). The 1937 version of Rule 23 divided class actions into three types. FED. R. CIV. P. R. 23(a) 
(1937) (classifying class suits according to whether “the character of the right sought to be enforced for or 
against the class is (1) joint, or common . . . ; (2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of 
claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or (3) several, and there is a 
common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought”). Moore stated 
that these categories mapped on to categories originally used by Joseph Story, and cited American and 
English cases extensively to support the rules. Moore & Cohn, supra, at 314-2; id. at 310 n.25. He also 
linked them to terminology introduced by Thomas Street, calling suits under Rule 23(a)(1) “true,” suits 
under Rule 23(a)(3) “spurious,” and suits under Rule 23(a)(2) “hybrid.” Id. 310 n.25; James W. Moore & 
Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions—Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32 ILL. L. REV. 555, 555 (1938). 
Robert Bone has argued, however, that Moore’s “tripartite scheme fit nineteenth and early twentieth 
century representative suit categories poorly.” Robert G. Bone, Book Review, Personal and Impersonal 
Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 288-89 
(1990) (reviewing YEAZELL, supra note 108). These three categories were abolished in 1966, when Rule 
23(a) took its modern form. See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendments (stating that the Rule 
23(a) classification “proved obscure and uncertain”); see also Charles Alan Wright, Federal Rules 
Decisions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 175-77 (1970) (criticizing the 1937 classification). 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also covered derivative suits. The Supreme Court first 
recognized the right of shareholders to sue derivatively in Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856). 
Beginning in 1887, the Court established certain limitations on derivative suits, such as the requirement that 
they plaintiff allege that the directors have acted unwisely or in bad faith. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 
(1882); see John C. Coffee & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and 
a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 265-68 (1981).  But the number of suits grew 
so substantially in the second half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries that in 1949 the 
Court could term them the “chief regulator of corporate management.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan 
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938 codified some 
of the restrictions on derivative suits, in particular the demand requirement. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 23(b) (1938) 
(“The complaint shall also set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to. secure from the 
managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, from the shareholders such action as he desires, and the 
reasons for his failure to obtain such action or the reasons for not making such effort. Nevertheless, as the 
number of strike suits grew, states began to impose more restrictions on derivative actions, such as 
requiring security for expenses. See, e.g., George D. Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders’ Derivative 
Suits, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1947). Despite this, derivative suits survived and flourished. See, e.g., 
Coffee & Schwartz, at 261; Daniel J. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74 
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change in representative litigation over this period was in the interest groups that used the 
doctrines, rather than in the rules themselves.  During the 20th century, representative 
litigation transformed from an “oddity” on the fringe of American jurisprudence to a 
regular, powerful tool for certain groups of litigants.139  A number of constituencies 
began to employ the representative action with effect in a range of substantive areas, 
including mass tort, civil rights, and corporate litigation.140  The legal services industry 
responded in turn, leading to competition (or perhaps cooperation) among counsel to 
represent large, and often lucrative, classes.141 And that behavior has culminated in the 
inefficiencies and perverse incentives reviewed in Section I above. 
5. Summary 
The 20th century saw a double-movement regarding the allocation of actions 
among the states.  International Shoe and its progeny expanded courts’ reach by 
transforming jurisdictional analysis from a formalistic examination of static boundaries to 
a case-by-case inquiry into the facts of a defendant’s connections with a forum.  
Relatedly, the courts ended the use of the internal affairs doctrine as a jurisdictional bar, 
retaining it solely for the purpose of determining the law applicable to a dispute.  
                                                                                                                                                 
(1967). In 1966, Rule 23(b) was made its own separate provision—Rule 23.1—and was amended so that 
the plaintiff must “fairly and adequately represent the interests of shareholders.” FED. R. CIV. PRO. 23.1; see 
id. (Notes of Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendments). 
139 Compare YEAZELL, supra note 75, at 224 (“[G]roup litigation entered the twentieth century as an 
oddity . . . .”), with id. at 237 (noting that the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966 
led to a “flowering” of class actions). See also 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 101, § 1751 (“It now is 
apparent that the increasing complexity and urbanization of modern American society has magnified 
tremendously the importance of the class action as a procedural device for resolving disputes affecting 
numerous people.”).   
140 See, e.g., YEAZELL, supra note 75, at 243-44 (importance of class actions to consumer and 
environmental movement); id. at 240-43 (civil rights movement). See supra note 138 (growth of 
stockholders’ derivative suits). 
141 See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Class Action Lawyers as Lawmakers, 46 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 733, 772 (2004) (discussing competition among lawyers to assemble plaintiff groups with a large 
financial interest in litigation under the PSLRA). For an opposing view—that plaintiffs’ firms tend to 
collude, rather than compete, with each other—see Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of 
Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1089-1102 (1996). 
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Although a departure from Pennoyer’s formalism, the 20th century approach retained a 
territorial basis.  The minimum contacts analysis for determining personal jurisdiction 
still looks through the old lens of geography, focusing on a defendant’s physical 
connections to a forum.  In other words, although physical boundaries no longer were 
outcome determinative, geography remained important. 
What the modern approach abandoned, however, is the link between the choice of 
forum and choice of law.  Although it is possible, and perhaps even likely, that the 
minimum contacts analysis and the most substantial relationship rules will result in a 
single jurisdiction being selected in both the choice of forum and choice of law analysis, 
it is equally possible that one state will be deemed an appropriate forum while another 
state’s laws are chosen to apply.  Even as the choice of forum and choice of law approach 
have evolved in parallel tracks, resulting in conceptual consistency between them, their 
flexible approaches can produce outcomes that are, in practice, decoupled.   
III. Forum Non Conveniens and the First-Filed Rule: Ineffective 
Counterbalances to Expanding Jurisdictional Reach 
 
The expansion of jurisdiction discussed in Section II was coupled with the 
countervailing development of a discretionary doctrine that allowed the courts to refuse 
to hear a case.142  Described occasionally as a “safety valve,”143 the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens gave the courts a basis upon which to decline to exercise jurisdiction.  
Complementing forum non conveniens as a means for allocating jurisdiction particularly 
in parallel litigation scenarios was the increased use of the first-filed rule, the modern 
                                                 
142 See Stein, supra note 117, at 801-03 (noting that the forum non conveniens doctrine was adopted in 
response to “the expansion of personal jurisdiction and the demise of Pennoyer v. Neff”). 
143 See Earl M. Maltz, Choice of Forum and Choice of Law in the Federal Courts, 79 KY. L.J. 231, 250 
(1991) (applying the term “safety valve” to forum non conveniens). 
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iteration of the abatement doctrine described below.  Therefore, although the general 
movement in the 20th century was to expand courts’ ability to exercise their jurisdiction, 
rules were also developed to avoid situations where adjudicating an action would place a 
heavy burden on a defendant (and to relieve pressure on courts’ dockets).144 
In practice the first-filed rule and forum non conveniens are often used in 
tandem.145  The two rules’ evidentiary thresholds have an important difference, however: 
defendants face a lower hurdle in seeking to stay a second-filed lawsuit, where 
“discretion should be freely exercised in favor of the stay” if the elements supporting the 
movant’s request are present,146 compared to the burden required to dismiss an action 
based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens,147  And this may make perfect sense in 
                                                 
144 Tools other than the forum non conveniens doctrine and the first filed rule have tentatively emerged as 
means to address parallel suits.  Doctrines such as federal abstention doctrine or anti-suit injunctions also 
provide a basis for a refusal to exercise jurisdiction, but those doctrines are largely similar to forum non 
conveniens for our purposes, and we therefore do not discuss them in depth here.  Likewise, we postpone 
discussing certain “work-arounds” that have recently surfaced—e.g., forum selection charter or bylaw 
provisions and “one-forum,” or “Savitt” motions—to the treatment of our policy recommendations in Part 
V below. For the origin of the term “Savitt” motion, see Mot. To Proceed in One Jurisdiction, In re Wyeth 
S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 4329-VCN (Mar. 25, 2009).   
145 See Silverstein v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., No. 11285, 1991 WL 12835 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1991); Jim 
Walter Corp. v. Allen, No. 10974, 1990 WL 3899, at *472-73 (Del. Ch. Jan. 12, 1990). 
146 Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 1143, 1145 (Del. 2010) (“Delaware courts should exercise discretion in 
favor of a stay where a prior action, involving the same parties and issues, is pending elsewhere in a court 
capable of doing prompt and complete justice.”); see also Sensient Colors Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 939 
A.2d 767, 774 (N.J. 2008) (“Under the first-filed rule, a New Jersey state court ordinarily will stay or 
dismiss a civil action in deference to an already pending, substantially similar lawsuit in another state, 
unless compelling reasons dictate that it retain jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted); Perry v. Del Rio, 66 
S.W.3d 239, 252 (Tex. 2001) (“It is not unusual for parties with a choice of forums to prefer one over 
another, and when more than one party can sue on the same subject matter, they may choose difference 
courts.  As a rule, when cases involving the same subject matter are brought in different courts, the court 
with the first-filed case has dominant jurisdiction and should proceed, and the other cases should abate.”) 
(citations omitted); White Light Productions, Inc. v. On the Scene Prods., Inc., 231 A.D.2d 90, 96-97 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1997) (“As a matter of New York policy, the rule has been stated that ‘proceedings begun in 
another State should not be interfered with unless there is some necessity clearly shown.  Generally the 
court which has first taken jurisdiction is the one in which the matter should be determined and it is a 
violation of the rules of comity to interfere.’”) (citations omitted). 
147 Under Delaware law, courts will only dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds if the factors 
“overwhelmingly” favor adjudicating the case in the alternative forum.  See Berger v. Intelident Solutions, 
Inc., 906 A.2d 134, 135 (Del. 2006); Candlewood Timber Group, LLC v. Pan Am. Energy, LLC, 859 A.2d 
989, 998-99 (Del. 2004); Warburg Pincus Ventures, L.P. v. Schrapper, 774 A.2d 264, 267 (Del. 2001).  
That burden decreases if only a stay of the proceedings is sought.  See HFTP Invs., LLC v. Ariad Pharms., 
Inc., 752 A.2d 115, 121 (Del. Ch. 1999).  For cases in other jurisdictions, see Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., 782 
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the garden variety tort case, where the court should respect the plaintiff’s forum choice148 
and not permit the defendant to strategically file parallel litigation to defeat it.149  But in 
shareholder class and derivative actions the need to respect the plaintiffs’ (attorney’s) 
choice of forum may take a backseat to other issues, such as what is best for the 
shareholders as a class.150  A particularly egregious example of filing suit in a foreign 
jurisdiction with a lack or regard to the class as a whole is when a plaintiffs’ attorney 
filed in a jurisdiction where they could not even get class certification.151  Which 
                                                                                                                                                 
A.2d 103, 111 (Conn. 2001) (“Accordingly, the trial court, in exercising its structured discretion, should 
place its thumb firmly on the [plaintiffs’] side of the scale, as a representation of the strong presumption in 
favor of the [plaintiffs’] chosen forum, before attempting to balance the private and public interest factors 
relevant to a forum non conveniens motion.”) (citations omitted); Ex parte Preston Hood Chevrolet, Inc., 
638 So. 2d 842, 845 (Ala. 1994) (“The court will weigh the relative advantages and burdens associated 
with litigating in the plaintiff's choice of forum.  Nevertheless, ‘unless the balance is strongly in favor of 
the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.’”) (citation omitted); and Torres v. 
Walsh, 456 N.E.2d 601, 607 (Ill. 1983) (“We also caution our trial courts that unless those [forum non 
conveniens] factors strongly favor the defendant, then the plaintiff should be allowed to exercise his choice 
in deciding in what forum to bring the case when venue is proper.”).  
148 Supra note 7. 
149 See, e.g., McWane Cast Iron Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Eng’g Co., 263 A.2d 281, 283 (Del. 
1970) (“[A] defendant should not be permitted to defeat the plaintiff's choice of forum in a pending suit by 
commencing litigation involving the same cause of action in another jurisdiction of its own choosing . . . 
[this is] impelled by considerations of comity and the necessities of an orderly and efficient administration 
of justice”); CTC Demolition Co. v. GMH AETC Mgmt./Dev. LLC, 34 A.3d 1258, 1261 (N.J. Super. App. 
Div. 2012) (“The first-filed rule, as noted at the outset, generally requires that a court with jurisdiction over 
a matter should defer to the court that first acquired jurisdiction over the dispute.  As explained by our 
Supreme Court, ‘[i]f we are to have harmonious relations with our sister states, absent extenuating 
circumstances sufficient to qualify as special equities, comity and common sense counsel that a New Jersey 
court should not interfere with a similar, earlier-filed case in another jurisdiction that is capable of affording 
adequate relief and doing complete justice.’”) (citations omitted).   
150 La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc., 46 A.3d 313, 337 (Del. Ch. 2012) 
(“Because specialized plaintiffs’ firms ultimately receive compensation from awards of attorneys’ fees, 
their interests can diverge from the class or entity they represent.  Interests diverge routinely during the 
initial period following an event that could provide a basis for filing a case.”) (citing Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 
A.2d 1148, 1158-59 (Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d sub nom. In re HealthSouth Corp. S’holders Litig., 847 A.2d 
1121 (Del. 2004) (“The application of the McWane doctrine to representative actions—i.e., class and 
derivative actions—is troublesome.  In that context, the McWane doctrine is both most useful and most 
difficult to apply.  Representative actions present the greatest chance for identical claims to be presented to 
multiple courts at the same time.  Hence, there is utility to a legal rule of decision that promotes comity and 
judicial economy by reducing the likelihood for duplicative effort and unseemly wrestling over which 
forum should take hold of a matter.  At the same time, representative actions pose certain dangers—in 
particular, the potential divergence in the best interests of the plaintiffs' attorneys and the plaintiffs they are 
purporting to represent—that are not addressed, and indeed may be exacerbated, by a legal rule that places 
determinative weight on which complaint was filed first.”)).   
151 See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg., Continuum Capital v. Nolan, C.A. No. 5687-VCL, at *4-5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 10, 
2010) (discussing the problems with filing on behalf of shareholders in Virginia where “there is case law 
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illustrates that even the first filed rule, with its lower burden, does not adequately deal 
with the choice of forum problem in representative litigation.  Thus, neither the first filed 
rule nor the doctrine of forum non conveniens responds to the multi-forum litigation 
problem in a principled manner that promotes stable and cohesive development of the 
law or protects parties’ legitimate expectations.   
A. Forum Non Conveniens as a Basis for Declining to Exercise Jurisdiction 
As the doctrine of personal jurisdiction was expanding, the countervailing rule of 
forum non conveniens was also being developed.152  With little precedent before the 
1930s,153 the Supreme Court embraced the doctrine of forum non conveniens in its Gulf 
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert decision, which held that a court could, in its discretion, decline to 
exercise jurisdiction in situations where both public and private interests point to 
adjudicating a dispute in an alternative forum.154  Echoing the Gulf Oil decision, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
from Virginia appellate courts that talk about how you cannot certify a class in an action that seeks money 
damages”).  
152 Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibration: Paths to a Via Media?, 26 
HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 385, 393 (2003) (“However ancient its lineage, forum non conveniens as a general 
tool of jurisdictional equilibration dates to the 1940s, to the very period, that is, when the Supreme Court 
was empowering states to broaden their jurisdictional reach.”). 
153 See Stein, supra note 117, at 811-12 (noting that the forum non conveniens concept was first articulated 
in 1929 in a law review article and there are almost no references to the doctrine before that article’s 
publication) (citing Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929)). 
154 330 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1947).  In 1992, thirty-two states and the District of Columbia had recognized the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens “through statute, common law, or procedural methods.”  Christopher 
Speer, The Continued Use of Forum Non Conveniens: Is It Justified?, 58 J. AIR L. & COM. 845, 846 n.2 
(1993).  Forum non conveniens was a controversial issue in other states. See Paula K. Speck, Access to 
State Courts in Transnational Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 
TEX. L. REV. 937, 949-51 (1991) (“Four . . . states have given . . . equivocal indications of following the 
federal doctrine.  Still four other states have adopted more limited versions of forum non conveniens . . . . 
In five states the existence of a forum non conveniens doctrine is a completely open question.  Courts in 
Montana and West Virginia have rejected forum non conveniens in FELA cases, otherwise leaving the 
doctrine's existence an open question.  Louisiana law precludes forum non conveniens dismissal except in a 
narrow range of situations . . . . And at this writing the decisions in Georgia and Texas seem to reject the 
doctrine altogether.”).  But, by 2002, fifteen states and the District of Columbia had adopted forum non 
conveniens through statute or rules of procedure and thirty-one states had adopted forum non conveniens 
through case law. Michael J. Jacobs, Georgia on the Non-Resident Plaintiff’s Mind: Why the General 
Assembly Should Enact Statutory Forum Non Conveniens, 36 GA. L. REV. 1109, 1110 & n.9 (2002). 
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Second Restatement states that “[a] state will not exercise jurisdiction if it is a seriously 
inconvenient forum for the trial of the action provided that a more appropriate forum is 
available to the plaintiff.”155   
To determine whether a forum is “seriously inconvenient,” the Second 
Restatement recommends consideration of a number of factors.  First, it identifies the 
“two most important factors” for the court to consider, namely the fact that “since it is for 
the plaintiff to choose the place of suit, his choice of forum should not be disturbed 
except for weighty reasons,” and that the action should not be dismissed unless an 
appropriate alternative exists.156  Those factors raise a high hurdle for a movant to 
overcome.157  Second, the Second Restatement lists the following “private” interests to be 
considered: access to proof; availability of compulsory process; possibility of viewing the 
premises; the enforceability of any resulting judgment; and “all other practical problems 
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.”158  Finally, the Second 
Restatement provides a number of “public” interests that factor into the analysis: 
inefficiencies arise if litigation is “piled up in congested centers instead of being handled 
                                                 
155 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 (1971). 
156 Id. cmt. c.   
157 See Thomson v. Palmieri, 355 F.2d 64, 66 (2d Cir. 1966) (noting that “the central question [in a motion 
to dismiss under forum non conveniens] is one of convenience, and we should respect plaintiff’s choice of 
forum as long as no harassment is intended”); All States Freight v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011 (3d Cir. 
1952) (“[The forum non conveniens] doctrine involves the dismissal of a case because the forum chosen by 
the plaintiff is so completely inappropriate and inconvenient that it is better to stop the litigation in the 
place where brought and let it start all over again somewhere else. It is quite naturally subject to careful 
limitation for it not only denies the plaintiff the generally accorded privilege of bringing an action where he 
chooses, but makes it possible for him to lose out completely, through the running of the statute of 
limitations in the forum finally deemed appropriate.”); Mobil Tankers Co. v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 363 
F.2d 611, 613-14 (3d Cir. 1966) (noting that “unless ‘the balance is strongly in favor of the (respondent), 
(the libellant’s) choice of forum should rarely be disturbed’” and reversing lower court’s dismissal under 
forum non conveniens where action was brought in New York but governed by Venezuelan law, because 
dismissal “would relegate the libellants to a foreign forum in which the procedural remedies are far less 
conducive to the fair administration of justice than those available under our admiralty rules”) (quoting 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)). 
158 Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508. 
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at its origins;” jury duty should not be imposed on members of a community unrelated to 
the litigation; and a court should not have to “untangle problems in conflict of laws, and 
in law foreign to itself.”159  Weighing these factors is a matter of discretion for the judge, 
and depends upon the facts of any given case.160 
Forum non conveniens is a limited solution to the modern multi-forum litigation 
problem because, just like contemporary minimum contacts analysis, its factors focus 
upon a defendant’s geographic connections to a state.  Inconvenience to a defendant is 
understood in terms of the physical costs of a court proceeding—whether evidence will 
be readily available, whether the premises are close enough for inspection, whether 
witnesses can be compelled to testify, whether a trial will be “easy, expeditious, and 
inexpensive,” etc.  The Second Restatement’s geographic focus is also evidenced in its 
                                                 
159 Id.  
160 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 cmt. b (1971).  The federal abstention doctrines 
often serve a similar function to forum non conveniens, although the doctrines’ origins and analysis differ 
in important respects. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 722-23 (1996) (“To be sure, the 
abstention doctrines and the doctrine of forum non conveniens proceed from a similar premise: In rare 
circumstances, federal courts can relinquish their jurisdiction in favor of another forum.  But our abstention 
doctrine is of a distinct historical pedigree, and the traditional considerations behind dismissal for forum 
non conveniens differ markedly from those informing the decision to abstain.”).  The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
first articulation of the doctrine of abstention was in Pullman, which stands for the proposition that, if there 
is an unsettled question of state law, the resolution of which may make consideration of a federal 
constitutional question unnecessary, then the federal court should abstain from deciding the case until the 
state court has resolved the state question.  R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).  
Later, the court articulated a second type of abstention in Burford, where the court established that there 
may be circumstances where a court should decline to hear a case where doing so would lead to “[d]elay, 
misunderstanding of local law, and needless federal conflict with State policy.”  Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 
319 U.S. 315, 327 (1943); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).  In each of these variations, the 
overarching concerns animating these abstention doctrines are rooted in federalism.  Quackenbush, 517 U.S. 
at 723 (“Federal courts abstain out of deference to the paramount interests of another sovereign, and the 
concern is with principles of comity and federalism.”). 
But, there is another type of abstention that more closely mimics the forum non conveniens analysis.  
In its 1976 decision in Colorado River, the Supreme Court held that, for reasons of judicial efficiency, there 
are situations where a federal court should defer to a concurrent state court proceeding.  Colorado River 
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).  Noting that the “general principle [in the 
federal courts] is to avoid duplicative litigation,” the court in Colorado River stated that it considered the 
following factors when deciding whether to abstain from exercising jurisdiction on efficiency grounds: (1) 
the avoidance of piecemeal litigation; (2) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained, namely the absence 
of any proceedings in the federal trial court, other than filing a complaint; (3) the broad implication of 
rights based in state law; (4) the convenience of the federal forum to the parties; and (5) the defendant’s 
participation in state court proceedings in pre-existing, related litigations.  Id. at 819-20. 
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comments, which suggest that the geographic locations of the incident leading to the 
dispute and of the defendant’s domicile are presumed to be suitable forums.161  Concern 
about consistent application of law is mentioned as only one of a number of factors.  
Forum non conveniens analysis is driven more by process concerns—the availability of 
witnesses, for example—viewed through a geography-focused lens, than by an interest in 
promoting stable precedent and vindicating parties’ established expectations.162 
B. The So Called “First-Filed Rule” as an Additional Basis for Determining 
Priority Among Parallel Actions 
As noted above, the first filed rule is often a complement to forum non 
conveniens.  In addition to placing a lower burden of persuasion on a person seeking a 
stay, the so called first-filed rule has the advantage over forum non conveniens of not 
being tied down directly to notions of parties’ geographic connections to a forum.163  In 
its contemporary formulation, the first-filed rule provides that, when parallel litigation 
has been initiated in separate courts, the suit that commences first has priority, and 
                                                 
161 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 cmt. f (1971). 
162 The Supreme Court has freely admitted that forum non conveniens doctrine is unstable and 
unpredictable. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994) (“The discretionary nature of the 
doctrine, combined with the multifariousness of the factors relevant to its application . . . make uniformity 
and predictability of outcome almost impossible.”). Even when the Court first adopted the forum non 
conveniens doctrine in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, the Court laid out a list of factors, relating to both the 
“private interest” of the litigants and the “public interest” of society and the judicial process, that a district 
court could consider when determining whether to dismiss a suit on forum non conveniens grounds—but 
admitted that “the combination and weight of factors requisite to given results are difficult to forecast or 
state.” 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). One author complained in 1985 that courts’ decisions are inconsistent, 
dubbing them a “quilt of ad hoc, capricious, and inconsistent” rulings. Stein, supra note 117, at 785.  Courts 
have tended simply to recite the Gulf Oil factors and then conclude that the factors’ application favors 
retention or dismissal, and decisions are virtually immune from appellate review. Id. at 831-32. If anything, 
“forum non conveniens dismissal standards have become steadily less predictable” in the last thirty years. 
Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of 
the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147, 1150 (2006). 
163 In short the first-filed rule provides just what its name implies: that second-filed actions should be 
stayed or dismissed in deference to the first-filed action. See infra notes 168 to 172 and accompanying text.  
But application of the first-filed rule can often take on aspects of forum non conveniens analysis. See 
WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 42, § 5.01 (“[T]he Delaware Supreme Court in McWane considered many 
of the same factors applied under the traditional forum non conveniens analysis.”). 
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subsequent actions are to be stayed or dismissed in deference to it.164  At its core, the 
first-filed rule is based upon respect for a plaintiff’s choice of forum and upon 
considerations of comity and the orderly administration of justice.165  Key motivations 
behind the rule include the avoidance of “wasteful duplication of time, effort, and 
expense,” the “possibility of inconsistent and conflicting rulings and judgments,” and 
preventing “an unseemly race by each party to trial and judgment in the forum of its 
choice.”166 
The origins of the first filed rule can be traced both to nineteenth century federal 
decisions that gave preference to first-filed cases in situations where two courts had 
                                                 
164 As a general matter, federal courts follow a “first-filed” rule. 15 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 101, § 
3854 (“[W]hen two courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a dispute involving the same parties and issues, 
as a general proposition the forum in which the first-filed action is lodged has priority.”); see, e.g., 
Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc., 765 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing Pacesetter Sys., Inc. 
v. Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93, 94-95 (9th Cir. 1982); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Haydu, 
675 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1982)). State courts also follow a “first-filed” rule, although, like the federal 
rule, the doctrine is discretionary. See, e.g., Leadford v. Leadford, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 9, 12 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(“[I]n many cases, considerations of comity and the prevention of multiple and vexatious litigation will 
most often militate in favor of stay [in favor of earlier filed action in different state].”); McWane Cast Iron 
Pipe Corp. v. McDowell-Wellman Eng’g Co., 263 A.2d 281, 283 (Del. 1970) (stating that a court’s 
discretion to stay an action “should be exercised freely in favor of the stay when there is a prior action 
pending elsewhere, in a court capable of doing prompt and complete justice, involving the same parties and 
the same issues”); Leslie Fay Retail Outlets, Inc. v. Gallery Mfg., Corp., 653 So.2d 1106, 1107 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1995) (“Principles of comity between sovereigns suggest that a court of one state should stay a 
proceeding pending before it on grounds that a prior filed case involving substantially the same subject 
matter and parties is pending in another state’s courts.”); Edward Rose Bldg. Co. v. Cascade Lumber Co., 
621 N.W.2d 193, 195-96 (Iowa 2001) (“A court may defer to the courts of another state where there is a 
pending proceeding involving the same subject matter and parties . . . .”); Yancoskie v. Del. River Port 
Auth., 395 A.2d 192 (N.J. 1978) (“[T]he general rule [is] that the court which first acquires jurisdiction has 
precedence in the absence of special equities.”); White Light Prods., Inc. v. On the Scene Prods., Inc., 660 
N.Y.S.2d 568, 572 (App. Div. 1997) (“Generally the court which has first taken jurisdiction is the one in 
which the matter should be determined and it is a violation of the rules of comity to interfere.”) (citation 
omitted); Space Master Int’l, Inc. v. Porta-Kamp Mfg. Co., 794 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (“As 
a matter of comity . . . it is the custom for [a] court in which the later action is instituted to stay proceedings 
therein until the prior action is determined . . . .”); see also 21 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM §308 (updated ed. 
2012) (“The mere pendency of a prior parallel suit in one state cannot be pleaded in abatement or in bar to a 
subsequent suit in another state or country, but as a matter of comity, the court of one state may stay a 
proceeding pending before it on the ground that a case involving the same subject matter and the same 
parties is pending in a court of another state . . . .”). 
165 E.g., McWane, 263 A.2d at 283; Cascade Lumber Co., 621 N.W.2d at 196; White Light Prods., 660 
N.Y.S.2d 568 at 572-73. 
166 McWane, 263 A.2d at 283. 
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concurrent jurisdiction167 and to the common law doctrine of abatement.168  It appears 
that the rule was originally developed outside of the representative litigation context as a 
mechanism for staying or dismissing a second filed suit between the same two parties.169  
As such, the first-filed rule was a tool for preventing a defendant from initiating “reactive” 
                                                 
167 The Supreme Court applied the first-filed rule as early as 1824, when it decided that “[i]n all cases of 
concurrent jurisdiction, the Court which first has possession of the subject must decide it” in a situation 
where a party to a property dispute sought equitable relief in a court of chancery after receiving an adverse 
ruling from a court of law.  Smith v. McIver, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 532, 536 (1824); see also Rickey Land & 
Cattle Co. v. Miller & Lux, 218 U.S. 258, 262 (1910) (affirming a California state court’s decision to 
enjoin proceedings in deference to a first-filed action in Nevada, reasoning that “there was concurrent 
jurisdiction in the two courts, and that the substantive issues in the Nevada and California suits were so far 
the same that the court first seised should proceed to the determination without interference, on the 
principles now well settled as between the courts of the United States and of the states”); Crosley Corp. v. 
Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 813 (1942) (citing McIver and 
stating that, when “two actions are pending in courts of equal dignity within the judicial system of a single 
sovereignty,” the party who first files suit should be able to enjoin “subsequent litigation over the same 
subject matter”).  Much of the federal law involving the first-filed rule has arisen out of suits for 
declaratory judgments, which are often brought in the patent infringement context.  See Crosley, 122 F.2d 
at 930 (noting that the first-filed rule applies “with especial force to patent suits . . . brought under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act”); see also Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185 
(1952) (patent infringement suit discussing first-filed rule); see generally Michael A. Cicero, First-To-File 
And Choice-Of-Forum Roots Run Too Deep for Micron To Curb Most Races to the Courthouse, 90 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 547, 550-57 (2008) (discussing the evolution of the first-filed rule in the patent 
infringement context). 
168 State courts tend to base their first-filed rules on the doctrine of abatement and on general principles of 
comity rather than on the line of federal authority that evolved from Smith, as described in the previous 
footnote. See, e.g., McWane, 263 A.2d at 283 (stating that a court’s discretion to stay an action “should be 
exercised freely in favor of the stay when there is a prior action pending elsewhere, in a court capable of 
doing prompt and complete justice, involving the same parties and the same issues”); O’Loughlin v. 
O’Loughlin, 78 A.2d 64, 68 (N.J. 1951) (“Considerations of comity forbid interference with the 
prosecution of a proceeding in a foreign jurisdiction capable of affording adequate relief and doing 
complete justice, unless there be a special equity sufficient in conscience to stay the hand of the 
defendant . . . . The rule of comity is grounded in the policy of avoiding conflicts of jurisdiction, unless 
upon strong grounds, and the general principle that the court which first acquires jurisdiction of the issue 
has precedence.”).   
Although the common law doctrine of abatement closely resembles the first-filed rule articulated by 
the Supreme Court in McIver, neither the abatement case law nor McIver and its progeny appear to invoke 
or reference the other in the discussion of their respective doctrines.  Abatement, in its general sense, refers 
to “a termination of the proceedings of an action by reason of some formal defect or misnomer.” 1 C.J.S. 
Abatement and Revival § 1; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY  (9th ed. 2009) (defining “abatement” in 
relevant part to mean “[t]he suspension or defeat of a pending action for a reason unrelated to the merits of 
the claim”).  One ground for an abatement defense is “that there is a separate, identical lawsuit pending.”  
Hyman v. City of Gastonia, 466 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing 1 Am.Jur.2d Abatement, Survival, 
and Revival §§ 1-44); see also Allan D. Vestal, Repetitive Litigation, 45 IOWA L. REV. 525, 528 (1960) 
(“Under the common law the pendency of an action in a court of general jurisdiction involving the same 
parties and the same cause of action was grounds for a plea of abatement in a second suit brought on the 
same cause of action.”). 
169 See, e.g., Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148, 1159 n.21 (Del. Ch. 2003) (discussing the application of 
Delaware’s first-filed rule to representative suits, and stating that, “in this regard, it is noteworthy that 
McWane itself did not involve a representative action”). 
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litigation that would make an end-run around a plaintiff by filing a subsequent action in a 
forum more to its liking.170   
As originally articulated, the doctrine of abatement (and its first-filed component) 
generally applied only to competing actions within the same state, and the doctrine did 
not apply to identical suits pending in multiple jurisdictions.171  Over the course of the 
                                                 
170 See, e.g., Thompson v. FitzGerald, 198 A. 58, 62 (Pa. 1938) (“‘It is a doctrine of law too long 
established to require a citation of authorities, that, where a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide 
every question which occurs in the cause, and . . . where the jurisdiction of a court, and the right of a 
plaintiff to prosecute his suit in it, have once attached, that right cannot be arrested or taken away by 
proceedings in another court. These rules have their foundation, not merely in comity, but on necessity.  
For if one may enjoin, the other may retort by injunction, and thus the parties be without remedy; being 
liable to a process for contempt in one, if they dare to proceed in the other.’” (quoting Peck v. Jenness, 48 
U.S. (7 How.) 612, 624 (1849)); see also McWane, 263 A.2d at 283 (“[A] defendant should not be 
permitted to defeat the plaintiff's choice of forum in a pending suit by commencing litigation involving the 
same cause of action in another jurisdiction of its own choosing . . . .”).   
Sometimes, courts would not simply enjoin “reactive” litigation, but would prevent a party from suing 
in another forum even when that party was unaware of the pending suit against it, in order to prevent 
duplicative litigation.  In Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp., the 
court enjoined the defendant from prosecuting a suit in New York, on the ground that the plaintiff had filed 
suit in Delaware, one day before the defendant filed. 163 A. 646 (Del. Ch. 1932). The court held that it was 
irrelevant that the defendant had received the plaintiff’s subpoena after the plaintiff had received the 
defendant’s subpoena. Id. at 647-48.  On the other hand, a court would only issue an injunction against a 
later filed action if the earlier-filed action could definitively resolve the case. E.g., Peyton v. William C. 
Peyton Corp., 187 A. 849, 852 (Del. Ch. 1936) (“[W]here the courts of the forum in which the first suit was 
inaugurated are, by reason of the absence of jurisdiction over all the parties in interest, powerless to render 
a decree that finally and completely concludes the matter in controversy, an injunction ought not to issue 
against the bringing of suits elsewhere if the effect of such injunction would be to interfere with an attempt 
by the defendant to bring the matter to a head before some other court where all the parties could be served 
and their respective claims conclusively determined.”). Courts would also decline to issue injunctions 
against later-filed actions if they could not obtain jurisdiction over the parties to be enjoined. E.g., Smith v. 
Biggs Boiler Works Co., 85 A.2d 365, 367 (Del. Ch. 1951). 
171 Historically, for the purpose of determining whether abatement was proper, there was a significant 
doctrinal distinction between in personam actions and in rem or quasi in rem.  When the competing actions 
at issue were in personam, the traditional rule was that the first suit would only abate the second suit when 
the jurisdiction between the two courts was concurrent—that is, within the same state or jurisdictional 
territory.  See  Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Brune’s Assignee, 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 588, 592 (1877) (“At 
law, the pendency of a former action between the same parties for the same cause is pleadable in abatement 
to a second action, because the latter is regarded as vexatious.  But the former action must be in a domestic 
court; that is, in a court of the State in which the second action has been brought.”); Lynch v. Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co., 17 F. 627, 628-29 (D.N.H. 1883) (“The general rule is that a plea of lis alibi pendens is not good 
when the litigation is in a court of foreign jurisdiction.”); Colson v. Pelgram, 259 N.Y. 370, 375 (1932) (“It 
is also the general rule that, where separate actions have been instituted between the same parties in 
reference to the same subject-matter in courts having concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first obtains 
jurisdiction with adequate power to administer full justice should continue to exercise it.”); Smith v. 
Lathrop, 44 Pa. 326, 330-31 (1863) (holding that, although full faith and credit would be given to a foreign 
court’s judgment, the mere pendency of a suit in a foreign court could not bar proceedings in a different 
sovereign’s courts); 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 6; see also CHARLES D. DRAKE, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SUITS BY ATTACHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES § 701 (3d ed. 1866) 
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twentieth century, this limitation as to interstate disputes disappeared,172 and the first-
filed rule became broadly applicable to a wide variety of actions.  As representative 
                                                                                                                                                 
(summarizing Massachusetts, Alabama, Louisiana, Indiana, and California attachment cases as supporting 
the proposition that stays but not dismissals were appropriate, reasoning that jurisdictional conflicts “are 
avoided by considering [the parallel case] as cause for suspending the action of the creditor, until the 
attachment against his debtor is determined, when it can be certainly known what the rights of the parties 
are,” and recommending that a court facing a parallel proceeding “either suspend all proceedings until the 
attachment suit is determined, or render judgment with a stay of execution”).  Thus, where identical cases 
were pending in both federal and state court, or in the courts of two different states, the defendant in the 
second suit was not entitled to abatement. See Penn Gen. Cas. Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 
U.S. 189, 195 (1935) (“Where the judgment sought is strictly in personam, for the recovery of money or for 
an injunction compelling or restraining action by the defendant, both a state court and a federal court 
having concurrent jurisdiction may proceed with the litigation, at least until judgment is obtained in one 
court which may be set up as res adjudicata in the other.”); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 
(1922) (“The rule, therefore, has become generally established that where the action first brought is in 
personam and seeks only a personal judgment, another action for the same cause in another jurisdiction is 
not precluded.”) (collecting cases).  This requirement of concurrent jurisdiction for in personam actions 
developed because, under the common law, abatement would not lie if the first filed action was in a foreign 
court.  See Vestal, supra note 170, at 528-31 (discussing historical development of rule).   
By contrast, if the competing suits were in rem or quasi in rem, then regardless of jurisdictional 
relationship between the two courts, the second suit would be abated in favor of the first.  See Penn Gen. 
Cas. Co., 294 U.S. at 195 (“[I]f the two suits are in rem or quasi in rem, requiring that the court or its 
officer have possession or control of the property which is the subject of the suit in order to proceed with 
the cause and to grant the relief sought, the jurisdiction of one court must of necessity yield to that of the 
other.”) (citing cases).  The rationale is that “there is only one res and first court to assume jurisdiction over 
it withdraws it from the judicial power of the other as if it had been carried physically into a different 
territorial sovereignty.” 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 18 (citing Tonnemacher v. 
Touche Ross & Co., 920 P.2d 5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996)).  The Supreme Court in Kline v. Burke Construction 
Co. reasoned as follows when explaining why the separate sovereignty of the competing courts was not a 
relevant inquiry when the actions involved a single res:   
The rank and authority of the courts are equal, but both courts cannot possess or control 
the same thing at the same time, and any attempt to do so would result in unseemly 
conflict.  The rule, therefore, that the court first acquiring jurisdiction shall proceed 
without interference from a court of the other jurisdiction is a rule of right and of law 
based upon necessity, and where the necessity, actual or potential, does not exist the rule 
does not apply.  Since that necessity does exist in actions in rem and does not exist in 
actions in personam, involving a question of personal liability only, the rule applies in the 
former but does not apply in the latter.   
 260 U.S. at 235. 
172 During the twentieth century, as judicial workloads increased, courts began to use their inherent 
discretionary power to stay a later filed case in favor of a prior pending action when the conditions for 
abatement did not exist (e.g., where there were competing in personam actions in courts of both state and 
federal jurisdiction).  As the Seventh Circuit described, “[w]hile it seems to be well established that a 
federal court is not required to abate the normal in personam action on a plea of a pending action in a state 
court, nevertheless it is within the discretionary power of the district court to stay its proceedings pending 
the completion of state proceedings.” Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 1970), 
overruled by Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977), rev’d, 437 U.S. 655 (1978); see 
also Will, 437 U.S. at 665 (“There are sound reasons for our reiteration of the rule that a district court’s 
decision to defer proceedings because of concurrent state litigation is generally committed to the discretion 
of that court.  No one can seriously contend that a busy federal trial judge, confronted both with competing 
demands on his time for matters properly within his jurisdiction and with inevitable scheduling difficulties 
because of the unavailability of lawyers, parties, and witnesses, is not entrusted with a wide latitude in 
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litigation grew more common during the twentieth century, the first-filed rule also 
became widely invoked in determining priority between representative plaintiffs.  In 
other words, the first filed rule was not only cited to prevent a defendant from usurping a 
plaintiff’s choice of forum by filing a subsequent action somewhere else, but also to sort 
out priority among plaintiffs, as when parallel class actions are filed.   
Fortunately—and despite the view that the first-filed rule is and should be taken 
literally and applied mechanistically173—some courts have not applied the rule in that 
fashion, and have from time to time acknowledged that the rule does not translate well to 
shareholder representative actions contemporaneously filed in multiple forums.  This 
should not be surprising.  The text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23, which 
most states have used as a model for its own class action rules,174 does not seem to work 
well with a mechanical first filed rule.  Rather, it appears to invite judicial administration 
of the class action proceeding.  For instance, Rule 23.1 provides that the named plaintiff 
must “fairly and adequately represent the interests of shareholders…who are similarly 
situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association.”  The requirement of fair 
and adequate representation may depend on the litigants’ conduct, not just their speed in 
filing the complaint.175   
                                                                                                                                                 
setting his own calendar.”); Vestal, supra note 168, at 540 ( “[T]he courts have discretion in the manner in 
which they will handle the problem of judicial administration.  They need not use a mechanical test such as 
priority of actions as used in abatement under the traditional view.  There is a certain degree of discretion 
regarding how cases will be handled in the interest of justice.”). 
173 See, e.g., Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in 
Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 110 (2009) (“[I]nflexibility or rigidity promotes the positive goals 
of predictability and objectivity.”). 
174 Stephen Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context:  A Preliminary View, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1499 (2008).   
175 “A shareholder plaintiff does not sue for his direct benefit. Instead, he alleges injury to and seeks redress 
on behalf of the corporation. Further, the board or any shareholder with standing may represent the injured 
party. Thus, this Court places less emphasis on the celerity of such plaintiffs and grants less deference to 
the speedy plaintiff’s choice of forum.” Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 349 (Del. Ch. 2007); see also In re 
Oclaro, Inc. Derivative Litig., 2011 WL 4345099, at * 4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2011) (considering it 
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Representative shareholder suits are different from individual litigation in other 
ways.  Unlike an individual plaintiff’s case, when a different shareholder files a class or 
derivative action, it is not “reactive” in the usual sense.176  As far back as 1935, even 
before the United States Supreme Court refined the doctrine of forum non conveniens in 
Gilbert, the New York Supreme Court stayed a first-filed derivative suit in favor of a 
similar derivative suit brought two days later in Delaware.177  Additionally, shortly after 
the modernization of the class action in the 1966 amendments, the “the allure of state 
class action litigation format as an instrument of interstate forum shopping became 
apparent.”178  Indeed, “[c]ontemporary class action practice seems to confound the basic 
assumption of preclusion law by preferring multiple cases to just one.  This has long been 
true in certain substantive fields [and] overlapping class actions ha[ve] increased as the 
class action bar has become more entrepreneurial, more sophisticated, and more 
competitive.”179  As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys compete both to bring the most 
meritorious claims, which have the highest potential pay-out, but also to be the first to 
                                                                                                                                                 
important that the plaintiff was not only the first filed, but had actually taking the lead in consolidating 
parallel disputes when determining who the lead plaintiff would be in the derivative action).  
176 A typical reactive filing is one where the defendant races to another court house to file in the forum of 
its choice after the plaintiff has already filed a case.  See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Bayer 
CropScience, L.P., 2008 WL 2673376, at * 4 (Del. Ch. July 2, 2008) (“In other words, one of the 
underlying principles [the first filed rule] is that a plaintiff’s choice of forum should be respected (assuming 
it is a proper forum) and a defendant should not be allowed to engage in forum shopping by subsequently 
filing its own complaint in another court.”). 
177 Levy v. Pac. E. Corp., 277 N.Y.S. 659 (Sup. Ct. 1935).  The Delaware case had already been tried, and 
the New York court was particularly mindful under these circumstances of the potential for “unnecessary 
annoyance and expense to litigants in prosecuting or defending independent suits comprehending the same 
subject-matter.”  Id.  With respect to priority of filing, and with laudable flexibility in applying the first-
filed “rule,” the court observed that “[a]s a practical matter the pending actions may be deemed to have 
been simultaneously commenced and in any event priority of two days in the institution of the New York 
action does not necessarily control the court's discretion.”  Id.  What was important, then, was not priority 
of filing but rather the extent of effort already invested by the other court and the parties in that forum, 
regardless of which action was technically filed first.   
178 Burbank, supra note 174, at 1505.  
179 Id. at 1509 (citations omitted).   
64 
 
settle with the defendants.180  In representative stockholder litigation, the defendants are 
looking to “buy” a global release from shareholder claims, no matter how weak these 
claims are, and will settle with the plaintiffs even when there is no additional financial 
benefit to the shareholders if that can ensure that a transaction they have already proposed 
as good for the stockholders will close in a timely manner.181  In such an environment, it 
is obvious why judges have been skeptical of applying a first-filed rule in shareholder 
representative actions, especially when there exists the potential that plaintiffs’ attorneys 
will file cases not necessarily in the best forum for the class, but for their own 
pocketbooks.182    
Thus, in the context of competing shareholder representative actions, refusing to 
accord inflexible priority to a first-filed action solely on the basis of chronology of filing 
is related to an important goal of representative litigation, namely making sure that the 
plaintiff adequately represents the interests of the group on whose behalf the case is 
brought.183  Indeed, our review of the application of the first-filed rule in Delaware cases 
involving multi-forum shareholder representative actions—the most extensive body of 
such precedent—reveals that not once have the Delaware courts relied exclusively on the 
rule’s presumption in granting a stay in favor of a representative action elsewhere that 
                                                 
180 Griffith & Lahav, supra note 2, at *6. 
181 Id. at *27-32. 
182 See id. at 36-39 (discussing how judges decide, or approve awards of, attorney’s fees); infra note 184 
and accompanying text.  
183 See also Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665, 672 (2d Cir. 1961) (affirming denial of stay of later-filed 
derivative suit despite pendency of first-filed state court derivative action, due in part to the greater breadth 
of claims presented, and despite describing “a judicial trend to stay subsequently initiated derivative actions 
to await a final decision in an earlier suit.”); Stepak v. Tracinda Corp., 1989 WL 100884 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 
1989) (staying first-filed Delaware class action in favor of a California class action, and declining to apply 
the first-filed rule where service of process of the Delaware complaint did not occur until two years after 
filing).  The availability of a summary statutory remedy has also been a persistent factor underlying 
decisions in Delaware not to stay corporate litigation in deference to a prior filed action elsewhere that 
encompassed the potential relief available under the Delaware statute.  See, e.g., Coaxial Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
CNA Fin. Corp., 367 A.2d 994, 998 (Del. 1976) (summary statutory proceeding to compel convening of 
stockholder meeting); 1-5 WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 42, §5.01[d]. 
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was filed earlier but reasonably contemporaneously, where the Delaware plaintiffs 
wished to continue the Delaware action and had not previously filed a similar 
representative action elsewhere.184  To the contrary, over twenty years ago, when 
confronted with circumstances suggesting that the first-filed rule should not be woodenly 
applied, Chancellor William T. Allen concluded that the rule was not “ironclad,” and 
should not even be applied to determine priority as between class actions that had not yet 
been certified as such.185  This is not to say that the courts, in Delaware and elsewhere, 
have not frequently given priority to a first-filed action:  they have, often, but for reasons 
independent of mere chronological priority, and most commonly because of the advanced 
state of proceedings in the first-filed forum,186 or because the prior-filed suit was in 
                                                 
184 Cf. Kaufman v. Kumar, 2007 WL 1765617 (Del. Ch. June 8, 2007) (staying derivative action in favor of 
suit filed over two years earlier); Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Scrushy, 2004 WL 423122 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 2004) 
(staying later derivative action on ground that it was filed only after the courts, lawyers, and plaintiffs 
involved had decided where the derivative claims would be tried); La. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 
2001 WL 32638, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2001) (partially staying action in favor of earlier filed federal class 
action, where the Delaware derivative claim was simply a “repackaged” version of the federal claim); 
Corwin v. Silverman, 1999 WL 499456 (Del. Ch. June 30, 1999) (staying derivative suit in favor of earlier 
filed action, where the earlier action named as defendants non-director officers who could not be parties to 
the Delaware action); Schnell v. Porta Sys. Corp., 1994 WL 148276 (Del. Ch. Apr. 12, 1994) (granting stay 
of Delaware action, filed three weeks after New York action, on forum non conveniens grounds); Lewis v. 
LFC Holding Corp., 1986 WL 936 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 1986) (staying putative class action in favor of actions 
that had been pending in another state for over six months); Zimmerman v. Home Shopping Network, 1989 
WL 102488 (Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 1989) (staying derivative action in favor of action filed in district court over 
a year earlier); Hurst v. General Dynamics Corp., 583 A.2d 1334 (Del. Ch. 1990) (staying second-filed 
derivative action in favor of Canadian action filed over a year earlier); Schnell v. Porta Sys. Corp., 1994 
WL 148276 (Del. Ch. Apr. 12, 1994) (staying second-filed derivative suit on grounds of forum non 
conveniens); Monheit v. O’Neil, 1980 WL 268105 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1980) (staying class action brought 
by plaintiffs who had previously commenced similar federal litigation); H.K. Porter Co. v. Mo. Portland 
Cement Co., 1976 WL 2445 (Del. Ch. July 9, 1976) (staying action to determine election of directors in 
favor of prior and more comprehensive federal action, in which plaintiff had presented but withdrew the 
same claim for determination of the election).  
185 Jim Walter Corp. v. Allen, 1989 WL 3899 (Del. Ch. Jan. 12, 1990) (declining to stay a defendant class 
action despite pendency of earlier-filed Texas class action presenting overlapping issues).  In Jim Walter 
the court supported its denial of a stay in part on the applicability of Delaware law to determine the veil-
piercing issue, although the court did not regard that “as the most significant of the factors that are 
evaluated on a forum non conveniens motion.”).   
186 E.g., Post v. Peters, 1989 WL 1706 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 1976) (staying action to enjoin stockholder 
meeting, brought by a plaintiff who had previously brought the same claim in California federal court, and 
argument had already been scheduled in that proceeding); Issen & Settler v. GCS Enters., 1997 WL 
2588 (Del. Ch. Dec. 2, 1977) (staying action challenging merger, where same plaintiffs had brought 
litigation in Illinois federal court three years earlier and that court had already denied a preliminary 
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federal court and the state claims were supplemental to substantial securities law claims 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.187   
Thus, the problem is one of perception: it is easy to take the doctrinal formulation 
of the first-filed rule too literally, and to miss the operation of the judicial discretion that 
is at the core of the rule.  To the extent that the first-filed rule is understood as affording 
strongly presumptive priority to a shareholder class or derivative action filed only slightly 
earlier than another such action in a different forum, that understanding is unsupported by 
historical application of the doctrine, and is inconsistent with sound policy, as we argue 
below.188   
IV. Diagnosing the Contemporary System’s Pathologies 
Having now completed our review of the development of the doctrinal framework 
governing multi-forum representative litigation, we return to a topic broached earlier,189 
namely the ways and extent to which that framework operates suboptimally.  Our 
approach to this topic is more impressionistic than empirical, although we claim that it is 
at least informed by exposure to a steady diet of direct experience with application of the 
doctrinal framework.  We identify two principal categories of pathologies associated with 
the current framework:  pathologies of judicial administration, in which current doctrine 
leads courts and litigants into actions that unjustifiably increase the direct costs of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
injunction application); Tanzer v. Greyhound Computer Corp., 1978 WL 4953 (Del. Ch. July 26, 1978) 
(staying action filed by same plaintiffs as in a New York case filed 18 months earlier, where the New York 
court had already denied some of plaintiffs’ discovery requests); DiRocco v. Roessner, 1985 WL 
11567 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 1985) (staying class action brought only after takeover bidder’s motion for 
preliminary injunction was denied in a prior-filed federal action). 
187 Corwin v. Silverman, 1999 WL 499456 (Del. Ch. June 30, 1999) (staying derivative suit in favor of 
prior filed federal class action that encompassed the Delaware fiduciary duty claims but also involved 
federal securities claims subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction); Schnell, 1994 WL 148276 (same).  
188 See infra Section V.A. 
189 See supra Part I. 
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litigation system; and pathologies in which the current doctrinal framework impedes the 
development of bodies of precedent that promote economic efficiency. 
A. Pathologies of Judicial Administration 
We previously pointed out that in our current system, in which representative 
litigation readily extends to multiple forums, rational judges, defendants, and plaintiffs’ 
counsel have incentives to engage in behaviors that result in deadweight costs:  
unnecessarily expediting litigation, accepting inadequate settlements and awarding 
inappropriate attorney’s fees, prematurely filing derivative suits that unnecessarily 
engender dismissal motion practice, and inadequately supervising selection of class 
representatives and lead counsel.  To that list, we would add one more pathology of 
judicial administration: namely, the concern, regularly and justifiably raised by judicial 
authorities, about overcrowded dockets.  For example, the June 2012 report of the task 
force established by the Chief Judge of the State of New York to address the handling of 
commercial litigation in New York notes: 
In New York County alone, the Justices now confront a Commercial 
Division docket with thousands of cases and motions—and the docket 
continues to grow.  This burgeoning, increasingly complex workload 
limits the amount of time available for judges to prepare for any one case 
in advance of hearings, affects the atmosphere in courtrooms and delays 
resolution.190 
 
Judges facing similar constraints—and complaints of that sort are legion191—should 
welcome doctrinal reform that would clarify how to resolve claims of competing 
                                                 
190 THE CHIEF JUDGE’S TASK FORCE ON COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (June 2012) at 7, available at  
http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/comdiv/PDFs/ChiefJudgesTaskForceOnCommercialLitigationInThe21stpd
f.pdf.   
191 See, e.g., American Bar Association, House of Delegates Resolution 302, adopted Aug. 8-9, 2011, 
Report: Crisis in the Courts: Defining the Problem, at 1, 14, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/justice_center/task_force_on_the_preservation_of_the_justice_system.
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jurisdiction in representative commercial litigation.192  In the absence of any formal 
mechanism to prevent or minimize duplicative representative litigation,193 failure to 
develop and consistently apply a sensible doctrinal approach to the problem will 
inevitably exacerbate the burden on judicial dockets.  Judicial authorities who rightfully 
worry about the impact of crowded dockets should no less passionately criticize a 
doctrinal system that does not clearly and effectively direct representative litigation 
involving the same transaction and the same alleged misconduct into a single forum.   
                                                                                                                                                 
html (stating “The courts of our country are in crisis,” and advocating the use of specialty courts, including 
business courts, to promote efficiency); Chief Justice Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye, State of the Judiciary 
Address to a Joint Session of the California Legislature (Mar. 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/17293.htm (due to court closures and layoffs necessitated by funding cuts, “[w]e 
are already seeing worrisome and potentially dangerous delays in the resolution of cases”); Chief Justice 
Barbara A. Madsen, State of the Judiciary Address (January 17, 2012), available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/content/stateOfJudiciary/january2012.pdf (noting that “in these tough 
economic times, the public’s needs are at their highest levels and the courts again face a significant struggle 
to provide court services); Chief Justice Carol Hunstein, State of the Judiciary Address (Mar. 16, 2010), 
available at http://www.gasupreme.us/ press_releases/2012_soj.pdf (noting that growing caseloads and 
decreased funding make it “increasingly difficult [for courts] to do [their] constitutionally mandated 
duties”); see also Editorial, Threadbare American Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/opinion/threadbare-american-justice.html?_r=0. 
192 Cf. In re The Topps Co., Inc. S’holder Litig., 859 N.Y.S.2d 907, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) 
(emphasizing one-day filing priority and geographic contacts with New York in declining to stay a case 
involving directors’ compliance with fiduciary duties under Delaware law, and stating “[t]here has been no 
showing that retention of the action would unduly burden the Commercial Division, a specialized 
commercial court that has been successfully handling complex commercial and corporate litigation since its 
inception in 1993”). 
193 In describing the work of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Judge Heyburn points out that 
“The growth of multidistrict cases has created its own imperative. The Panel's work plays an increasingly 
important role in the distribution and reduction of the judicial workload.” Hon. John G. Heyburn II, 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: “Reflections on the Panel’s Work” (Jan. 2012), at 2, available at  
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/2012_jointcle_materials/ 
7_2_Judicial_Panel_on_Multidistrict_Litigation_Reflections_on_the_Panels_Work.authcheckdam.pdf.  He 
then asks, rhetorically: “Can you imagine the workload consequences to our judiciary were we unable to 
avail ourselves of the Section 1407 mechanism for centralization?”  Id.  It has been suggested, although 
without much hope, that a similar institution might be created to address multi-forum state litigation.  
Quinn, supra note 2.  As Professor Quinn acknowledges, that possibility is undoubtedly unrealistic, but the 
suggestion does point up the importance of improving the existing framework for limiting multi-forum 
litigation. See also Johnson, supra note 42, at 380 n.133 (discussing the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act 
§ 201, 14 U.L.A. 677 (1991), and noting that “[p]ast efforts to institute a formal process for coordination 
among states have failed”). 
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B. Non-Authoritative Adjudication Impeding Development of Precedent 
The pathologies of judicial administration reviewed above are the most directly 
visible costs of the current doctrinal framework governing multi-forum representative 
litigation.  Those costs, however, could conceivably be eliminated by any clear rule, 
however arbitrary, that resolved competing jurisdictional claims.  A rule giving priority 
according to alphabetical order of plaintiffs’ names, for example, would quickly and 
efficiently resolve competing forum claims, and would make Angela Aalborg an 
extremely valuable stockholder client.  Equally sensibly, one could accord priority based 
on which suit is filed first.194   
We are interested, however, in a doctrinal approach that not only reduces the 
incidence and extent of competing representative litigation, but does so in ways that are 
less arbitrary than the current approach.  Accordingly, we focus on another, less visible 
pathology—adjudication by forums whose decisions are neither authoritative nor the 
product of specialized application of governing law.  As we explain below, a doctrinal 
framework that unduly favors such adjudication discourages societally valuable 
development of controlling precedent.   
1. Why Concerns About Adjudicative Efficiency Apply to Corporate Law 
 We begin that explanation by noting the importance of efficient legal enforcement 
mechanisms to the modern economy, and, conversely, the risk of sub-optimal 
adjudication of disputes.  Consider, for example, the role of efficient enforcement 
mechanisms in the area of contract, where a widely ranging body of literature has 
examined how formal and informal governance mechanisms are crucial in order for 
                                                 
194 See infra Section V.A for a critique of such a rule. 
70 
 
parties to coordinate their future expectations.195  That ability to project exchange 
through time by means of enforcing market actors’ future commitments is a hallmark of 
modern capitalism, providing the foundation upon which impersonal, geographically-
unbounded markets are built.196   
Similar to the case of contract, efficient enforcement is likewise important in the 
adjudication of disputes involving a corporation’s internal affairs.197  Indeed, unlike 
European style “company laws” that often address regulatory issues, such as antitrust 
concerns or securities fraud, American corporate law statutes essentially operate as a 
specialized contract law governing the relations of the fiduciaries who manage a 
corporation and the corporation’s stockholders.198  For example, closely held 
                                                 
195 For useful overviews, see Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and 
Enforcement in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517 (2007), and Barak D. Richman, Firms, 
Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
2328-67 (2004). 
196 See MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 174 (1977) (“[T]he 
moment at which courts focus on expectation damages rather than restitution or specific performance to 
give a remedy for nondelivery is . . . [when] [c]ontract then becomes an instrument for protecting against 
changes in supply and price in a market economy.”); see also Avner Greif, Commitment, Coercion, and 
Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange, in HANDBOOK OF NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 727, 730 (Claude Menard and Mary Shirley, eds., 2005); Michael Trebilcock 
& Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 1517, 1522-25 (2007).   
197 This similarity is unsurprising given the close relationship between the two bodies of law.  See Mark J. 
Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 262 (2002) (“[C]orporate law . . . is in many 
dimensions a special form of contract law”).   
As defined in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the term “internal affairs” “concerns the 
relations inter se of the corporation, its shareholders, directors, officers or agents.”  § 313, cmt. a.  We 
advocate a somewhat narrower definition of that term, however, that would exclude agents in general, on 
the theory that agency relationships with the corporation as principal are quite diverse (including ordinary 
employees, retained consultants, etc.) and often concentrated in a specific state, whose laws would 
presumably govern the agency relationship.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 291 
(“The rights and duties of a principal and agent toward each other are determined by the local law of the 
state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the parties and the 
transaction under the principles stated in § 6.”).  The law of the state of incorporation does not ordinarily 
govern the relationship between the corporation and its agents, as such.  See, e.g., Model Business 
Corporation Act subchapter E, Introductory Comment 1 (“The indemnification of employees and agents, 
whose duties are prescribed by sources of law other than corporation law (e.g., contract and agency law), is 
beyond the scope of this subchapter.”). 
198 See Luca Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class 
§ 3.7, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW (2d ed. 2009).   
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corporations are often governed by a shareholders’ agreement and a certificate of 
incorporation that conforms to that agreement.199  The resulting legal relationship among 
the participants (shareholders, directors, and officers) thus strongly resembles the 
relationships among the participants in what we might more readily describe as 
contractual entities, like limited liability companies, where the operating agreement 
supplements the statutory default rules in providing the framework for the relationship.  
Even where a corporation’s shares are publicly traded and widely held, moreover, there 
are disputes on matters of internal corporate affairs that are also essentially contractual in 
nature, such as controversies over the interpretation of the dividend, voting, or other 
rights of preferred stock.200  In these cases, the courts have been explicit that principles 
applicable to contract interpretation in general are equally applicable where the 
interpretational issue involves a provision of the corporate charter or bylaws.201 
 More broadly, there is a widely held conception of the corporation as a “nexus of 
contracts,” a term described as “shorthand for the complex arrangements of many sorts 
that those who associate voluntarily in the corporation will work out among 
themselves.”202  On this view of the corporation, the same importance ascribed to 
consistent contract enforcement and clear judicial guidance to market actors, as discussed 
in the previous subsection addressing ordinary contracts, applies equally to the handling 
of disputes involving internal corporate affairs.  It has been suggested that the “nexus of 
                                                 
199 See, e.g., 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. §7.32, at 7-272 (2011 Rev.) (“Shareholders of closely held 
corporations, ranging from family businesses to joint ventures owned by large public corporations, 
frequently enter into agreements that govern the operation of the enterprise.”). 
200 E.g., Alta Berkeley VI C.V. v. Omneon, Inc., 41 A.3d 381, 385 (Del. 2012); Matulich v. Aegis 
Communs. Essar Invs., Ltd., 942 A.2d 596 (Del. 2008); Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843 
(Del. 1998). 
201 E.g., Ellingwood v. Wolf’s Head Oil Ref. Co., 38 A.2d 743, 747 (Del. 1944) (“In interpreting the 
meaning of charter provisions the same method is applied as that which is followed in interpreting written 
contracts generally.”).  
202 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 12. 
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contracts” perspective undermines the strength of the corporation’s relationship with the 
state of incorporation, because it rejects the concept of corporations as creatures of the 
incorporating state, and thus denies them an “umbilical cord that would tie a dispute 
against a corporation to the forum of the chartering state.”203  To the contrary, we see the 
“nexus of contracts” perspective as strengthening that cord:  the voluntary choice of law 
made whenever an investor joins a corporation recognizing that the law of the state of 
incorporation will govern its internal affairs creates a far more significant tie to the state 
of incorporation than this notion of the corporation as a “concession” or “creature” of the 
incorporating state. 
2. Forums Providing Governing Law Supply More Efficient Adjudication 
 Having thus acknowledged the importance of efficient adjudication of disputes 
involving commercial dealings, we next submit that such efficiency is impaired by a 
doctrinal system that undervalues the development of controlling precedent, and the role 
of the courts of the forum that supplies that governing law.  More specifically, in the case 
of the law governing voluntary private commercial relationships, it is important that 
courts responsible for developing that law be preferred as adjudicatory forums over 
courts whose application of that law is not, and will not be considered, authoritative.204   
Unnecessarily deciding a case implicating a foreign jurisdiction’s commercial law 
robs the market of authoritative precedent, which gives important guidance in future 
                                                 
203 Stevelman, supra note 173, at 77. 
204 We acknowledge that, in many situations where a choice of law provision has been included, the parties 
have also expressly chosen the forum in which disputes are to be heard.  In those situations, we do not 
advocate disturbing the general rule that deference should be given to the parties’ contractual choice of 
forum.  See, e.g., Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9-10 (upholding deference to contractual 
choice of forum); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (1991) (accord); In re 
AutoNation, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 663, 668 (Tex. 2007); British W. Indies Guar. Trust Co. v. Banque 
Internationale A Luxembourg, 172 A.D.2d 234, 234 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); Baker v. Impact Holding, Inc., 
2010 WL 1931032, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2010) (enforcing a stockholders’ agreement provision selecting 
a Texas forum, in a case involving the corporation’s internal affairs). 
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transactions.  Parties need a single, definitive answer, not only to resolve whatever 
dispute they may have but also to shape future commercial dealings.  The courts of the 
jurisdiction whose law is at stake are best positioned to provide the authoritative decision 
that parties and the market in general need.  Denying those courts that opportunity saps a 
forum’s law of its vitality, and in so doing undercuts the public’s interest in a rich, 
responsive body of law that provides timely answers to ongoing issues. 
Of course, judiciaries throughout the United States are staffed with competent 
judges capable of producing serviceable opinions applying other jurisdiction’s laws.  On 
balance, however, doctrinal complexity means that optimal applications of a 
jurisdiction’s law will most likely be accomplished by that jurisdiction’s courts, which 
are steeped in its traditions and nuances.   
We say this for several reasons.  First, there is a risk that a “foreign” court will 
misinterpret governing law, due to unfamiliarity with its nuances.  Second, even a correct 
outcome (correct in the sense of accurately predicting how the governing law would be 
applied) can only be achieved with extra judicial effort, no matter how capable the judge.  
Learning and properly applying the law of another jurisdiction are more work for a judge 
than applying the law which the judge routinely encounters, and presumably the last thing 
judges need is extra, unnecessary work.  Third, when the consistent management of cases 
is important to ensure that representative litigation works for its intended beneficiaries, 
and that excess agency costs do not compromise its integrity and effectiveness, there is an 
especially important interest in giving primacy to the courts of the state whose law is at 
stake.  Finally, spreading the task of interpreting a state’s law among more judges can 
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only promote greater uncertainty and less consistency in the development of the 
governing law.205 
And in both ordinary contract law and corporate law, interstate differences in law 
make these two considerations non-trivial.  Even in what might be thought of as “plain 
vanilla” contract disputes, applying another jurisdiction’s contract doctrines poses a 
number of challenges.  Subtle yet important substantive differences exist between 
jurisdictions’ canons of contract law.206  In other words, jurisdictions have differing 
articulations of the same rules.  Second, certain jurisdictions specialize in the 
interpretation and enforcement of particular types of agreements, meaning that some 
judiciaries will have precedent and experience that is absent in other states.207  These two 
factors belie the view that a different state’s contract doctrines are susceptible to easy 
application by a court unfamiliar with them. 
 Likewise, states vary in their treatment of issues of corporate law, even where 
those issues appear formally identical and do not involve divergent statutory formulations.  
                                                 
205 J. Clark Kelso, A Report on the California Appellate System, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 448 (1994) (“The 
more judges there are deciding the cases, the more likely there will be conflicts in the law stemming from 
inconsistent interpretations of the law and case precedents.”). 
206 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 
(2010) (identifying differences between California and New York contract law in over a dozen doctrines, 
including: the obligation to negotiate in good faith; the use of promissory estoppel to impose liability for 
preliminary negotiations; the role and nature of consideration; when duress, unconscionability, or public 
policy considerations render a contract unenforceable; the scope of the statute of frauds; when mistake 
excuses performance; the use of parol evidence; the enforceability of choice of law and forum selection 
provisions; the enforceability of agreements to shape the adjudicatory process (e.g., arbitration provisions, 
jury trial waivers, class action waivers, etc.); and the scope of extra-contractual liability (e.g. unjust 
enrichment and quantum meruit). 
207 For example, of the samples of agreements examined in two of Eisenberg and Miller’s studies, nearly 
every credit commitment agreement, underwriting agreement, pooling & servicing agreement, and security 
agreement chose New York law to govern, while nearly every trust agreement chose Delaware law.  See 
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law 
and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts 27-28 (New York University Law 
and Economics Working Paper No. 124 2008) (working paper version). Similarly, Delaware law is chosen 
most often to govern merger agreements.  Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law 
and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975 (2006); 
Matthew Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware’s Competitive Reach (University of Connecticut School of 
Law Working Paper 2010).  
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Thus, for example, state courts have varied in their treatment of the question of whether a 
sale of the corporation’s assets should be regarded as a “de facto merger:” some courts 
have viewed the asset sale as an evasion of statutory appraisal rights applicable to 
mergers because it achieves the same basic economic result as a merger;208 other courts, 
however, including Delaware’s, have been guided by the “independent legal significance” 
or “equal dignity” doctrine, under which a transaction structured as a sale of assets and 
governed by a statute not providing for appraisal rights cannot be tested by and subject to 
requirements imposed under a different statute (the merger statute).209   
 For another example, consider the treatment of fiduciary duties of directors to 
creditors, and the rise and (perhaps) fall of the so-called “deepening insolvency” doctrine:  
before the Delaware courts had an opportunity to squarely consider the viability of that 
doctrine, other courts had construed applicable Delaware law to establish a cause of 
action against corporate directors for fraudulently continuing the corporation’s existence 
and exacerbating (“deepening”) its insolvency.210  When the matter came before the 
Delaware courts, however, the “deepening insolvency” doctrine failed to pass muster as a 
matter of Delaware law211—thereby illustrating the concern that courts unfamiliar with 
the deep structure of a body of law run a high risk of getting that law wrong, or at least 
                                                 
208 Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958); Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 159 
A.2d 146, 152-153 (N.J. Super.), aff’d, 161 A.2d 474 (N.J. 1960); see also Kan. City Power & Light Co. v. 
W. Res., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 688  (W.D. Mo. 1996) (treating a two-step transaction as a long-form merger 
subject to the statutory two-third shareholder vote requirements because the result of the transaction was 
the same as a long-form merger, and rejecting application of the doctrine of independent legal significance). 
209 E.g., Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963). 
210 OHC Liquidation Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Oakwood Homes Corp.), 340 B.R. 510, 
2006 WL 864843, at * 16-17 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 31, 2006) (holding that Delaware, New York, and North 
Carolina would recognize a cause of action for deepening insolvency); In re Exide Techs., Inc., 299 B.R. 
732 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (following Official Comm. of Unsec. Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty, 267 F.3d 340 
(3d Cir. 2001) (recognizing deepening insolvency as a cause of action under Pennsylvania law)). 
211 Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 174, 204-207 (Del. Ch. 2006).   
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wrong in the sense of incorrectly predicting how the courts of the state supplying the 
governing law would apply the law.  
* * * 
Our arguments in this section can be summarized by reference to the literature, 
rooted in economics but cross-disciplinary in nature, that has developed over the years to 
examine the relationship between legal institutions and markets.212  That scholarship 
understands legal institutions as a necessary condition to the impersonal markets that 
characterize modern capitalism.213  In short, legal institutions facilitate exchange and 
investment by: (1) protecting property rights; (2) vindicating contractual expectations; 
and (3) providing a menu of entities by which joint investment can be organized and 
financed.214  The law is an infrastructure upon which markets rely. 
Put in those conceptual terms, the problems discussed in this section can be 
summarized as follows: there is a growing mismatch between the privately-ordered 
arrangements parties use to organize and finance economic activity and the legal 
infrastructure designed to support them.  As markets have evolved and economic 
                                                 
212 This literature has roots in the work of Weber and other early institutionalists, received firmer 
conceptual foundations through Coase’s work, see Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 
386 (1937) and Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), and has matured into a 
multidisciplinary effort spanning economics, political economy, economic sociology, law, business history, 
etc.  See, e.g., ALFRED CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND (1974); DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE 
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); MICHAEL PIORE & 
CHARLES SABLE, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE (1984); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structures: The 
Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 481 (1985). 
213 See HORWITZ, supra note 196, at 174. 
214 THRÁINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 48 (1990) (“The state, by using its 
police power and the courts, assists private individuals in enforcing legitimate contracts and thus lowers the 
costs of exchange, particularly when the state uses its power to enforce contracts in a systematic and 
predictable manner.”).  In the 1980s and 1990s, this view of law’s relationship to economic development 
was implemented into public policy as the so-called “Washington Consensus,” which emphasized the 
liberalization of markets and the privatization of industry.  See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT 1997, at 41 (1997). 
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organization has become global in scope, the corresponding legal institutions have lagged 
in their response.  The task at hand, then, is to recalibrate the law so that it once again is 
responsive to the needs of the ever-evolving modern economy.  Given the broad 
understanding of that evolution, it has become increasingly important as a matter of 
public interest to tailor legal doctrine to give more appropriate and significant effect to 
contract expectations in litigation over essentially contractual relationships. 
 
V. Rationalizing Parallel Litigation in Corporate Disputes 
In this section, we set forth our recommendations for correcting the current 
system’s dysfunction.  We make three basic recommendations to address the principles of 
laws that judges must apply when resolving which forum should be given primacy when 
identical or overlapping cases are filed in multiple jurisdictions.  We thus focus closely 
on the Restatement provisions that bear most directly on this subject from the 
Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws as well as the general common law principles.  
First, we propose that the so-called common law first-filed rule be jettisoned in its current 
form, at least in the case of representative corporate litigation, and be replaced by more 
concrete considerations of efficiency.  Second, we recommend re-calibrating the factors 
in forum non conveniens analysis.  Although a state’s interest in interpreting its own laws 
is a commonly enumerated factor in forum non conveniens analysis, it is only one 
consideration among several equally-weighted concerns in most states and the 
Restatement.   
We propose changing that relationship.  Rather than treating the litigants’ choice 
of law as just one factor among many, we recommend giving presumptive weight to that 
choice of law when determining whether a given forum is appropriate in a parallel 
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litigation situation, and lesser weight to geographic considerations that have become 
much less compelling with the advent of advanced communications technologies.  Our 
third recommendation, which applies specifically to corporate law disputes, is to amend 
the Restatement’s articulation of the internal affairs doctrine in similar fashion.  Currently, 
the internal affairs doctrine is typically formulated as follows: “A court will exercise 
jurisdiction over an action involving the internal affairs of a foreign corporation unless it 
is an inappropriate or an inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.”215  We propose 
changing that formulation to: “A court will not exercise jurisdiction over an action 
involving the internal affairs of a foreign corporation where there is a contemporaneously 
filed parallel action in the forum of incorporation.”   
Our recommendations are unique in at least this respect: unlike scholarly 
responses to the parallel litigation problem that suggest procedural solutions focused 
upon case management,216 our prescriptions are tailored to foster the continued, 
consistent development of substantive doctrines.  Our different approach arises from our 
understanding of courts’ role in underpinning market exchange, and not only from a 
concern about overcrowded dockets (though that also motivates our prescriptions).  In 
our view, suggestions that only recommend expanding courts’ discretion to stay or 
                                                 
215 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 313 (1971). 
216 For example, Rhonda Wasserman has proposed a range of solutions, from creating a registry that would 
give courts better notice of overlapping class actions and amending Rule 23 to make certification of a 
second class action more difficult, to enacting legislation at state and federal level to enable the 
consolidation of competing class actions.  Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 
528-41 (2000).  Alan Morrison has suggested a variant on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 that would 
give defendants the power to remove and consolidate derivative suits into federal court; unlike the actual 
Class Action Fairness Act, this statute would not exclude actions that “relate[] to the internal affairs or 
governance of a corporation,” and removal would be discretionary and not automatic. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d) 
(2006); Alan B. Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal Court: A Better Way to Handle the Problem 
of Overlapping Class Actions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1521 (2005) (critiquing the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005). Sean Griffith and Alexandra Lahav have criticized proposals that would “force federalization” of 
class actions, and instead have urged courts facing competing class actions to confer among themselves and 
to decide which jurisdiction should hear the case. Griffith & Lahav, supra note 2, at *53, *59-77.  
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dismiss parallel cases without expressly taking choice of law considerations into account 
are bound to perpetuate the current problem.217   
A. What Interests Merit Consideration in Resolving Competing 
Representative Corporate Litigation? 
Before presenting such a solution, however, we turn first to a foundational 
question:  in evaluating competing jurisdictional claims in representative corporate 
litigation, whose interests should be considered? 
 The concern articulated in the previous Section was that it is relatively inefficient 
and costly for courts in states that do not supply the law chosen to govern commercial 
dealings to adjudicate disputes involving application of that law.  At least as to litigation 
involving internal corporate affairs, expression of this concern is nothing new.  The 
Restatement asserts that “uniformity of result, as well as the giving of proper attention to 
local custom that is not reflected in law books, can best be assured by having the action 
                                                 
217 One-forum motions, which are filed in parallel jurisdictions simultaneously and ask the courts to confer 
with one another in order to decide which action should proceed, are also of little utility: they are 
unnecessary where a foreign court is predisposed to defer to the forum whose law is at stake and useless 
where a judge is determined to keep the case.  Furthermore, one-forum motions can provide a pretext for 
courts who want to cling to cases for the wrong reasons, further calling for a more effective and influential 
doctrinal solution that judges would more likely respect.  
Exclusive choice of forum provisions in corporate bylaws and charters dispense at least nominally with 
room for such judicial discretion.  See Quinn, supra note 2, at 141-42, 144 n.22.  The efficacy of such 
provisions, however, depends upon their enforceability throughout the nation, and not all courts enforce 
forum choices even in bilateral contracts.  See Idacorp, Inc. v. Am. Fiber Sys., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
135049 (D. Idaho Sep. 19, 2012) (invoking Idaho Code § 29-110, providing that “every stipulation or 
condition in a contract, by which any party is restricted from enforcing his rights under the contract by the 
usual proceedings in the ordinary tribunals . . . is void,” to refuse to enforce a choice of forum in a bilateral 
asset acquisition agreement).  Even in jurisdictions (most of them, we acknowledge) that give effect to 
forum choice provisions in bilateral contracts, precedent governing forum choice provisions in charters and 
bylaws is sparse, and not all courts have enforced such provisions. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (declining to apply forum choice bylaw adopted by directors after the conduct giving rise 
to the derivative claims asserted).  Moreover, even if exclusive forum provisions are enforceable and are 
drafted to afford the defendant corporation the flexibility to waive the provision and permit litigation to go 
forward in a different forum, they still do not permit courts to bring considerations of public interest to bear 
in determining where litigation ought to proceed.   
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tried in the state of incorporation.”218  Indeed, the Restatement notes that this 
consideration counsels in favor of dismissing a suit based upon the law of the state of 
incorporation, “even in a situation where the court, if it were to hear the case, would 
apply the local law of the state of incorporation in reaching its decision.”219   
 Shortly after making these compelling points, however, the Restatement 
commentary undermines their force by retreating back to and, in our view, unduly 
emphasizing geographic considerations:  it urges that the forum state exercise jurisdiction 
where the corporation is “only technically a foreign corporation” because its business “is 
carried on entirely or principally in the state of the forum and when the directors of the 
corporation or a majority of them reside in the state and are accustomed to hold meetings 
in the state . . . .”220  This reference back to geographic considerations is, we submit, 
misguided.  In corporate class or derivative actions, the issues presented—usually 
whether directors or officers have comported themselves in accordance with their 
fiduciary duties, or how the rights of stock or stockholders under the corporation’s charter 
or bylaws are to be interpreted—are matters that most directly and meaningfully affect 
the interests of shareholders, and not those of corporate customers or suppliers or 
employees.  In most cases of corporate representative litigation, the meaningful interests 
at stake do not arise from the physical location of the corporation’s business activities, or 
where its directors happen to meet;221 to the contrary, it is the impact (direct or indirect) 
                                                 
218 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 313 cmt. c (1971). 
219 Id.  
220 Id. 
221 See ABRY Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1049 (Del. Ch. 2006) (in 
determining choice of law in a commercial dispute, discounting significance of buyer’s physical location, 
and noting that “the place of injury is less significant in the case of fraudulent misrepresentations”) 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmt. f (1971)). 
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of the directors’ and officers’ conduct upon investors that represents the most significant 
concern.   
We acknowledge that the primacy of shareholder interests in the corporation has 
long been a matter of debate, and that many states have adopted so-called “constituency 
statutes” that arguably dilute that generally accepted primacy to some uncertain extent.222  
This interesting debate, however, should not obscure that fact that it is shareholders who 
bring shareholder derivative suits, and shareholders who bring shareholder class actions, 
on behalf of the corporation or other shareholders as class members.  Almost universally, 
moreover, it is only shareholders, and not employees or any other constituency, which 
have the power to elect the corporation’s directors.223  In any event, the existence of a 
“constituency statute” in a forum state other than the state of incorporation should do 
nothing to favor the forum state as the situs of representative shareholder litigation.  The 
decision as to whether and to what extent corporate statutory law should protect other 
constituencies is a matter for the state of incorporation to decide.  Even if a particular 
constituency enjoys fiduciary attention by virtue of a constituency statute, that statutory 
choice carries no weight, under well-settled principles of choice of law,224 unless that 
statute is adopted by the state of incorporation.  There is no basis on which to require 
regard for that constituency under the corporate laws of a state other than the state of 
                                                 
222 For some of the leading expressions on this subject, see, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting 
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 971, 992-93 (1992); Committee on 
Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion,  45 BUS. LAW. 2253 (1990); 
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and 
“The Modern Corporation,” 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008); Lynn Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for 
Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of 
Boards of Directors and Stockholders in Change of Control Transactions: Is There Any “There” There?, 
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1170–73 (2002).   
 
223 E.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT §8.03(c) (directors elected at annual shareholders’ meeting); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§211(c), 221 (directors elected at annual stockholder meeting, unless certificate of 
incorporation confers voting rights on holders of bonds, debentures or other obligations of the corporation). 
224 See supra note 121. 
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incorporation.  Thus, judges in states with constituency statutes must apply those statutes 
only to their own domestic corporations, and respect the choice of other corporations to 
incorporate in non-constituency states.  If a corporation of a state without a constituency 
statute is involved in corporate law litigation in a state with a constituency statute, on 
what basis can the presence of constituencies in that state not protected by the applicable 
law of the state of incorporation be a justification for the courts of the state with a 
constituency statute to exercise jurisdiction over the corporate law dispute?  In that 
circumstance, those constituencies have no case-specific interest in the matter and are 
irrelevant to any rational resolution of a forum conflict.  Rather, the limited reach of 
constituency statutes highlights that in a forum conflict, the tribunal whose substantive 
corporate law must govern has the highest policy interest and should decide the dispute. 
Indeed, the Restatement does not seem to apply, on its own terms, to public 
companies, because it is unlikely that a public corporation’s business would be “carried 
on entirely or principally in the state of the forum.”  But, even when this is the case, and 
the corporation’s directors reside in and hold their meetings entirely in the forum state, 
the interests of that state are secondary at best because those with the greatest interest in 
the litigation—the public shareholders—are scattered widely among the states. Thus, in a 
publicly held corporation with widely traded shares, it is most likely that no single state 
could claim to have an interest in a representative corporate lawsuit superior to that of the 
state supplying the governing law (the state of incorporation).225  In an era of increasing 
                                                 
225 Under our analysis, the state where certain stakeholder groups are concentrated—such as employees—is 
not relevant, because corporate representative litigation does not seek to redress harm to these groups, 
except insofar as the members of these groups are also investors.  Furthermore, looking to which state has 
the dominant interest based on the location of the investors in the corporation would create its own 
problems.  Such a claim of dominant interest could not rest upon a mere head count of resident 
shareholders:  any geographic assessment of impact on shareholders would also have to take into account 
the shareholders’ level of investment.  Thus, for example, simply having more shareholders resident in 
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institutional investor ownership,226 moreover, even the “residence” of shareholders 
becomes an abstract and obscure proposition, where equity securities are held by 
intermediary institutional investors for the ultimate benefit of yet another geographically 
dispersed set of beneficiaries.227 
 As important, a represented member of a stockholder class cares little about 
having her state of residency’s courts address a case.  What she wants is her reasonable 
expectations as an investor vindicated—expectations based on the law of the state of 
incorporation.  The reality, moreover, is that the plaintiffs in stockholder representative 
actions do not sue for the most part in their own domiciles anyway.228  When a plaintiff 
sues on behalf of a class, that plaintiff’s at most minimal interest in geographic 
convenience must as a matter of principle be subordinated to the class’s interests in 
                                                                                                                                                 
California would not militate in favor of keeping a proceeding in the courts of that state if a far smaller 
number of New York-based shareholders nevertheless had a far larger investment in the company, and 
therefore had a considerably more significant interest in the outcome of representative litigation involving 
the company.  
226 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities 
Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026 n.4 (2009) (noting that “institutions owned 73.4% of the market value 
of outstanding equity securities in 2006”) (citing SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, 2007 FACT BOOK 65 
(Charles M. Bartlett, Jr. ed., 2007)).   
227 For example, a mutual fund may have its principal offices in, say, Boston, but the fund’s shareholders—
whose economic interests in the fund’s portfolio shares are ultimately the interests most importantly, albeit 
indirectly, affected by the outcome of corporate class and derivative litigation—may and likely do reside in 
many states in addition to Massachusetts.  Thus, it seems unproductive to determine an appropriate forum 
even by reference to which state has the highest concentration of equity investment in the firm, as 
determined by the nominal address of the shareholder.  Cf. In re The Topps Co., Inc. S’holder Litig., 859 
N.Y.S.2d 907, at *19 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (attaching significance to the fact that “four of the company’s six 
largest shareholders are located in New York”). 
228 Examples of forum choices of several regular institutional shareholder plaintiffs illustrate this 
geographic indifference to the forum in which they are headquartered.  E.g., Frederick v. Mechel OAO, 475 
Fed. App’x 353 (2d Cir. 2012) (City of Westland, Michigan, Police and Fire Retirement System acting as 
co-plaintiff in securities class action filed in New York); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 
2001) (California Public Employees’ Retirement System acting as co-plaintiff in securities class action 
filed in New Jersey); City of Pompano Beach Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Synovus Financial Corp., 2009 WL 
4641804 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 2009); (Florida pension fund suing in securities action in Georgia); In re Royal 
Ahold N.V. Secs. & Erisa Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334 (D. Md. 2004) (Public Employees Retirement 
Association of Colorado acting as lead plaintiff in securities action heard in Maryland); La. Mun. Emps.’ 
Ret. Sys. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 904 N.Y.S.2d 492 (2010) (Louisiana pension fund suing in fiduciary 
duty action in New York); State of Wisc. Inv. Bd. v. Bartlett, 2000 WL 238026 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2000); 
(Wisconsin pension fund suing as class plaintiff in fiduciary duty class action in Delaware).  These are 
illustrative examples; and we expect that readers could identify many more. 
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getting the most authoritative ruling they can under the law they chose to govern the 
investment.  But even if somehow the convenience of the representative plaintiffs to 
some extent must be balanced against the fair expectations of the represented, that 
reasoning has no relevance when a plaintiff files outside its own state, as is typically the 
case.229   
 This reality also illustrates another reason why the Restatement’s approach is 
outdated.  In a typical corporate case, the defendants produce almost all of the discovery 
and face all of the real burden.  Modern litigation alleviates this by allowing the 
discovery to occur where the evidence is: it has long been traditional in corporate cases in 
Delaware and securities cases in the federal district courts for discovery to occur where 
the evidence is located, thus limiting any inconvenience to those producing the discovery 
materials.230  The named plaintiffs in stockholder litigation bear almost no burden.  Their 
lawyers will travel wherever the case is litigated.  In most situations, the defendants will 
find it as convenient to have the case tried in the state of incorporation or in the 
headquarters state, because the location of discovery will not change, many directors are 
dispersed anyway, and thus the only incremental cost to getting an authoritative ruling 
from the courts whose law is at stake is the modest one of traveling for actual in-court 
hearings.  This modest incremental cost is usually in fact non-existent to the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers, who must travel anyway and whose clients are rarely witnesses.     
                                                 
229 Id. 
230 See WOLFE & PITTENGER, supra note 45, § 6.05[a] (“the deposition of an individual defendant typically 
is taken at his or her residence or place of employment, and the deposition of an organization, through one 
of its directors or agents, generally is taken at the principal place of business of the organization.”); 7-34 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE – CIVIL § 34.14  (“When the documents are needed by a party for use in the 
transaction of its business, the inspection should generally take place at the party's place of business.”). 
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In sum, the one and only interest most consistently and directly affected by class 
and derivative litigation relating to the corporation’s internal affairs is the interest of the 
corporation’s equity investors.  And the geographic focus of the class as investors is 
singular, unified, and focused on the state of incorporation whose law they have chosen 
to govern their investment.  Accordingly, and as we argue above, the most compelling 
interest at stake is the investors’ interest in promoting the orderly, consistent, and full 
development of the law governing the corporation’s internal affairs.  That is, the physical 
residence of particular stockholders bears no relation to where they want corporate cases 
decided.  In a class action, giving weight to the geographic preference of a named 
plaintiff is not only irrational in the sense of having no logical relation to any legitimate 
interest of the class, it is unworkable as a tie-breaking rule.  If a Texas-resident plaintiff 
favors litigation in Texas and a New York-based plaintiff prefers litigation in New York, 
whose interest prevails in deciding where a class of diversely resident stockholders get 
their rights decided?  Or to use a more common scenario, when a Texas-resident plaintiff 
wants a class action decided in Iowa, and a New York-based plaintiff wants a class action 
decided in California, who prevails?  The answer, if it is to be based on the best interests 
of the class, has to give no weight to the physical residence of the filing plaintiffs.   
If one is inclined to treat investors as adults, as we are, we find it far more likely 
that the investor’s choice to invest in particular corporation reflects in part the investor’s 
view that the governing corporate law is one that is acceptable and perhaps even 
beneficial.231  And that interest therefore ordinarily suggests that disputes over the 
corporation’s internal affairs, at least for publicly held corporations, should 
presumptively go forward in the courts of the state of incorporation.   
                                                 
231 See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 57 (1993). 
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Our suggestion does not accommodate one-way application: courts (notably the 
Delaware courts) accustomed to resolving questions of internal corporate affairs should 
be receptive to dismissing or staying litigation presenting claims arising primarily under 
the laws of another state or jurisdiction.  In this regard, we commend the Texas federal 
district court’s dismissal of shareholder derivative litigation involving the BP/Deepwater 
Horizon oil well explosion of 2010, in favor of litigation in the United Kingdom, where 
the controversy, involving claims of breach of fiduciary by the directors of a U.K. 
corporation, was controlled by a newly enacted British corporate statute.232  We expect, 
as well, that Delaware courts would be equally receptive to dismissing or staying cases 
based on the business entity or other private commercial laws of other jurisdictions, and 
overall we find that they are.233 
                                                 
232 In re BP S’holder Derivative Litig., 2011 WL 4345209, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2011) (“At base, this 
case seeks to resolve questions surrounding the appropriate internal governance of an English company.  In 
such situations, courts have found that the country of incorporation has the greatest interest. . . . [T]his 
lawsuit is not intended to redress the devastating impact of the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the United 
States.  Instead, the lawsuit is intended to compensate BP for the financial and reputational harm the 
company suffered as a result of its high level management’s alleged disregard for the safety of its 
operations.  The English courts have a greater interest in resolving a dispute related to the internal 
governance of an English company, especially one about whether the company’s directors violated their 
fiduciary duties.”). Cf. Bushansky v. Armacost, 2012 WL 3276937, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012) (staying 
derivative action in favor of state court class action presenting the same issues, and noting that “judges in 
Delaware are more familiar with Delaware state law than judges in California.  Given the high likelihood 
that this entire case is governed by Delaware law, there is wisdom in letting Delaware judges decide these 
issues.”). 
233 See, e.g., TA Instruments-Waters, LLC v. Univ. of Conn., 31 A.3d 1204  (Del. Ch. 2011) (declining to 
expedite litigation challenging compliance with Connecticut law on public bidding on a contract with the 
University of Connecticut); Trans. of Oral Arg., Walton v. Apollo Global Mgmt. LLC, C.A. No. 5216-VCS, 
at *25-28 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 2010) (staying action claiming breach of fiduciary duty by general partner of a 
Delaware limited partnership, where the limited partnership agreement defined the corporate general 
partner’s fiduciary duties to the limited partners by reference to the law establishing the duties of directors 
of the corporate general partner, an Ohio corporation); Third Ave. Trust v. MBIA Ins. Corp., 2009 WL 
3465985  (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2009) (“[T]he notes [at the heart of the dispute] were issued in accordance 
with the New York Insurance Law, the [contract governing noteholders’ rights] is governed by New York 
contract law, and [the plaintiff’s] claims are based entirely upon New York, not Delaware, statutes and 
common law.  Because of the importance of this question to New York public policy, and the absence of 
any legitimate interest Delaware has in the question, I believe that an appropriate regard for comity requires 
this court to abstain and allow the courts of New York to speak on the collateral effect to be given to the 
determinations of the Superintendent of the New York Insurance Department.”); Diedenhofen-Lennartz v. 
Diedenhofen, 931 A.2d 439, 442, 451 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Of all the states of the union, Delaware should be 
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B. Proposed Doctrinal Improvements 
1. Eliminate Mere Priority of Filing as a Relevant Consideration 
 As explained earlier, courts in Delaware and elsewhere have traditionally 
accorded great deference to a plaintiff’s choice of forum, holding that a “plaintiff ... is 
afforded the presumption that its choice of forum is proper and a defendant who attempts 
to obtain dismissal based on grounds of forum non conveniens bears a heavy burden.”234  
 Especially in the context of representative corporate litigation, however, the 
problem of multi-forum litigation calls into question the rationality of this doctrinal 
deference.  Where a plaintiff is seeking to vindicate solely her own interests, deference to 
the plaintiff’s autonomy in selecting a forum may give effect to a meaningful social value.  
In the corporate context, however, the value of that selection is decidedly less meaningful.  
If nothing else, the representative derivative plaintiff does not seek relief for himself; he 
                                                                                                                                                 
most sensitive to the need to afford comity to the courts of the jurisdiction that charters an entity. . . . The 
Delaware courts have long asserted that this state has a compelling interest in the efficient and consistent 
application of its laws governing business entities. . . . Delaware has a related and equally important interest 
in affording comity to the courts of other jurisdictions when a dispute arises under foreign business law.”); 
IM2 Merchandising & Mfg., Inc. v. Tirex Corp., 2000 WL 1664168, at *10  (Del. Ch. Nov. 2, 2000) 
(dismissing on forum non conveniens ground a case based primarily on the contract law of Quebec, and 
recognizing that “[t]he great weight given to a plaintiffs interest in having novel Delaware law questions, 
decided in our own courts . . . suggests that a defendant's interest in having the courts of the jurisdiction of 
the governing law decide important legal issues ought also be given some weight.  This is especially so 
when the plaintiffs themselves chose the laws of that jurisdiction to govern their relations with the 
defendants”); Colonial Secs. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 1979 WL 4626, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 18, 1979) (staying 
Delaware class action on behalf of debenture holders alleging fraud in connection with redemption of 
convertible debentures, and finding that Delaware incorporation of both plaintiff and defendant is 
“irrelevant” in this context); see also McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987) (reversing a 
judgment regarding voting rights of shares of a Panamanian corporation due to lower court’s application of 
Delaware and Louisiana law). But cf. Berger v. Intelident Solutions, Inc., 906 A.2d 134, 135 (Del. 2006) 
(reversing dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds of an action based on Florida corporation law, 
finding no “overwhelming hardship” justifying dismissal); Taylor v. LSI Logic Corp., 689 A.2d 1196, 1197, 
1199-1201 (Del. 1997) (reversing dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds of an action involving 
Canadian corporate law, reasoning that overwhelming hardship and inconvenience justifying dismissal was 
not established). 
234 Mar-Land Indus. Contractors, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Ref., L.P., 777 A.2d 774, 777-78 (Del. 2001); 
Durkin v. Intevac, Inc., 782 A.2d 103, 111 (Ct. 2001); Ex parte Preston Hood Chevrolet, Inc., 638 So.2d 
842, 845 (Ala. 1994); Torres v. Walsh, 456 N.E.2d 601, 607 (Ill. 1983). 
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seeks a recovery for the corporation.235  As the United States Supreme Court explained in 
Koster in 1947, “where there are hundreds of potential plaintiffs, all equally entitled 
voluntarily to invest themselves with the corporation's cause of action and all of whom 
could with equal show of right go into their many home courts, the claim of any one 
plaintiff that a forum is appropriate merely because it is his home forum is considerably 
weakened.”236  The distinction between derivative and class action litigation is irrelevant 
for the application of this common sense and, to us, irrefutable logic.  The intellectual and 
policy claim of a representative plaintiff’s choice of forum is at best weak, in class as 
well as in derivative actions, when compared to the represented’s interest in having the 
matter decided by the judiciary whose law the represented rely upon to govern their 
investment.237 
 Discounting the significance of a representative plaintiff’s choice of forum is 
appropriate, in our view, regardless of one’s opinion about the professionalism or 
integrity of plaintiff’s counsel;238 one could assume purely altruistic motives on the part 
                                                 
235 See, e.g., Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 349 (Del. Ch. 2007); Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148, 1159 
(Del. Ch. 2003). 
236 330 U.S. at 524. 
237 Delaware law provides precedent in this regard, holding that, in the representative context, a court is to 
“give[] less weight to the first-filed status of a lawsuit, and instead will examine more closely the relevant 
factors bearing on where the case should best proceed using something akin to . . . a forum non conveniens 
analysis.”  In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 117 (Del. Ch. 2009); see also 
Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 349 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“A shareholder plaintiff does not sue for his direct 
benefit. Instead, he alleges injury to and seeks redress on behalf of the corporation. Further, the board or 
any shareholder with standing may represent the injured party. Thus, this Court places less emphasis on the 
celerity of such plaintiffs and grants less deference to the speedy plaintiff's choice of forum.”); WOLFE & 
PITTENGER, supra note 42, § 5.01[c], at 5-20 (“While the principles of [the first-filed rule] are not entirely 
disregarded in the context of competing stockholder representative suits, it is now clear that the first-filed 
complaint will be given decidedly less deference in that context.”); note 150, supra (citing La. Mun. Police 
Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc., 46 A.3d 313, 337 (Del. Ch. 2012) and Biondi v. Scrushy, 
820 A.2d 1148, 1158-59 (Del. Ch. 2003)). 
238 Cf. Stevelman, supra note 173, at 113 (stating that discounting the derivative plaintiff’s choice of forum 
“reflects the Court of Chancery’s open cynicism about plaintiffs-lawyers’ conduct in representative 
actions”).  In so arguing, however, Professor Stevelman offers nothing specific about why a derivative 
plaintiff’s forum preference ought to be entitled to any weight at all, as against the preference of other 
plaintiffs, other investors, or the corporation’s fiduciaries. 
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of such counsel and still question why they or any one of their clients should be able to 
presumptively dictate where litigation on behalf of the corporation should proceed.  This 
is especially true in the context of multi-forum litigation, in which other plaintiffs and 
other plaintiffs’ counsel have a more or less equal claim of deference to their own 
different choice of forum.  It is true in any event, given that the corporate representative 
plaintiff acts not solely for his own interests, but as a self-selected, unelected fiduciary for 
the corporation and all of its shareholders.239  That self-selection, moreover, is not 
without the potential for creating perverse incentives, as illustrated above:  in an 
increasingly competitive environment, the ability of a plaintiffs’ law firm to “plant a flag” 
in a distinct forum affords that firm a degree of leverage in negotiating fee-sharing, 
regardless of whether initiating such litigation is beneficial to the corporation, its 
shareholders, or society as a whole. 
 Thus, we claim that in representative litigation where the corporation’s investors 
are geographically dispersed, the choice by any particular shareholder plaintiff to bring 
suit in her place of residence—let alone in some forum in which she does not even 
reside—ought not to be given any substantial deference.  The importance of the forum 
choice to all investors, wherever located, counsels against giving undue, let alone 
presumptive, weight to the forum choice made by any one representative plaintiff, even 
one who resides in the forum state.  The traditional approach of deferring to such a forum 
choice has never been justified, as a policy matter, in relation to representative 
                                                 
239 E.g., Cohen v. Benefit Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549 (1949) (“a stockholder who brings suit on a 
cause of action derived from the corporation assumes a position, not technically as a trustee perhaps, but 
one of a fiduciary character. He sues, not for himself alone, but as representative of a class comprising all 
who are similarly situated.”); In re M&F Worldwide Corp. S’holders Litig., 799 A.2d 1164, 1174 n.34 (Del. 
Ch. 2002) (“[B]y asserting a representative role on behalf of a proposed class, representative plaintiffs and 
their counsel voluntarily accept a fiduciary obligation towards members of the putative class.”). 
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shareholder litigation, nor has any explanation been offered, to our knowledge, as to how 
or why such a forum choice ought to have greater significance than concerns relating to 
the full range of geographically dispersed investors and to judicial administration, and 
most notably the value of channeling litigation to the state most capable of developing the 
law through its judicial decisions. 
As discussed above, the first-filed rule’s original purpose was to serve as a tool 
for preventing “reactive” litigation.240  We acknowledge the potential for parties to file 
subsequent actions in another forum once they realize that the first filed action is not 
going in their favor, and we agree that the law should prevent parties from making such 
an end run around a plaintiff’s choice of forum.241  But the analysis should examine the 
evidence that a party has initiated subsequent litigation opportunistically and not rely 
solely upon a mechanical timing assessment to determine whether to stay or dismiss the 
second filed case.   
Mechanical application of the first-filed rule is especially troubling where the 
actions are contemporaneously filed.  First of all, determining which action was filed first 
in those situations often requires detailed, almost comical, parsing of when filings and 
services of process are made.  Secondly, where parallel actions are filed 
contemporaneously, reactive litigation’s primary evil is not present: where the first-filed 
case has not progressed further than the second in any material sense, there is no 
meaningful prejudice to the first-filing party.  Of course, allowing a technically second-
filed complaint to proceed would mean that the first-filing party would not enjoy its 
choice of forum.  But for the reasons discussed above, there is no reason to give 
                                                 
240 See supra notes 170 through 172 and accompanying text. 
241 See supra note 184 (citing opinions staying litigation that is commenced after plaintiff’s claim suffers 
setbacks in prior-filed litigation). 
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independent weight to the plaintiff’s choice of forum in parallel shareholder 
representative actions.242 Thus, we propose that the deference to the plaintiff’s choice of 
forum, as expressed in the Restatement243 and the cases that follow it, should be 
eliminated in cases where the plaintiff seeks to litigate on behalf of others. 
It has been argued that mechanical application of the first-filed rule “promotes the 
positive goals of predictability and objectivity” and that “[p]redictability benefits litigants; 
objectivity benefits the legal system.”244  This argument is followed by the observation 
that “rejection of filing chronology to decide forum seems inefficient. It therefore looks 
especially bad for Delaware because Delaware’s jurisprudence has championed the 
importance of clear, predictable rules of decision.”245  Not surprisingly, we take a very 
different view of the matter.  This argument fails to address the distinct considerations 
raised by using the first-filed doctrine in the representative litigation context.  As a result, 
the argument does not take into account the costs of any mechanical predictability that 
might arise from a strictly enforced first-filed rule.  We have two particular costs in mind.  
First, a blindly applied first-filed rule fails to acknowledge the costs, which we outline 
above, of directing litigation to a forum that is less equipped by experience and 
specialization to apply and develop governing law in a consistent manner.   
Second, a mechanistically applied first-filed rule rewards conduct that no rational 
investor represented in a class or derivative suit would be expected ex ante to view as 
beneficial.  “[P]leadings matter tremendously,”246 and a forum-selection rule that 
                                                 
242 See supra notes 221–232 and related text.  
243 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 cmt. c (1971) (“[S]ince it is for the plaintiff to 
choose the place of suit, his choice of a forum should not be disturbed except for weighty reasons.”). 
244 Stevelman, supra note 173, at 110. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. at 112. 
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powerfully encourages the filing of poorly researched pleadings disserves represented 
investors and burdens courts with unnecessary motion practice.  We agree that the choice 
of forum should not be dictated solely by which plaintiffs’ lawyer has drafted the better 
complaint,247 but we are not advocating that approach at all; we are instead advocating 
that a reflexive, mechanistic reliance on filing chronology, in the name of predictability, 
objectivity or tradition, creates harmful incentives and should not be perpetuated. 
2. Revise The Restatement’s Forum Non Conveniens Factors to Give More 
Weight to Parties’ Choice of Law Decisions 
Our second recommendation is to reprioritize the factors in forum non conveniens 
analysis.  As discussed above, under the Restatement and the law of most jurisdictions, 
forum non conveniens analysis requires the court to equally weigh a number of public 
and private interests.  Key private interests include access to sources of proof, availability 
of compulsory process, the cost of obtaining attendance of unwilling witnesses, the 
possibility to view the premises (if appropriate to the action), etc.248  Public interests 
include the state’s interest in keeping dockets from becoming overburdened, the 
obligation of jury duty being borne by the affected community, and the state’s interest in 
avoiding having to interpret foreign law.249  As noted above, this is a flexible 
discretionary analysis that provides courts a great deal of leeway in deciding whether or 
not to exercise jurisdiction. 
Although a state’s interest in interpreting its own laws is a commonly enumerated 
factor in the foreign non conveniens analysis, it is only one consideration among several 
equally-weighted concerns.  We propose changing that relationship in representative 
                                                 
247 Id. 
248 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 cmt. c (1971).   
249 Id. 
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shareholder actions that are contemporaneously filed in multiple jurisdictions.  In that 
situation, rather than simply being one among many factors of equal weight, the litigants’ 
choice of law should be accorded primary, presumptive significance when determining 
which forum is appropriate.  In other words, all other considerations being equal—and 
they are not, because several of the geographically-centered factors have become largely 
obsolete in light of technological advances250 —we believe that the parties’ choice of law 
decision should be the presumptively deciding factor in the forum non conveniens 
analysis.  In the contract dispute context, this means that the parties’ express choice of 
law as evidenced in the relevant agreement will presumptively determine which of 
multiple forums should handle the case; in the internal corporate affairs context, the 
courts of the state in which the defendant corporation is incorporated will presumptively 
handle the case. 
                                                 
250 The traditionally cited forum non conveniens factors are surely no longer of equal significance, if they 
ever were.  As has been previously pointed out, the importance of factors such as “relative ease of access to 
sources of proof” is substantially diminished today in comparison to the situation in 1947 when the 
Supreme Court announced the basic contours of the doctrine. Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal 
Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 309, 312, 324 (2002) (describing the Gilbert factors as 
“anachronistic,” and urging that “most of the Gilbert factors should be given very different weight today 
than when they were first enunciated in 1947,” and that “[e]ven if the factors are to remain unchanged, their 
application should now be very different because of recent changes in technology . . . .”).  Professor Davies 
concentrates on application of the forum non conveniens doctrine in transnational litigation, because of his 
view that this doctrine “is now used only in international cases, where the alternative forum favored by the 
defendant is in another country.”  Id. at 312.  Nevertheless, many of the points he makes translate well to 
application of the doctrine to litigation in multiple state forums.  By way of most notable example, it seems 
downright naïve to give any significant weight to the physical location of documents, given that the “best 
evidence” rule (requiring presentation of original documents) has been largely eliminated, and documents 
can now be scanned, emailed, and printed (if necessary) to any significant commercial center  in the world 
in a matter of seconds.  Id. at 336-337 (noting the 1974, post-Gilbert revision of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence to eliminate the “best evidence” rule for most purposes); see also F.R.E. § 1003 (“A duplicate is 
admissible to the same extent as the original unless a genuine question is raised about the original's 
authenticity or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.”)  Similarly, consideration of the 
potential need for a “view of the premises” is hardly the factor it once may have been, in light of the 
availability of video recording or direct video feeds.  Id. at 345. 
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Operationalizing our recommended adjustment to the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens is simple, at least in terms of articulating a general test.251  The Restatement, 
after discussing the various private and public interests to be taken into consideration in 
the forum non conveniens analysis, describes the relationship between those factors as 
follows: “These two categories of factors are not mutually exclusive but rather 
supplement each other.  Some differences, however, do exist among the courts of the 
various states as to whether one or the other of these two categories should be given 
primary emphasis.”252  At the end of that two-sentence summary, we propose adding the 
following guidance: “Unless other factors are compelling, however, primary weight in 
contemporaneously filed corporate or commercial contract actions should be given to the 
parties’ choice of law, which not only reflects expressly the litigants’ private interests but 
also invokes the chosen state’s public interest in developing its own jurisprudence.”  In 
any event, we recommend that jurisdictions adopt corresponding language into their 
respective forum non conveniens doctrines. 
This change is consistent with the Restatement’s own public policy in resolving 
choice of law conflicts.  When there is a bona fide question of what law applies to a 
dispute, the Restatement answers that in favor of the state with the most important and 
policy interests at stake.253  Our reasoning is analogous.  When there is a forum dispute in 
a case where the parties’ relations are governed by a particular state’s corporate law, 
                                                 
251 We have no serious expectation, of course, that the American Law Institute will any time soon revise the 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws.  See Thomas & Thompson, supra note 2, at *78 (“[I]t seems unlikely to 
us that the existing law reform organizations would be able to quickly and universally address the multi-
jurisdictional litigation issues discussed in this paper.”).  On the hand, it is hoped that individual courts and 
judges may find our suggestions informative and perhaps even persuasive in evaluating competing 
jurisdictional claims. 
252 Id. 
253 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145, 188 (1971) (using the most 
significant relationship test to determine what law should apply).   
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directing that dispute to be resolved by that state’s courts is in line with directing the case 
to be resolved by the courts with the supreme policy interest. 
3. Reinvigorate the Restatement’s Respect for Internal Affairs Doctrine 
We also suggest a related change to the Restatement’s treatment of jurisdiction 
over cases involving the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.  The Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws states that “[a] court will exercise jurisdiction over an 
action involving the affairs of a foreign corporation unless it is an inappropriate or an 
inconvenient forum for the trial of the action”254 and provides in its comments a number 
of considerations, ranked in order of importance, for determining whether to dismiss a 
suit over the internal affairs of a corporation, including: (1) whether the court has the 
ability to grant effective relief; (2) the nature of the foreign corporation’s relationship to 
the state of the forum, and the issue involved in the suit; and (3) those factors typically 
considered in the forum non conveniens analysis discussed above.255  The Restatement 
places an analysis of the corporation’s contacts with a forum at the heart of the question 
of whether to hear a case involving the internal affairs of a corporation:  
[W]hen the corporation is only technically a foreign corporation, since all, 
or the great majority, of its contacts, other than the place of its 
incorporation, are in the state of the forum, the courts will even entertain 
actions which call for relief affecting the corporation’s organic structure or 
internal administration.  So, when the business of a foreign corporation is 
carried on entirely or principally in the state of the forum and when the 
directors of the corporation or a majority of them reside in the state and 
are accustomed to hold meetings in the state, the court may entertain an 
action which questions the validity of a stock issue or of a dividend or 
which seeks to enjoin a proposed reorganization of the corporation or to 
require the calling of a shareholders' meeting.256 
 
                                                 
254 Id. § 313. 
255 Id. cmt. c.   
256 Id. 
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In other words, the Restatement suggests an analysis akin to the minimum contacts 
analysis undertaken to determine whether personal jurisdiction is appropriate in the first 
place.257  The Restatement takes the minimum contacts paradigm so far, and neglects 
shareholders’ legitimate interest in incorporating in a certain jurisdiction on account of 
the characteristics of its corporate law, that it refers to some corporations as only 
“technically” incorporated in a jurisdiction while they are de facto creatures of another 
jurisdiction.258 
 Rather than repeating an analysis of the minimum contacts factors, we 
recommend changing this language to reflect the fact that the shareholders’ choice to 
incorporate in a particular state is an indication of which forum has the most important 
policy interest.  As previously noted, the Restatement acknowledges that the parties’ 
choice of law is important:  
Indeed, the suit may be dismissed even in a situation where the court, if it 
were to hear the case, would apply the local law of the state of 
incorporation in reaching its decision.  This is because uniformity of result, 
as well as the giving of proper attention to local custom that is not 
reflected in law books, can best be assured by having the action tried in 
the state of incorporation.259  
 
But the Restatement subsumes the interest of the state and the markets in maintaining 
doctrinal uniformity within the broader framework of the minimum contacts analysis.  
We propose elevating that explicit concern for consistency from its current role as an 
ancillary consideration to the leading factor for determining which forum has the 
dominant interest in adjudicating a dispute.   
                                                 
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
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Namely, we recommend changing § 313 by qualifying its basic premise (“A court 
will exercise jurisdiction over an action involving the internal affairs of a foreign 
corporation unless it is an inappropriate or an inconvenient forum for the trial of the 
action.”).  Although we do not quarrel with that principle where there is no prospect of 
parallel contemporaneous litigation in the courts of the state of incorporation, we submit 
that it is important to qualify that principle by elaborating that “A court will ordinarily 
not exercise jurisdiction over an action involving the internal affairs of a foreign 
corporation where there is a contemporaneously filed parallel action in the forum of 
incorporation.”  We would then revise lengthy Comment c in Section 313 to reflect the 
position that (1) the shareholders’ choice to incorporate in a given state is an expression 
of their presumptive preference as to where suits involving the internal affairs of the 
corporation should be heard, and that (2) absent certain circumstances, and in the 
situation where there are contemporaneously filed actions in the state of incorporation as 
well as in one or more other states, the state of incorporation is presumed to have the 
greater policy interest in adjudicating such disputes.260 
Our proposal is consistent with the Restatement’s own de-emphasis of geography 
as to causes of action where geographical residence has less relationship to the parties’ 
legitimate expectations and the parties have chosen the law to govern their 
                                                 
260 We would also suggest parallel changes to § 84 cmt. d, which briefly discusses the internal affairs 
doctrine and refers to § 313.  We would also amend Comment e of § 145 (“Torts—The General Principle”), 
which states that “[a]t least with respect to most issues, a corporation’s principal place of business is a more 
important contact than the place of incorporation, and this is particularly true in situations where the 
corporation does little, or no, business in the latter place.”  We would clarify that these “most issues” cover 
torts, but not the internal governance of a corporation.  Indeed, Comment f of § 145 gives less weight to 
geographic considerations in the case of torts where “the place of injury is less significant,” such as unfair 
competition. 
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relationship.261  As to internal affairs cases involving a corporation with stockholders of 
diverse residence, the only logical geographic consideration, if it be so considered, is the 
state of incorporation because that is the geographic unit on which the relevant 
expectations focus.  In such a case, the location of the corporation’s headquarters, or its 
largest facilities, or employee bodies, has no relationship to the cause of actions or the 
stockholders’ expectations of the persons—the stockholders—whose interests are to be 
determined in the litigation.262  Rather, our proposal comports with the Restatement’s 
own emphasis on ensuring predictability and uniformity of result, which are “of 
particular importance in areas where the parties are likely to give advance thought to the 
legal consequences of their transactions.”263 
 It is important to note that our prescription is not meant to be a wholesale return to 
the application of the internal affairs doctrine as a jurisdictional bar.264  Rather, we are 
proposing a measured shift of the burden in determining which forum has the greater 
interest in deciding a case.  As it currently stands, the forum non conveniens doctrine is 
an open-ended analysis, emptied of most practical content by the fact that it parrots the 
factors examined in the minimum contacts analysis for determining personal jurisdiction 
without any convincing determination of why those factors bear on which forum should 
decide a corporate law case.  Our recommendations reinvigorate the rule by increasing 
the burden on the plaintiffs to show why it is important for a court in the non-
                                                 
261 See, e.g., id. § 6 cmt. c (noting, for example, that the law of the situs should be given most weight in 
land transactions, but that “the policies in favor of protecting the basic expectations of the parties and of 
effectuating the basic policy underlying the particular field of law come to the fore in the rule that, subject 
to certain limitations, the parties can choose the law to govern their contract”);  
262 The Restatement recognizes this logic. See id. § 47 (“Foreign Corporations—Doing Business In State”), 
at (1) (“A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which does business in 
the state with respect to causes of action arising from the business done in the state.”) (emphasis added). 
263 Id. cmt. i.  
264 See supra Subsection II.A.3. 
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incorporating state to hear the suit, while nevertheless maintaining the option for courts to 
decide cases involving the affairs of foreign corporations in exceptional circumstances.    
4.  The Limits of Our Recommended Doctrinal Changes 
 Before concluding, we wish to dispel any overly aggressive reading of our 
recommendations for doctrinal reform.  Most importantly, we do not advocate an 
inflexible insistence that in the case of competing forums, a class or derivative suit 
involving corporate internal affairs must invariably proceed in the courts of the state of 
incorporation.  For example, when the governing legal principles are thoroughly settled 
and the facts do not present novel issues, and the defendants, plaintiffs, and the court in a 
jurisdiction other than the state of incorporation have actively and responsibly advanced 
the proceedings, a belatedly filed complaint in the state of incorporation should not 
compel the court there to go forward with the case simply because the law of its state is at 
issue.265 Thus, productive progress in litigation—as distinguished from mere 
chronological priority of filing—can militate in favor of centering litigation in courts 
other than those of the state of incorporation, and our recommended presumptive 
preference for litigation in those courts can give way to considerations of efficient 
allocation of judicial and litigants’ resources.  Likewise, where claims involving the 
corporation’s internal affairs are factually intertwined with more substantial claims 
governed by the law of a jurisdiction other than that of the state of incorporation, it could 
be more efficient overall to have all claims resolved by one court, even if that court were 
                                                 
265 See, e.g., Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Scrushy, 2004 WL 423122 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 2004) (staying a derivative 
action in favor of derivative litigation filed in Alabama, where the Delaware action—and even the books 
and records litigation that preceded it—was commenced after substantial progress in the Alabama 
proceedings, including orders coordinating plaintiffs’ counsel, and where the existence of personal 
jurisdiction in Delaware over certain officer defendants in the Alabama proceedings was doubtful). 
100 
 
not situated in the state of incorporation.266  This same result may be appropriate where 
the corporate law claims are factually intertwined with pending claims subject to 
exclusive federal jurisdiction, such as claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934.267 
Conclusions 
 The impetus for this article is the recent growth in parallel class and derivative 
litigation challenging corporate action.  The large percentage of such cases that are 
resolved by settlement in which the only monetary compensation flows to plaintiffs’ 
counsel, and neither the corporation nor the class of stockholders receives any such 
consideration, invites closer examination of the situation to determine whether such 
parallel litigation is promoting undue agency costs.  We have suggested a variety of 
specific ways in which such costs come about, all of which are exacerbated by 
uncertainty over the forum in which the litigation will ultimately proceed.   
 We propose that such uncertainty may be mitigated by measured reformulation of 
the judicial doctrines—forum non conveniens and the first-filed rule—that have been 
developed to sort out the choice among competing venues for parallel litigation.  We find 
that such doctrines, as applied to interstate venue conflicts, were developed largely to 
limit reactive litigation by a defendant in a first-filed suit, and are not well tailored to 
address competing class or derivative actions brought by multiple putative shareholder 
                                                 
266 See Brookstone Partners Acquisition XVI, LLC v. Tanus, C.A. No. 7533-VCN (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 2012) 
(dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds in favor of previously filed litigation in Texas, in part 
because the facts giving rise to claims under an LLC agreement of a Delaware LLC also involved claims of 
breach of an employment agreement governed by Texas law); IM2 Merchandising & Mfg. v. Tirex, 2000 
WL 1664168, at *10 (Del. Ch. Nov. 2, 2000) (dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds in part because 
a claim of arising under Delaware law involved “at best a min[u]scule part of this case”). 
267 15 USC § 78aa.  In such situations, the federal court is guided by the prudential considerations 
articulated in Colorado River and described supra note 160. 
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representatives.  In particular, we claim that such doctrines, as applied in the field of 
parallel shareholder representative litigation, do not adequately capture the importance of 
the choice of law—that of the state of incorporation—made by investors in the 
corporation.  In particular, we claim that the relevant doctrines need to give effect to the 
systemic value of consistent development of governing precedent and of consistent 
judicial oversight of the corporate representative litigation system itself. 
 Accordingly, we propose several related doctrinal refinements.   First, in applying 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the parties’ choice of law should be given 
presumptive weight; in other words, shareholder representative litigation should 
presumptively go forward in the jurisdiction that supplies the governing law, unless the 
traditional forum non conveniens considerations of public and private interests 
demonstrate otherwise.  Second, chronological priority of filing of representative 
shareholder lawsuits should be deemed irrelevant, in and of itself, where such suits are 
filed contemporaneously.  In that circumstance, an unelected, representative plaintiff’s 
choice of forum merits no sensible deference.  Finally, we propose that the internal affairs 
doctrine be strengthened in a related way, such that where there are contemporaneously 
filed actions in the state of incorporation as well as in one or more other states, the state 
of incorporation is presumed to have the greater policy interest in adjudicating such 
disputes. 
